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Healthcare-associated infections (HAIs) are infections patients get in healthcare facilities 
while being treated for another disease (1). These infections appear during admission or 
after discharge and are therefore mostly referred to as nosocomial infections or hospital 
infections. Most commonly, they are defined as occurring between 48 hours after admis-
sion and 30 days after discharge (2, 3). However, there are many other definitions, one 
more applicable than the other. It was estimated that in the United States (U.S.) about 
721,800 patients developed HAIs in 2011, and about 75,000 patients (10.4%) with a HAI 
died (4). Additionally, a U.S. survey showed that the percentage of HAIs in 2011 was 4.0% 
(95% confidence interval [CI] =3.7% to 4.4%) (4). Pneumonia (21.8%) and surgical site in-
fections (SSI, 21.8%) were the leading HAIs in the U.S., followed by gastrointestinal tract 
infections (17.1%), urinary tract infections (12.9%) and primary bloodstream infections 
(9.9%) (4). More than half of these HAIs occurred outside the intensive care unit (ICU). The 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reports that efforts to prevent HAIs are 
successful, as for example central line-associated bloodstream infections (CLABSIs) were 
shown to be reduced in the U.S. by 50% between 2008 and 2014 (5). Annual financial 
losses by HAIs have been estimated at $6.5 billion in the U.S., and €7 billion in Europe (2).
In the Netherlands, since 2007, the Dutch National Nosocomial Surveillance Network 
(PREZIES) has monitored HAIs by prevalence surveys based on voluntary participation 
of hospitals. In 2017, 66 out of 78 Dutch hospitals participated (6). The prevalence of 
HAIs in Dutch hospitals in 2017 was 5.0% (95% CI= 4.6% to 5.3%) - 624 HAIs in absolute 
numbers (6, 7). Similar to the U.S. surveys, the most prevalent HAIs in the Netherlands 
were pneumonia and SSI (7).
HAIs may be caused by a variety of microorganisms, including bacteria, viruses, fungi 
and parasites. In this thesis we will focus on bacteria. Globally, the most common mi-
croorganisms causing HAIs are bacteria - with as most frequently isolated Staphylococ-
cus aureus and Escherichia coli (2). However, geographical differences do occur as for 
example in Italy Klebsiella species were most frequently isolated in HAIs, followed by E. 
coli and Pseudomonas aeruginosa (8). In the Netherlands, the picture mimics the global 
situation with E. coli and S. aureus as most common bacteria in HAIs (8).
The microorganisms that cause HAIs may come from endogenous or exogenous 
sources. Endogenous sources are sites in or on the human body that are normally inhab-
ited by microorganisms, such as the skin and the gastrointestinal tract (1). Preventive 
measures that can be installed to prevent HAIs from an endogenous source include 
for example S. aureus decolonization of nasal and extranasal body sites to prevent SSI, 
or selective digestive tract decontamination (SDD) for patients admitted to the ICU to 
prevent pneumonia (9, 10). Additionally, skin antiseptics before surgery and attention 
to personal hygiene of patients are also to prevent endogenous infections (11, 12). 
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Exogenous sources refer to all sources outside the patients’ body, such as the hospital 
environment, healthcare workers and other patients (1). In the innate environment of 
hospitals, including patients’ rooms, microorganisms can survive from a few days up to 
months, depending on the microorganisms involved (13). Therefore, washbasins, tables, 
door handles, etc. can act as a continuous source for transmission of microorganisms, 
which after successful transmission leads to colonization, and can then subsequently 
cause HAIs in patients (14-16). Also, HAIs can be associated with devices used for medi-
cal procedures, such as catheters, ventilators or endoscopes (14-16). Especially when 
devices are used into sterile or organic spaces in the body, exogenous infections can be 
detected. Prevention of HAIs from exogenous sources includes for example thoughtful 
use of medical devices and thorough cleaning and disinfection, the latter if appropriate, 
of the hospital environment (14, 16). A measure that prevents infections from endog-
enous sources as well as from exogenous sources is hand hygiene.
Questions to be addressed in this thesis; chapter 2: Which infection prevention 
measures can be installed and are proven to be effective to prevent HAIs in patients?
HigHly-ResisTAnT miCRooRgAnisms
In recent years there has been a worldwide increase of HAIs caused by highly-resistant 
microorganisms (HRMO) and of patients colonized with HRMO. These HRMO are of great 
concern since there is no parallel progression in the development of novel antibiotics. 
Examples are extended-spectrum beta-lactamase (ESBL)-producing Enterobacteriaceae 
(i.e. Gram-negative bacteria resistant to third-generation cephalosporin antibiotics), 
carbapenemase-producing bacteria such as oxacillinase (OXA)-48 K. pneumoniae, or 
Verona Integron-encoded Metallo-β-lactamase (VIM)-positive P. aeruginosa (i.e. Gram-
negative bacteria resistant to carbapenem antibiotics), and vancomycin-resistant 
enterococci (VRE – Gram-positive bacteria resistant to the antibiotic vancomycin). In 
February 2017, the World Health Organization (WHO) classified carbapenem-resistant 
Enterobacteriaceae, ESBL-producing Enterobacteriaceae, and carbapenem-resistant P. 
aeruginosa and Acinetobacter baumannii as priority 1; critical (17). Enterobacteriaceae 
include K. pneumoniae, E. coli, Enterobacter spp., Serratia spp., Proteus spp., Providencia 
spp., and Morganella spp. (17). Global health experts agreed that these bacteria pose the 
greatest threat to human health and new antibiotics are urgently needed. The burden of 
disease caused by HRMO is high in terms of morbidity and mortality in affected patients, 
and extra costs for healthcare (18). Worldwide, the prevalence of HRMO varies from less 
than one percent to above 50 percent and differs between countries and per HRMO. 
In 2011 and 2012, the European Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (ECDC) 
conducted an EU-wide point prevalence survey to determine antimicrobial resistance 
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of microorganisms reported in HAIs (19). The results showed alarming rates of third-
generation cephalosporin resistance in Enterobacteriaceae and carbapenem resistance 
in A. baumannii and P. aeruginosa (19).
Two large Dutch studies showed that at admission in a hospital, 6.4% to 7.4% of pa-
tients carried an ESBL-producing Enterobacteriaceae, and at discharge 8.7% to 10.1%, 
respectively (20). This means that 2.3% to 2.7% is possibly hospital acquired (20). Pos-
sibly, because bacteria which were undetected at admission can proliferate and become 
predominant due to antibiotic selection pressure (21).
If patients are identified as being either colonized or infected with HRMO in the 
hospital, measures to prevent transmission of these HRMO to other patients should be 
installed. Colonized means presence of a HRMO on a body surface (e.g. skin, mouth, 
intestines or airway) without causing disease. Infection means multiplication of bacteria 
in the human body, causing disease (22). Regarding HRMO, it is not only important 
to prevent infections, but also colonizations and its spread; because colonization can 
lead to an invasive infection. Specific measures can differ per HRMO involved, but 
most often it involves a single-occupancy room and wearing gloves and gowns when 
entering the room. In a large Dutch study, the rate of transmission of ESBL-producing 
Enterobacteriaceae to other patients despite the use of contact-isolation measures was 
5.4%, of which 61% was attributable to ESBL-producing E. coli (23). In this multicenter 
cluster-randomized study, acquisition to roommates and/or to patients admitted to the 
same department was assessed by taking perianal swabs at admission and at discharge 
from all patients hospitalized for more than 2 days (20). Given the above facts, there is an 
ongoing discussion about the indications for isolation and in case of isolation, to what 
extent preventive measures are absolutely necessary (24). Of course, not only costs, but 
also the setting (e.g. case mix), patient outcome and difficulty of treatment needs to be 
taken into consideration.
Questions to be addressed in this thesis; chapter 3: What are the risk factors for 
acquisition of HRMO? How are HRMO transmitted?
ouTbReAks
The CDC definition of an outbreak is: “the occurrence of more cases of disease than 
expected in a given area or among a specific group of people over a particular period 
of time” (www.cdc.gov). Outbreaks can be caused by all microorganisms possible, but 
outbreaks by HRMO are especially of great concern, since they pose the greatest threat 
to human health (18, 25). Outbreaks can be small and contained quickly, however, trans-
mission can also be ongoing with ultimately involvement of hundreds of patients (26, 
27). A hospital outbreak is most often uncovered by (i) analyzing surveillance data by the 
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infection control department, or (ii) by an alert by a concerned clinician to the infection 
control department. Often, after the alert an epidemiological timeline will be created to 
visualize patient movements throughout the hospital, and to unravel epidemiological 
relationships between patients identified with the same microorganism (Figure 1).
When an outbreak is detected, exposed patients need to be screened and the source 
needs to be eliminated in order to halt the outbreak. Also, for a full understanding and 
investigation of the outbreak, data needs to be collected about all patients involved. 
Patient information that needs to be collected includes: (i) full admission history (includ-
ing departments and room numbers) of colonized and infected patients, (ii) information 
about contact-isolation measures installed and at which date(s), (iii) dates of all infection 
prevention measures installed at the department(s) of interest, (iv) all laboratory results 
of the microorganism(s) of interest, including susceptibility pattern, minimal inhibitory 
concentrations (MICs) of the antibiotics tested, resistance genes, and phenotypic and/
or genotypic typing results, and (v) all patient information about known risk factors. 
Known risk factors are for example antibiotic use, ICU admission, mechanical ventilation 
and length of hospital stay.
Questions to be addressed in this thesis, chapter 2 and 3: Which risk factors, envi-
ronmental sources and effective infection prevention strategies have been identified in 
other outbreaks? What is the best way to describe and study outbreaks?
moleCulAR TyPing
Because of the increase in HRMO and the subsequent hospital outbreaks sophisticated 
laboratory typing techniques are needed (28). Molecular typing techniques help to 
identify different bacterial strains and clones and are therefore important in infection 
prevention and control. Currently, a wide range of genotypic and phenotypic typing 
techniques are available, each with advantages and disadvantages (29-31). Important 
aspects of typing techniques to consider are: (i) stability, (ii) typeability, (iii) discrimina-
tory power, (iv) epidemiological concordance, (v) reproducibility, (vi) appropriate and 
Month
Day 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
Patient 1  +R  +B discharged home
Department A-room2 Department B-room4 Department C-room1
Patient 2  +R discharge to other hospital
Department B-room6
Patient 3  +R †
Department C-room1 Department A-room1
Patient 4  +R  +B †
Department B-room1 Department A-room2
Patient 5  +R discharged home
Department B-room6
January February
Figure 1. Epidemiological timeline of 5 individual patients. The different colors are different departments. 
+R; rectal swab positive for the specific microorganism, +B, blood culture positive for the specific microor-
ganism.
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well-defined test population, (vii) flexibility, (viii) rapidity, (ix) accessibility, (x) ease of 
use, (xi) costs, (xii) amenability to computerized analysis, and (xiii) incorporation of typ-
ing results in an electronic databases (32). An overview of the most commonly used 
genotypic typing techniques in hospital settings is presented in Table 1.
The choice of genotyping method depends on the microorganism involved, the 
availability of the method, and knowledge and local or national expertise about the 
method. It is also important to consider whether you want to compare isolates only 
within your hospital setting, or also between hospitals and even between different 
countries, and if you want to compare strains identified over a short or long period of 
time (Table 1). Pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) is still considered as the golden 
standard for many important healthcare-related pathogens (29, 33). However, PFGE is 
technically demanding, time consuming and labor intensive (29). It is difficult to ap-
ply this technique in routine diagnostics as a tool for detection of an outbreak and is 
therefore not widely used. Whole-genome sequencing (WGS) is a technology providing 
full genetic information on the entire bacterial genome (34). However, this technique is 
still costly and time consuming. As alternative, conventional Multilocus sequence typing 
(7 or 8 genes), is extended to whole genome MLST (wgMLST) (35). In this way, 1500-4000 
genes can be considered. In some microbiological laboratories in the world, including 
the Netherlands, wgMLST is already implemented as a routine technique to monitor 
HRMO and to detect outbreaks in an early phase (36).
Questions to be addressed in this thesis; chapter 4: Is routine, rapid typing needed 
in a non-outbreak situation? Can recent transmission events be detected by a combina-
tion of phenotypic and genotypic typing techniques?
Table 1. An overview of most commonly used genotypic typing techniques in hospital laboratories and its 






























Amplified Fragment Length Polymorphism AFLP + ++ -
Multilocus Sequence Typing MLST + + ++
Multilocus Variable-Number Tandem Repeat Analysis MLVA + + ++
Polymerase Chain Reaction – Ribotyping PCR Ribotyping + + +
Single Locus Sequence Typing SLST - + +
Whole Genome Sequencing WGS ++ ++ ++
1-,low; +, medium; ++, high.
2 -, not applicable; +, applicable; ++, highly applicable.
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ouTline oF THis THesis
The literature reviews and observational studies in this thesis are about the role of epi-
demiology in describing, identifying and controlling transmission of healthcare-related 
pathogens. The ultimate goal of conducting these studies is to optimize care and to 
provide safer care for patients admitted to the Erasmus MC. In chapter 2 three literature 
reviews are described about (i) ESBL-producing Klebsiella species, (ii) carbapenem-
producing Enterobacteriaceae and (iii) VIM-positive P. aeruginosa. The most important 
risk factors, effective infection prevention strategies and sources have been identified. 
In chapter 3 the theoretical knowledge from the systematic reviews has been applied in 
different outbreak scenarios in the Erasmus MC. (i) A case-control study on a long-lasting 
outbreak of VIM-positive P. aeruginosa. (ii) A nationwide study about contamination of 
duodenoscopes; following an outbreak report on a duodenoscope as source of VIM-
positive P. aeruginosa published by Verfaillie et al. (37). (iii) An outbreak investigation of 
a Clostridium difficile outbreak at a gastro-intestinal surgical ward. Finally, in chapter 4 
the role of epidemiology when using genotypic and phenotypic typing techniques is 
described, (i) for ESBL-producing Klebsiella species, and (ii) for ESBL-producing E. coli.
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AbsTRACT
Carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae (CRE) are major healthcare-associated patho-
gens and responsible for hospital outbreaks worldwide. To prevent a further increase in 
CRE infections and to improve infection prevention strategies, it is important to sum-
marize the current knowledge about CRE infection prevention in hospital settings. This 
systematic review aimed to identify risk factors for CRE acquisition among hospitalized 
patients. In addition, we summarized the environmental sources/reservoirs and the 
most successful infection prevention strategies related to CRE. A total of 3,983 poten-
tially relevant articles were identified and screened. Finally, we included 162 studies in 
the systematic review, of which 69 studies regarding risk factors for CRE acquisition were 
included in the random-effects meta-analysis studies. The meta-analyses regarding 
risk factors for CRE acquisition showed that the use of medical devices generated the 
highest pooled estimate (odds ratio [OR] = 5.09; 95% confidence interval [CI] = 3.38 to 
7.67), followed by carbapenem use (OR = 4.71; 95% CI = 3.54 to 6.26). To control hospital 
outbreaks, bundled interventions, including the use of barrier/contact precautions 
for patients colonized or infected with CRE, are needed. In addition, it is necessary to 
optimize the therapeutic approach, which is an important message to infectious disease 
specialists, who need to be actively involved in a timely manner in the treatment of 
patients with known CRE infections or suspected carriers of CRE.
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inTRoduCTion
Over the last two decades, a global dissemination of carbapenem-resistant Enterobac-
teriaceae (CRE) has been observed (1, 2). Currently, CRE are responsible for hospital 
outbreaks worldwide. Infections with these resistant bacteria are associated with high 
rates of morbidity and mortality, especially in patients with serious underlying disorders 
or patients admitted to the intensive care unit (ICU) (3).
Carbapenem resistance in Enterobacteriaceae is mainly mediated by the horizontal 
transfer of genes encoding carbapenem-hydrolyzing carbapenemase enzymes, al-
though porin mutations or the overexpression of efflux pumps can also lead to carbap-
enem resistance, especially in combination with the hyperproduction of β-lactamase 
enzymes (4, 5). The production of carbapenemase enzymes is plasmid mediated and 
can be found in multiple different species of Enterobacteriaceae, such as Klebsiella 
pneumoniae and Escherichia coli (1, 5-7). These conjugative plasmids often carry ad-
ditional genes conferring resistance to other antibiotics, such as fluoroquinolones and 
aminoglycosides, limiting the treatment options even more (3, 8).
To prevent a further increase in CRE infections in patients by improving infection 
prevention strategies, it is important to summarize the current knowledge about CRE 
in hospital settings. This systematic review and meta-analyses aimed to evaluate the 
clinical epidemiology of CRE by answering the following questions. First, what are risk 
factors associated with CRE acquisition among hospitalized patients? Second, which 
environmental sources/reservoirs were identified in CRE outbreaks? Third, what were 
the essential components of effective infection control in preventing or ending hospital 
outbreaks?
meTHods
This systematic review and meta-analyses followed the guidelines presented in the 
PRISMA statement (supplement 1) (9). Protocol details were submitted to the PROS-
PERO International Prospective Register of Systematic Reviews (registration number: 
CRD42017055455).
study selection
Articles related to our research questions were identified through a search of the litera-
ture in multiple databases (until 11 January 2017): Embase, Medline Ovid, Cochrane, Web 
of Science, and Google Scholar (supplement 2). The search was not limited by language, 
date of publication, country of publication, carbapenem resistance mechanism, study 
design, or patient characteristics.
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We used the following inclusion criteria during the study selection: (i) studies report-
ing risk factors for the acquisition of CRE, (ii) studies mentioning environmental sources/
reservoirs for CRE, and (iii) studies describing effective infection prevention strategies 
to halt nosocomial outbreaks. Risk factors for acquisition could include risk factors 
for infection as well as risk factors for colonization with CRE. Enterobacteriaceae were 
considered resistant to carbapenem antibiotics when this was shown using phenotypic 
tests and/or when carbapenemase genes could be identified.
We excluded studies related to nonhuman infections, nonhospital studies, conference 
abstracts, letters to the editor, commentaries, weekly reports, and editorials. Studies 
were also excluded if patients with CRE infections were compared to patients who were 
colonized with CRE. First, the titles and abstracts of all retrieved citations were screened 
independently by K.V.L. and A.F.V. After this screening, K.V.L. and A.F.V. performed a 
second screening based on the full text.
data extraction
We designed a data abstraction form, pilot-tested it on three randomly selected articles, 
and redefined it according to the outcomes. The following data were extracted: first 
author, journal, year published, country, study design, study setting, patient character-
istics, the carbapenem-resistant microorganism(s) studied, risk factors for acquisition/
mortality, site of colonization/infection, protective factors for acquisition/mortality, 
potential reservoirs for CRE, and effective infection prevention strategies for CRE. The 
extracted data were sent to the corresponding author of the original article to verify the 
extracted data and to gain additional information if relevant. When we did not receive 
any response after the given deadline (i.e. 2 weeks), a reminder was sent. If no response 
was received and crucial information was missing, the study was excluded.
data analysis
Risk factors for CRE acquisition
All risk factors associated with the acquisition of CRE for which an odds ratio (OR) with 
95% confidence interval (95% CI) was reported were divided into two groups: those 
related to antibiotic exposure and other. Risk factors that were reported as a hazard ratio 
or relative risk were not included in a random-effects meta-analysis and were therefore 
only summarized.
The first category, related to antibiotic exposure, was further divided into the follow-
ing nine categories: (i) carbapenem use, (ii) cephalosporin use, (iii) quinolone use, (iv) 
use of other β-lactam antibiotics or β -lactam use in general, (v) glycopeptide use, (vi) 
antibiotic exposure (in general), (vii) number of antibiotics administered, (viii) duration 
of exposure, and (ix) other. The second category, other, was also divided into nine cat-
egories, as follows: (i) underlying disease or condition, (ii) invasive procedures, (iii) medi-
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cal devices, (iv) ICU admission, (v) exposure to hospital care, (vi) demographic patient 
characteristics, (vii) mechanical ventilation, (viii) CRE exposure, and (ix) other.
Studies reporting protective factors for the acquisition of CRE were summarized and 
included in a meta-analysis if they could be categorized into one of the previously 
described categories.
Meta-analysis
The meta-analyses were performed using StatsDirect statistical software (Altrincham, 
United Kingdom) including the random-effects model of DerSimonian and Laird (10). A 
P value of <0.05 was considered statistically significant. A meta-analysis was performed 
only if ≥3 studies reported the same risk factor and if the risk factors within the category 
were not too diverse. Publication bias was examined visually with the use of funnel plots 
and assessed with the indicators of Egger et al. and Begg-Mazumdar (11, 12). When both 
indications showed a significant result, it was assumed that publication bias was present.
Eight additional meta-analyses were performed for each risk factor category: 1a, 
studies including only K. pneumoniae isolates; 1b, other studies; 2a, studies with an ICU 
setting; 2b, studies with a different study setting; 3a, studies describing only carbapen-
emase production as the carbapenem resistance mechanism; 3b, studies describing an-
other resistance mechanism or did not investigate the resistance mechanism involved; 
4a, studies with a moderate/high study quality; 4b, studies with a low study quality.
Infection prevention strategies and environmental sources/reservoirs
All effective infection prevention strategies mentioned in the included articles were cat-
egorized, and a top 10 was created on the basis of the number of studies that reported 
these infection prevention strategies. In addition, studies describing sources and/or 
reservoirs for CRE in a hospital setting were reviewed and summarized.
study quality
A quality assessment was performed for all studies included in a meta-analysis using 
the strengthening the reporting of observational studies in epidemiology (STROBE) 
guideline (supplement 3) (13). Studies with a score of ≤15 points were considered to be 
of relatively low methodological quality, studies receiving a quality score of 16, 17, or 18 
points were rated to be of moderate quality, and studies with a score of ≥19 points were 




During our literature search we identified 3,983 potentially relevant articles (Figure 1). 
All titles and abstracts of the retrieved articles were screened against our inclusion and 
exclusion criteria, resulting in the exclusion of 3,720 publications. The remaining 263 
articles underwent a second screening based on the full text. Seven full-text articles 
were received by e-mail after we contacted the corresponding authors. Finally, 162 
articles were included in the systematic review (Figure 1). For these studies, the data 
were extracted and the corresponding author was contacted with a request to check 
our completed data extraction form. Finally, the corresponding authors of 100 out of 
162 articles (61.7%) responded to our request and provided feedback and additional 
information if necessary.
Articles screened based on title and abstract
Included (n = 263)
Excluded (n = 3720) 
E.g. not related to the subject, non-hospital studies, not about 
Enterobacteriaceae, only about Carbapenem-susceptible 
Enterobacteriaceae, reviews, letters to the editor, weekly reports, 
commentaries, conference abstracts and duplicates
Full copies retrieved and assessed for eligibility: 
studies meeting inclusion criteria
Excluded (n = 56) 
Only univariate/bivariate analysis (n = 23)
CRE mixed with non-CRE (n = 12)
Did not include risk factors, environmental sources or infection 
prevention strategies (n = 9)
No risk factors for CRE acquisition (e.g. only risk factors for 
infection (n = 5) 
Other (n = 4) 
No statistical analysis (n = 2)
Duplicate (n = 1) 
Included (n = 207) 
Number of studies included in the review (n = 162)
Literature search (until January 11, 2017) 
Databases:   EMBASE, Medline Ovid, Cochrane,         
Web of Science, Google Scholar
(n = 3983)






Top 10 effective 
infection prevention 




Risk factor category too diverse (n = 4)
Reporting relative risk (n = 1)
Excluded (n = 45) 
Only risk factors for mortality (n = 19)
No risk factors for CRE acquisition (e.g. only risk factors for 
infection (n = 13)) 
Insufficient data (n = 8)
No carbapenem resistance (n = 3)
No significant results (n = 2)




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































All included studies were published between 2005 and 2017. Two articles were written 
in Spanish, one article was written in Chinese, one article was written in Greek, and one 
article was written in Slovak. All other articles were written in English (n=157, 96.9%). 
Most studies were conducted in Europe (n=62; 38.3%), mainly in Greece (n=14) and Italy 
(n=11). A total of 52 studies (32.1%) were conducted in Asia, mainly in Israel (n=18) and 
China (n=16). The remaining 48 studies were conducted in North America (n=31), South 
America (n=12), Australia (n=3), and Africa (n=2). Thirty-seven (22.8%) out of the 162 
studies used a study design involving only the ICU. The majority of studies focused on 
a single species of the Enterobacteriaceae family; a Klebsiella spp. (n=103; 63.6%), an 
Enterobacter spp. (n=5), E. coli (n=4), Citrobacter freundii (n=3), and Providencia stuartii 
(n=2). The remaining 45 studies (27.8%) involved multiple Enterobacteriaceae species.
Carbapenemase production was described by 124 studies (76.5%), and these mainly 
involved KPC (n=91), NDM (n=24), and OXA (n=22) carbapenemases. Nine studies (5.6%) 
mentioned the production of β-lactamase enzymes in combination with porin muta-
tions. In addition, one study detected only porin mutations and two studies detected 
only β-lactamase production in their carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae isolates. 
Thirty-two studies (19.8%) did not mention or investigate the carbapenem resistance 
mechanism involved.
Factors associated with CRe acquisition
We identified 74 studies describing factors associated with CRE acquisition with a sta-
tistically significant odds ratio (OR) or hazard ratio (HR) obtained from a multivariable 
analysis. All reported protective factors for CRE acquisition are summarized in Table 1. 
All reported risk factors were divided into two groups: related to antibiotic exposure and 
other. In addition, five studies reported risk factors associated with mortality among CRE 
carriers, including nine risk factors and four protective factors (14-18). The highest odds 
ratio was reported for the risk factor ICU stay (OR = 11.10, 95% CI = 1.85 to 66.95) (17).
Risk factors related to antibiotic exposure
All factors related to antibiotic exposure were further divided into nine smaller catego-
ries (Table 2). Carbapenem exposure (n=26) and cephalosporin exposure (n=15) were 
the most frequently mentioned risk factors associated with CRE acquisition.
For five out of the nine categories a random-effects meta-analysis was performed (Table 
3 and Figure 2). For the risk factor carbapenem exposure, one study was excluded be-
cause it reported a hazard ratio instead of an odds ratio. The five meta-analyses included 
43 studies, reporting 63 risk factors (OR>1) and 2 protective factors (OR<1). Carbapenem 
use (OR = 4.71, 95% CI = 3.54 to 6.26) and cephalosporin use (OR = 4.49, 95% CI = 2.42 
to 8.33) generated to highest pooled ORs. Both publication bias indicators showed a sig-
nificant result for risk factors carbapenem use, cephalosporin use, and glycopeptide use.
Carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae 29
In total, 26 additional meta-analyses were performed to access the effect of the 
Enterobacteriaceae species studied, ICU study setting, the carbapenem resistance 
mechanism involved, and the study quality on the overall risk estimates (supplement 
4). In the additional meta-analyses, all risk factors remained significantly associated with 
CRE acquisition (pooled OR > 1).
other risk factors for CRe acquisition
Other risk factors associated with the acquisition of carbapenem-resistant Enterobacte-
riaceae were divided into nine categories and are summarized in Table 4. The risk factor 
underlying disease or condition (n=32 times identified) was the most frequently found. 
For eight out of nine categories, a meta-analysis including 59 studies was performed 
(Table 3 and Figure 3). In the categories underlying disease or condition and CRE expo-
sure, one study was excluded because it reported a hazard ratio instead of an odds ratio. 
In the categories exposure to hospital care and mechanical ventilation, one study was 
excluded because it reported relative risk instead of an odds ratio.
From the eight different random-effects meta-analyses, the highest pooled OR was 
found for medical devices (OR = 5.09, 95% CI = 3.38 to 7.67), followed by invasive pro-
cedures (OR = 4.67, 95% CI = 3.59 to 6.07) and ICU admission (OR = 4.62, 95% CI = 2.46 
Table 2. Antibiotic exposure as a risk factor for the acquisition of CRE, based on multivariable analysisc
Associated risk 
factor
Frequency Re Re range no. of cases 
(range)
studies
Carbapenem use 25 OR 1.83-29.17 9-100 (28);(29);(30);(31);(32);(33);(20);(34);(35);(36);(
37);(23);(38);(39);(40)d;(41);(42);(17);(43);(44);(
27);(18);(45);(46)
1 HR 2.68 19 (27)
Cephalosporin use 15 OR 2.24-49.56 15-100 (47);(30);(21);(48);(16);(23);(49);(38);(50);(40)
d;(17);(51);(18);(44)
Quinolone use 9 OR 1.18-28.9 18-88 (28);(52);(53);(21);(35);(44);(54);(55);(56)
Antibiotic exposure 
(in general)a,b
9 OR 1.66-13.37 26-464 (57);(58);(33);(59);(35);(60);(61);(62);(54)
Other β-lactam use 9 OR 1.08-11.71 34-464 (58);(63);(64);(53);(65);(66);(50);(41);(44)
Othera 7 OR 1.02-33 25-103 (67);(36);(65);(68);(39);(51);(44)
Glycopeptide use 5 OR 2.94-43.84 20-203 (16);(66);(39);(69);(46)
No. of antibiotics 
administereda,b
3 OR 1.6-12.60 59-164 (31);(70);(42)
Duration of 
exposurea,b
3 OR 1.04-9.8 25-104 (67);(71);(72)
aThis category was not included in a random-effects meta-analysis. bExposure to any antibiotic.
cAbbreviations: CRE; carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae; RE, risk estimate; OR, odds ratio; HR, hazard 
ratio.
dThis risk factor was identified two times in the study of Orsi et al. (40)
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to 8.69. Both publication bias indicators showed a significant result for all risk factors, 
except underlying disease or condition and CRE exposure.
The effects of the different variables (e.g., the CRE species studied, ICU study setting 
and the mechanisms of carbapenem resistance) were reviewed by performing 47 
additional meta-analyses. Surprisingly, all risk factors showed a decreased (or equal) 
pooled OR when only studies in which carbapenemase production was shown were 
included, with the OR difference ranging from 0 to -1.29 (supplement 5, figure C). The 
meta-analyses of the remaining studies that described another resistance mechanism 
(e.g., porin mutations) or that did not investigate the resistance mechanism involved 
showed a large increase in the reported pooled ORs for all tested risk factors with the 
mean change being +2.89.
effective infection prevention strategies
We identified 95 studies describing effective infection prevention strategies used to 
control the spread of carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae in a hospital setting. 
These were converted to the top 10 most successful intervention strategies (Table 5). 
The use of barrier and/or contact precautions was found to be the most successful in-
Table 3. Random-effects meta-analyses of antibiotic exposure and other risk factors and/or protective fac-
tors for acquisition of CREa
Associated risk factor




P value for risk of publication 





Carbapenem use 25 4.71 (3.54-6.26) <0.05 <0.05
Cephalosporin use 16 4.49 (2.42-8.33) <0.05 <0.05
Quinolone use 10 2.46 (1.44-4.23) <0.05 0.29
Other β-lactam use 9 2.00 (1.49-2.70) <0.05 0.26
Glycopeptide use 5 4.18 (2.30-7.60) <0.05 <0.05
other risk factors
Underlying disease or condition 31 2.54 (2.08-3.09) <0.05 0.12
Invasive procedures 20 4.67 (3.59-6.07) <0.05 <0.05
Medical devices 17 5.09 (3.38-7.67) <0.05 <0.05
ICU admission 15 4.62 (2.46-8.69) <0.05 <0.05
Demographic patient characteristics 13 1.08 (1.03-1.14) <0.05 <0.05
Exposure to hospital care 12 1.05 (1.02-1.08) <0.05 <0.05
Mechanical ventilation 11 1.96 (1.42-2.69) <0.05 <0.05
CRE exposure 5 4.10 (1.46-11.52) <0.05 0.23
aAbbreviations: CRE, carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae; OR, odds radio; CI, confidence interval; ICU, 
intensive care unit.
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Figure 2. (continued on next page)
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tervention strategy (n=71), followed by patient cohorting (n=68) and active surveillance 
(n=56). Control of antibiotic use was mentioned in only 17 studies and could be found 
in ninth place. Besides these 10 strategies, some other interventions were described in 
the literature, such as restricted/no admission to the affected wards (n=9) and the use of 
chlorhexidine for patient disinfection (n=9).
environmental sources and reservoirs
Twenty-seven studies provided information about the environmental sources and 
reservoirs identified within their hospitals. All hospital locations in which carbapenem-
resistant Enterobacteriaceae were identified are summarized in Table 6. Contaminated 
sinks were the most frequently described (n=10), followed by patient beds (n=6) and 
mechanical ventilation equipment (n=5).
disCussion
summary of evidence
In this systematic review, we identified 13 risk factors associated with the presence of 
carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae. These risk factors were, in order of those with 
Figure 2. Forest plots of random-effects meta-analyses of antibiotic exposure as a risk factor and/or protec-
tive factor for the acquisition of carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae.
(A) Carbapenem use; (B) cephalosporin use; (C) quinolone use; (D) β-lactam use; (E) glycopeptide use. *non-
significant confidence interval (Orsi et al. were contacted multiple times to receive the correct numbers; 
unfortunately, the authors did not respond).
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the highest to those with the lowest pooled OR, (i) medical devices, (ii) carbapenem use, 
(iii) invasive procedures, (iv) ICU admission, (v) cephalosporin use, (vi) glycopeptide use, 
(vii) CRE exposure, (viii) underlying disease or condition, (ix) quinolone use, (x) β-lactam 
use, (xi) mechanical ventilation, (xii) demographic patient characteristics, and (xiii) expo-
sure to hospital care (Table 3). Medical devices, antibiotic use, ICU admission, exposure to 
hospital care, and underlying diseases were also identified to be risk factors in systematic 
reviews regarding the acquisition of extended-spectrum β-lactamase (ESBL)-producing 
Klebsiella spp. (176,) and carbapenem-resistant Pseudomonas aeruginosa (177).








study reference(s) (no. of different 
risk factors per reference
Underlying disease 
or condition
31 OR 1.07-98.58 17-133 (73)(2x);(29)(2x);(63);(64);(21);(37);(74);(49
);(60);(61)(2x);(75)(6x);(40);(41);(42)(2x);(76)
(3x);(44)(2x);(54);(72);(27)
1 HR 5.74 19 (27)
Other a 19 OR 1.35-45.904 20-464 (57);(77);(58)(2x);(30);(32);(78)
(2x);(79);(49);(60)
(2x);(39);(75);(42);(80);(27)(2x);(69)
1 RR 5.94 149 (81)
1 HR 19.0 26 (78)
Invasive procedures 20 OR 2.18-35.98 15-99 (82);(83);(14);(84);(20);(78);(48);(
36);(85);(74);(60);(50)(2x);(39);(40)
(2x);(17);(76);(27);(69)
Medical devicesb 17 OR 1.67-677.82 15-203 (73);(77);(47);(30);(82)
(2x);(14);(84);(86);(16);(37)
(2x);(66);(87);(70);(51);(55)













1 RR 1.36 149 (81)
Mechanical 
ventilation
10 OR 1.2-17.80 18-164 (63);(82);(64);(39);(70);(17);(51);(26);(
72);(56)
1 RR 1.99 149 (81)
CRE exposure 5 OR 1.15-11.9 53-165 (70)(2x);(26);(72);(27)
1 HR 5.03 19 (27)
aThis category was not included in a random-effects meta-analysis. bMechanical ventilation is excluded 
from this category.
cAbbreviations: CRE, carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae; RE, risk estimate; OR, odds ratio; HR, hazard 
ratio; RR, relative risk; ICU, intensive care unit.
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Plasmids responsible for carbapenem resistance often carry additional genes confer-
ring resistance to other antibiotics, such as fluoroquinolones and aminoglycosides. This 
can explain why the use of these antibiotic classes is found to be a risk factor for CRE 
acquisition. However, this explanation cannot be used for glycopeptide antibiotics. Wu 
et al. (46) and Jiao et al. (16) supposed that vancomycin treatment disrupts the intestinal 
Figure 3. (conitnued on next page)
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microflora, promoting the colonization of Enterobacteriaceae. Glycopeptide use was 
also identified to be a risk factor for carbapenem-resistant P. aeruginosa (177, 178) and 
ESBL-producing bacteria (179) acquisition.
On the contrary, 4 out of 13 significant risk factors were also described to be protective 
against CRE acquisition by other authors: quinolone use (23), mechanical ventilation (25), 
Figure 3. (conitnued on next page)
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cephalosporin use (26), and ICU admission (27). Kwak et al. speculated that fluoroquino-
lone use was found to be a protective factor because this antibiotic was often given 
as a substitute for carbapenem or cephalosporin antibiotics (23). Torres-Gonzalez et al. 
reported that ICU admission was protective against CRE acquisition. This observation 
could be explained by the fact that their CRE outbreak was initially detected in the ICU 
and a successful bundle of infection prevention measures was initiated in that area (27).
We also performed additional meta-analyses to estimate the influence of the fol-
lowing variables on the overall risk estimate: the Enterobacteriaceae species studied, 
the ICU study setting, the carbapenem resistance mechanism involved, and the study 
quality. The carbapenem resistance mechanism was found to have the highest influ-
ence on the risk estimates, especially in the meta-analyses of non-antibiotic-related risk 
factors for CRE acquisition (supplement 4, figure C). We observed that our risk factors 
Figure 3. Forest plots of random-effects meta-analyses of other risk factors and/or protective factors for the 
acquisition of carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae. (A) Underlying disease or condition; (B) invasive 
procedures; (C) medical devices; (D) ICU admission; (E) demographic patient characteristics; (F) exposure to 
hospital care; (G) mechanical ventilation; (H) CRE exposure.
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showed a lower risk estimate only when studies in which carbapenemase-producing 
Enterobacteriaceae were described were included.
The most successful interventions to stop the spread of CRE were barrier/contact 
precautions, patient cohorting, and active surveillance. Our findings correspond to the 





































6. Staff educational programs 34 (93);(150);(164);(99);(63);(100);(64);(154);(102);(103);(104);(84);(1
09);(22);(110);(157);(112);(114);(116);(119);(160);(123);(124);(126
);(161);(127);(162);(136);(137);(138);(139);(141);(144);(45)
7. Staff cohorting 32 (90);(91);(150);(98);(63);(100);(152);(101);(64);(155);(103);(104);(1
06);(84);(148);(107);(78);(113);(158);(87);(121);(160);(75);(126);(1
61);(131);(133);(134);(135);(136);(138);(142)




9. Control of antibiotic use 17 (165);(96);(99);(103);(106);(84);(109);(78);(113);(114);(168);(121);(
122);(137);(138);(139);(45)




guidelines presented by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), which 
mainly highlight active surveillance and contact precautions (180, 181). Surprisingly, an-
timicrobial stewardship was mentioned in only 17 out of 95 studies, although multiple 
antimicrobial classes were identified to be risk factors for CRE acquisition.
Only 27 out of 95 studies reported environmental sources or reservoirs for CRE 
within their hospitals (Table 6). This indicates that for many outbreaks the source or 
reservoir was not determined. Contaminated sinks were the most frequently described, 
and correspond to the reservoirs identified for other nosocomial pathogens, such as 
carbapenem-resistant P. aeruginosa (177) and ESBL producing Klebsiella spp. (176).
Table 6. Identified environmental sources and reservoirs for CREb
environmental source or reservoir studies
Sinks (169);(159)a;(170)a;(118)a;(130);(167)a;(135)a;(133);(171);(150)a
Patient bed (e.g., bedrail, mattress) (126)a;(161)a;(171);(160)a;(150)a;(96)
Mechanical ventilation equipment (165)a;(161)a;(172)a;(135)a;(160)a


















Intravenous infusion counter apparatus (96)
Enteral feeding formula (96)





A strength of our study was the inclusion of both Enterobacteriaceae that showed in vitro 
resistance to any carbapenem antibiotic and Enterobacteriaceae that were found to pro-
duce carbapenemase enzymes. This is important because carbapenemase-production 
does not always confer high-level carbapenem resistance and therefore leads to false-
negative results when only phenotypic tests are used to identify carbapenem-resistant 
Enterobacteriaceae (182). This review included only two studies in which carbapenemase 
producing but carbapenem-sensitive and -resistant isolates were studied. However, the 
mechanism of resistance does influence transmission, and thus, epidemiology, as we 
showed different risk estimates, especially for the non-antibiotic-related risk factors, 
when each mechanism was analyzed. With the knowledge that we have up to now, we 
cannot explain this difference. As we included all kinds of mechanisms, this can also be 
seen as a limitation of the study.
The study also has some limitations; the first is the large heterogeneity of all studies 
included. Studies with different target populations for example neonates, adults, or 
transplant patients, were selected. In addition, different microbiological methods were 
used to identify the CRE isolates, different Enterobacteriaceae species were included, 
and different prevention strategies were installed. To limit the influence of the study het-
erogeneity, the random-effects model of DerSimonian and Laird (10) was implemented 
in the meta-analyses, and different subgroup analyses were performed.
Second, we included both studies reporting CRE colonization and studies reporting 
CRE infections in hospitalized patients. However, not all studies describing risk factors 
for CRE infection checked whether the patients were previously colonized with CRE or 
not. Likewise, they did not check whether patients from the control group were colo-
nized with CRE before or during the infection. For these studies, we cannot rule out the 
possibility that their reported risk factors are not specific for CRE acquisition but are 
specific for progression to infection after CRE colonization.
Third, both publication bias indicators showed a significant result for several risk fac-
tors (9/13), indicating that publication bias was present. To limit publication bias, the 
studies that we included were not limited by language, date of publication, country of 
publication, carbapenem resistance mechanism, study design, or patient characteristics.
Conclusions and implications
This systematic review shows that not only antibiotic use but also many other risk fac-
tors are associated with CRE acquisition. The most significant risk estimate found in our 
meta-analyses was found for the risk factor medical devices, followed by carbapenem 
use. We identified risk factors related to the emergence/selection of CRE, but also risk 
factors related to the transmission of the CRE isolates. To prevent or to control hospital 
outbreaks, bundled interventions are needed. These interventions need to focus on 
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both antibiotic stewardship and reduction of the use of indwelling devices to reduce the 
spread of CRE within the hospital. Indwelling medical devices do present a very high risk 
for the acquisition of CRE but are also a risk for the acquisition of infections in general. 
Therefore, a very useful prevention measure is the active decrease in the rate of use 
(deimplementation) of medical devices.
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AbsTRACT
A systematic review and meta-analyses were performed to identify the risk factors asso-
ciated with carbapenem-resistant Pseudomonas aeruginosa and to identify sources and 
reservoirs for the pathogen. A systematic search of PubMed and Embase databases from 
1 January 1987 until 27 January 2012 identified 1,662 articles, 53 of which were included 
in a systematic review and 38 in a random-effects meta-analysis study. The use of car-
bapenem, use of fluoroquinolones, use of vancomycin, use of other antibiotics, having 
medical devices, intensive care unit (ICU) admission, having underlying diseases, patient 
characteristics, and length of hospital stay were significant risk factors in multivariate 
analyses. The meta-analyses showed that carbapenem use (odds ratio [OR] = 7.09; 95% 
confidence interval [CI] = 5.43 to 9.25) and medical devices (OR = 5.11; 95% CI = 3.55 to 
7.37) generated the highest pooled estimates. Cumulative meta-analyses showed that 
the pooled estimate of carbapenem use was stable and that the pooled estimate of the 
risk factor “having medical devices” increased with time. We conclude that our results 
highlight the importance of antibiotic stewardship and the thoughtful use of medical 
devices in helping prevent outbreaks of carbapenem-resistant P. aeruginosa.
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inTRoduCTion
Pseudomonas aeruginosa is one of the most common nosocomial pathogens (1). P. 
aeruginosa can cause infections in patients with serious underlying disorders, such 
as a suppressed immune system or cystic fibrosis (CF), or in patients in intensive care 
units (ICU)(2, 3). Further, infections with P. aeruginosa in such patients lead to increased 
morbidity and mortality (2-4).
P. aeruginosa is intrinsically resistant to various antibiotics and is capable of acquiring 
additional resistance by either chromosomal mutations or horizontal gene transfer (5). 
The most important mechanisms are loss or alteration of outer membrane porins and 
increased efflux pump activity (6-8). The emergence of multidrug-resistant (MDR) P. ae-
ruginosa is a problem of global concern, and there are currently reports of hospital out-
breaks of MDR P. aeruginosa from countries around the world, including The Netherlands 
(9-13). These outbreaks are frequently caused by Pseudomonas aeruginosa clones with 
metallo-β-lactamases, such as Verona integron-encoded metallo-β-lactamase (VIM) and 
imipenemase (IMP). Importantly, outbreaks may be large and sustained, despite the 
adoption of infection control measures (12, 14).
In 2006, a summary on this subject was published by Falagas and Kopterides, who 
published a systematic review of the problem (15). However, there have been many more 
published reports regarding nosocomial (MDR) P. aeruginosa since 2006. Therefore, in the 
current publication, a more extensive and up-to-date systematic review was performed, 
focusing on carbapenem resistance, non-CF patients and including conventional and 
cumulative meta-analyses. The aim of the analysis was to answer the following two 
questions. First, what are the risk factors for the presence of carbapenem-resistant P. 
aeruginosa among hospitalized patients? Second, what environmental sources and/or 
reservoirs were identified in these outbreaks? This knowledge will be useful for world-
wide health care centers that are facing the threat of MDR P. aeruginosa, and will help in 
designing strategies to stop the emergence of spread of these MDR pathogens.
meTHods
The systematic review and meta-analyses presented in this publication include all of the 
items in the checklist detailed in the PRISMA guideline (16).
study and data collection
Eligible articles were identified by searching PubMed (Medline) and Embase databases. 
Additional articles were identified by hand searching the reference lists of included 
reviews. Searches were performed for the period from 1 January 1987 until 27 January 
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2012. Search terms included “Pseudomonas” as a title word, in combination with the key-
words “‘resistant,” “multidrug resistance,” “VIM,” “IMP,” “metallo-beta-lactamase” or “MBL” 
and “risk factors,” “determinants,” “outbreak,” “transmission,” “nosocomial,” “health care 
related,” “health care associated,” “epidemiology,” or “source,” including all possible ways 
of writing. The authors included peer-reviewed articles relating to carbapenem-resistant 
P. aeruginosa, that also described the risk factors associated with the presence of car-
bapenem-resistant P. aeruginosa using a multivariate model and in which a nosocomial 
infection was described. We excluded studies relating to non-human infections, studies 
that only included patients with CF, reviews, commentaries, editorials, letters, and ab-
stracts. We also excluded studies published before 1987, the year of the U.S. approval of 
imipenem (17). Environmental sources and reservoirs were searched for in both included 
and excluded studies. A study was excluded from the meta-analyses (i) if it reported only 
hazard ratios, (ii) if it reported only prevalence ratios or risk ratios, (iii) when confidence 
intervals were missing, and (iv) if it included only patients with P. aeruginosa bacteremia.
We extracted detailed information from the included studies. We based the classifica-
tion of studies regarding the different study designs on the description of the methods 
in a particular study, not on the study design claimed to be used by the authors (e.g., 
a reported retrospective cohort study can methodologically be a case-control study). 
We contacted the corresponding and/or first authors of 47 articles by e-mail in order to 
retrieve the full-text articles or to retrieve missing information.
study quality
To assess the quality, risk of bias, and generalizability of the included studies a quality 
assessment was performed using the STROBE guidelines for included cross-sectional 
studies, as well as the Newcastle-Ottawa quality assessment scale for included case-
control and cohort studies (18, 19). The quality of the studies was not considered an 
exclusion criterion.
statistical analysis
We merged all reported risk factors with a reported odds ratio (OR) and 95% confidence 
interval (95% CI) into 10 different groups: group 1, carbapenem use; group 2, quinolone 
use; group 3, vancomycin use; group 4, other antibiotic use; group 5, medical devices; 
group 6, ICU admission; group 7, underlying diseases; group 8, patient characteristics; 
group 9, length of hospital stay; and group 10, other. We selected the 10 groups using 
the results of the systematic review. For each of the first nine groups, a meta-analysis was 
performed. That was not possible for the group 10 (other), as the risk factors were too 
diverse. An additional meta-analysis was performed for the risk factors quinolone use, 
vancomycin use, and other antibiotic use together. All meta-analyses were performed 
using StatsDirect Statistical Software (Altrinchem, United Kingdom). The risk factors 
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reported by the studies included in the analyses were diverse; therefore, a random ef-
fects model was fitted to the data based on the method of DerSimonian and Laird (20). 
A P value of <0.05 was considered statistically significant, and no correction was made 
for multiple testing. The risk of publication bias across the studies was assessed by the 
Egger and Begg-Mazumdar (Kendall’s tau) indicators. Both bias indicators had to show 
a significant result before it was concluded that publication bias was present. Addition-
ally, two cumulative meta-analyses were performed for the groups 1 (carbapenem use) 
and 2 (medical devices), as these two groups showed highly significant results using 
conventional meta-analyses. A random effects model, based on the method of DerSimo-
nian and Laird, was also fitted to these cumulative meta-analysis (20).
ResulTs
description of included studies
A total of 1,662 articles were identified when the search results of PubMed and Embase 
were combined (Figure 1). After applying exclusion criteria as described in Materials and 
Methods, 256 articles were read in their entirety (full-text) (Figure 1). The corresponding 
and/or first authors of 47 out of 256 articles were contacted by e-mail. Authors from 19 
out of 47 articles responded to e-mail requests. Nine full-text articles were received by 
mail or e-mail, and from four articles missing information was retrieved. For two articles, 
the requested information was not available. Fifty-three studies were finally included 
in the analyses after exclusion of articles that did not meet our inclusion criteria as 
described in Materials and Methods (Figure 1). These studies represented 3,966 patient 
cases (ranging from 5 to 345 cases per publication) from 15 different countries (Tables 1 
and 2). Eight of 53 of the studies included patients with bacteremia only and are shown 
in Table 2. All 53 studies had an observational study design and were written in English. 
Eight studies reported that a retrospective cohort study was performed, whereas con-
ceptually they could be considered case-control studies. Five multicenter studies were 
also included. The percentage of male gender ranged from 38.6% to 84.0%. Patient age 
ranged from several days old (neonates) to very old, with 97 years as oldest.
Not all studies provided detailed information regarding the microbiological methods 
used. However, 23 of the 53 studies did describe the method used for the identification 
of P. aeruginosa, of which 10 studies used the Vitek system. Only 19 of the 53 studies 
described isolate genotyping, with 16 studies using pulsed-field gel electrophoresis 
(PFGE), 1 using multiple-locus variable-number tandem repeat analysis (MLVA), 1 using 
restriction fragment length polymorphism (RFLP), and 1 using repetitive-element-based 
PCR. The median number of cases, as included in the multivariate analyses in these 
19 studies, was 30 (ranging from six to 204 cases). The median number of genetically 
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identical clusters identified was 2 (ranging from 1 to 8). The median size of the clusters 
described in these genotyping studies was 4 (ranging from 2 to 47). Seven of the 53 stud-
ies also identified the presence of blaVIM and blaIMP genes (using PCR amplification). 
The average number of cases in these seven studies was 32 (ranging from 5 to 47 cases).
The statistically significant risk factors calculated from the multivariate analyses, 
specifically the presence of carbapenem-resistant P. aeruginosa (Table 1), were extracted 
and merged into 10 different classes. The definitions of the risk factors from the different 
studies were not uniform.
When considering all statistically significant risk factors from the multivariate analyses 
of 45 studies (n) that had not included “only bacteremic patients,” it was observed that 
the presence of medical devices was the most reported risk factor (n= 21) (Table 1). The 
risk factors extracted from the eight studies including only patients with bacteremia are 
shown in Table 2. Eight out of the 53 studies not only identified risk factors but also iden-
tified protective factors for presence of a carbapenem-resistant P. aeruginosa, including 
quinolone use, exclusive feeding by formula and duration of antibiotic treatment (Table 
3).
Figure 1. Flow diagram of study selection for the systematic review on carbapenem resistant P. aeruginosa
Literature search (until February 27, 2012)
        Databases:  PubMed (n=1352) 
EMBASE (n=310) 
Excluded (n=1406) 
E.g. not related to the subject, only cystic 
fibrosis patients, not about P. aeruginosa , no 
risk factors for presence, non-human or genetic 
studies,  reviews, letters to the editor, abstracts 
only and duplicates.
Excluded (n=200) 
Not about resistance against carbapenems 
(n=56)
No risk factors transmission/acquisition (n=37)
Published before 1987 (n=24)
Only univariate/bivariate analysis (n=22)
No statistical analysis (n=21) 
Only risk factors for mortality (n=17)
Not able to retrieve full-text (n=13) 
Other (n=6)
Community acquired P. aeruginosa  (n=4)Included (n=56) 






lists of reviews (n=20)
Number of studies included in the meta-analysis (n=38)
Excluded (n=15) 
Bacteremia only (n=8)
Reporting hazard ratio (n=2) 
Reporting risk ratio (n=2)
No confidence interval (n=2)
Reporting prevalence ratio (n=1)
Included (n= 256)
Search results combined (n=1662)
Articles screened based on title and abstract
Full copies retrieved and assessed for eligibility: studies 
meeting inclusion criteria
Figure 1. Flow diagram of study selection for the systematic review on carbapenem resistant P. aeruginosa
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Possible sources and reservoirs
Several environmental sources and reservoirs were identified (Table 4). In some 
outbreaks, a single source could be identified (e.g., a damaged bronchoscope or a 
contaminated automated urine collection machine), and the outbreak stopped after 
removing, repairing, or cleaning this source. However, often a reservoir was identified 
that was possibly not actually the main source of infection but rather a consequence 
of the presence of a colonized or infected patient that had led to contamination of the 
environment (e.g., via sinks or mattresses).
study quality
For all included studies (n= 53) a quality assessment was performed. Validation of case-
control studies (n= 38) according to the Newcastle-Ottawa quality assessment scale, 
resulted in all studies scoring between 4 and 6 stars of a possible 10 (19). However, the 
validation of cohort studies (n= 12) according to the Newcastle-Ottawa quality assess-
ment scale, resulted in scores between 6 and 7 stars of 13. The most important reasons 
for not awarding a star were (i) the use of hospital controls, (ii) the use of medical re-
cords, (iii) no information about follow-up of patients, and (iv) different matching criteria 
between studies. Validation of the two cross-sectional studies and the single study with 
an observational study design, all according to STROBE guidelines, resulted in scores of 
15, 17 and 18 points of a total of 22, respectively (18). The main reasons not to award 
points in these analyses were due to the limited description of the statistical analysis in 
the methods and results sections of the articles.
nine meta-analyses
Thirty-eight of 53 studies were included in the 9 conventional meta-analyses, reporting 
106 risk factors and 5 protective factors. Eight studies were excluded because only risk 
factors for P. aeruginosa bacteremia were reported. Five studies were excluded because 
they reported hazard ratios (n=2), risk ratios (n=2) and a prevalence ratio (n=1). Two 
studies were excluded because of missing confidence intervals. Thus, nine different 
meta-analyses were performed, plus an additional meta-analysis combining three risk 
factors (quinolone use, vancomycin use, and other antibiotic use). The results of the nine 
meta-analyses are shown in Table 5, and their forest plots are shown in Figure 2. When 
combining the risk factors quinolone use, vancomycin use and other antibiotic use, and 
performing an additional meta-analysis, the pooled odds ratio was 3.07 (95%CI= 2.27 to 
4.15). Publication bias indicators showed significant results for the risk factors carbap-
enem use, medical devices, patient characteristics, and length of hospital stay (Table 
5). For the additional meta-analysis, publication bias indicators showed no significant 
results. Carbapenem use (OR= 7.09, 95%CI= 5.43 to 9.25) and medical devices (OR= 5.11, 
95%CI= 3.55 to 7.37) resulted in the highest pooled ORs in the meta-analyses. Therefore, 
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Figure 2.  (continued on next page)
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cumulative meta-analyses were performed for these two risk factors. Results are shown 
in a forest plot (Figure 2a and 2b). For carbapenem use, all years showed statistically 
significant results. For the risk factor medical devices, the result was not significant when 
the estimate was updated the second time. When the estimate was updated for the third 
time, results became significant once more.
Even when excluding cohort and cross-sectional studies (n= 8) from the meta-anal-
yses, our estimated results changed only slightly. The mean change was +0.2, ranging 
from -0.1 (risk factor length of hospital stay) to +1.31 (risk factor underlying diseases). 
All previous significant result calculations remained significant after removal of these 
eight studies.
Figure 2. (a) Forest plots of conventional and cumulative meta-analyses of the risk factor carbapenem use 
in a random effects model, shown on a logarithmic scale. Plots: 1, conventional meta-analysis including the 
source given as first author and year of publication, number of case patients (in parentheses), odds ratio, 
and 95% confidence interval; 2, cumulative meta-analysis including number of case patients, odds ratio, 
and 95% confidence interval. (b) Forest plots of conventional and cumulative meta-analyses of the risk 
factor medical devices using a random effects model, shown on a logarithmic scale. Plots: 1, conventional 
meta-analysis including source and number of case patients as indicated for panel a, odds ratio, and 95% 
confidence interval; 2, cumulative meta-analysis including number of case patients, odds ratio, and 95% 
confidence interval. (c) Forest plots of individual and pooled odds ratios for seven different risk factors of 
transmission and acquisition of carbapenem resistant P. aeruginosa, using a random effects model, shown 




This systematic review identified the nine most significant and most reported risk 
factors for the presence of carbapenem-resistant P. aeruginosa, and summarized the 
sources and reservoirs of these bacteria within the hospital environment. The nine risk 
factors were in order of statistical significance, (i) carbapenem use, (ii) medical devices, 
(iii) other antibiotic use, (iv) ICU admission, (v) quinolone use, (vi) underlying diseases, 
(vii) vancomycin use, (viii) patient characteristics, and (ix) length of hospital stay. The risk 
factor carbapenem use showed the strongest pooled odds ratio in the meta-analysis 
(Table 5). However, the most frequently reported risk factor was medical devices, which 
showed the second strongest pooled odds ratio (Table 5). The cumulative meta-analyses 
(Figure 2a and 2b) of these two risk factors showed that the estimate of the risk factor 
carbapenem use was stable for studies published after 2005. Before 2005, only a few 
studies published were included, and therefore the estimate fluctuated per publication. 
However, after 2005, the worldwide use of carbapenem increased, mainly due to the 
appearance of endemic and epidemic multiresistant microorganisms, especially bacte-
ria expressing extended-spectrum beta-lactamases in ICUs (where most of the studies 
included in this publication were performed) (100-103). The estimate of the risk factor 
Table 3. Summary of studies reporting protective factors for transmission and acquisition of carbapenem 





estimate 95%Ci P value
van der Bij, 2011(12) The Netherlands Cystic fibrosis as an underlying 
disease
OR 0.10 0.1 - 0.6 NR
Fortaleza, 2009(53) Brazil Quinolone use OR 0.13 0.03 - 0.47 0.002
Martinez, 2009(47) Spain Quinolone use OR 0.27 0.1 - 0.7 NR
Martinez, 2009(47) Spain Antipseudomonal cephalosporins 
use
OR 0.27 0.08 - 0.9 NR
Mammina, 2008(61) Italy Exclusive feeding by formula HR 0.18 0.05 - 0.61 0.006
Mammina, 2008(61) Italy Length of stay >2 weeks HR 0.10 0.00 - 0.11 0.011
Lodise Jr, 2007(37) USA Risk factor 1 + 2 + 3c PR 0.60 0.4 - 0.9 0.02
Aloush, 2006(48) Israel Having a malignant disease OR 0.20 0.05 - 0.9 0.03
Berthelot, 2001(60) France Duration of antibiotic treatment OR 0.78 0.69 - 0.87 NR
Arruda, 1999(62) Brazil Number of antimicrobial drugs OR 0.33 NR 0.006
aStudies are reported by first author, year, and reference number.
bOR, odds ratio; HR, hazard ratio; PR, prevalence ratio; CI, confidence interval; NR, not reported.
cCombination of risk factors: 1, prior receipt of mechanical ventilation for 11 days or more; 2, prior carbap-
enem exposure for 3 days or more; 3, prior fluoroquinolone exposure of 3 days or more.
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medical devices decreased between 1995 and 2008, and increased from 2008 to 2011. 
We hypothesize that the estimate increased after 2008 due to an increase in the number 
of medical device days during this time period. The decrease in estimate from 1995 
to 2008 can be explained by the relatively few studies included in the first part of the 
cumulative meta-analysis.
We also looked whether studies identified environmental sources and/or reservoirs, 
not only in included studies, but also in those excluded. Only 31 outbreaks reported en-
vironmental sources or reservoirs (Table 4). This implies that in most epidemics a source 
Table 4. Environmental sources and reservoirs identified when searching 1,662 + 22 studies for carbap-
enem resistant P. aeruginosa
environmental source/reservoir Reference(s)a
Automated urine analyzer Hallin, 2012(72); Nagao, 2011*(50)
Urine vol-measuring device Sekiguchi, 2007(73)
Air-conditioning system Pinna, 2009(74)
Sinks Kouda, 2011(75); Babu, 2011(76); Crivaro, 2009(77); Hota, 2009(78); Mayank, 
2009(79); Crespo, 2004(80); Boutiba-Ben Boubaker, 2003(81); Bertrand, 
2000(82); Bert, 1998(83); Griffith, 1989(84)
Scopes Boutiba-Ben Boubaker, 2003(81); Bronchoscope: DiazGranados, 2009(85); 
Sorin, 2001(86); Panzig, 1999(87); ERCP scope: Fraser, 2004(88); Endoscope: 
Pitten, 2001(89)
Water tap Mentzelopoulos, 2007*(28); Bukholm, 2002(90)
Trap water Leung, 2008(91)
Tap water Mayank, 2009(79); Pitten, 2001(89); Bert, 1998(83)
Sanitation related contamination Kouda, 2011(75); Panzig, 1999(87); Verweij, 1997(92)
Contaminated patient room Kouda, 2011(75); Cezario, 2009*(24); Mayank, 2009(79); Boutiba-Ben 
Boubaker, 2003(81); Landman, 2002(93)
Positive cultures from nurses Crivaro, 2009(77); Mayank, 2009(79); Vilar-Compte, 2003(94); Bertrand, 
2000(82); Zheng, 1990(95)
Bed pan sterilizer Verweij, 1997(92)
Milk bank pasteurizer Gras-Le Guen, 2003(96)
Bottle warmer Gras-Le Guen, 2003(96)
Stethoscope Crespo, 2004(80)
Mechanical ventilation related Cezario, 2009*(24); Kikuchi, 2007(97); Landman, 2002(93)
Suction apparatus Babu, 2011(76); Mentzelopoulos, 2007*(28); Bertrand, 2000(82)
Ice packs Bertrand, 2000(82)
Mops Babu, 2011(76)
O2 bottles, O2 tubing Mayank, 2009(79)
Contaminated Cystoscopy room Pena, 2003(98)
Contaminated urodynamic lab Climo, 1997(99)
aReferences are reported by first author, year, and reference number. Studies followed by an asterisk were 
included in the systematic review.
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or reservoir is not identified, not reported, or not searched for. If carbapenem-resistant P. 
aeruginosa was identified in the innate environment, it was often unclear or not proven 
that the presumed reservoir was indeed the primary source of infection. In fact, sinks are 
most frequently reported and thought to be the main reservoir of carbapenem-resistant 
P. aeruginosa in hospitals (Table 4).
It was remarkable that in three of the studies included in the analyses, vancomycin 
use was identified as a risk factor for acquiring carbapenem-resistant P. aeruginosa (26, 
29, 34). All three articles hypothesize that this may have been due to antibiotic selection 
pressure, with the reduction or elimination of competing Gram-positive bacteria post-
antibiotic treatment having facilitated the colonization of the skin or gastrointestinal 
tract of patients with Gram-negative bacteria, including P. aeruginosa.
limitations and strengths
The limitations of this study are mostly related to the heterogeneity of the studies 
included in the analyses. From our investigations, it was obvious that every reported 
outbreak generally involved different target populations, microbial sources, microbio-
logical methods, active surveillance to find cases, and methods for identifying whether 
there was transmission or endogenous selection.
A limitation of the meta-analyses was the diverse models used by the different studies 
when performing multivariate regression analysis. Also, in almost all cases, the mod-
els used were not described. This problem is already known to be a major limitation 
of studies utilizing meta-analyses, as “confounders” can seriously alter the combined 
estimate. We know that the confounders that are adjusted for are different, whereas in 
meta-analysis we require them to be the same. However, from a clinical point of view 
Table 5. Conventional meta-analyses of the different risk factors for acquisition and transmission of carbap-


















Carbapenem use 16 7.09 5.43-9.25 3.6-76.0 1.39 0.02 0.47 0.01
Medical devices 19 5.11 3.55-7.37 2.1-64.3 2.30 <0.001 0.49 0.003
Other antibiotic use 19 3.56 2.52-5.03 0.3-43.7 1.49 0.06 0.38 0.02
ICU admission 8 3.02 1.62-5.61 1.1-13.3 2.96 0.002 0.07 0.90
Quinolone use 11 2.73 1.27-5.87 0.1-48.4 0.89 0.56 0.45 0.06
Underlying disease 13 2.44 1.23-4.84 0.1-25.0 1.34 0.06 -0.05 0.77
Vancomycin use 3 2.10 1.42-3.09 1.8-2.9 NC NC NC NC
Patient characteristics 13 1.46 1.22-1.75 1.0-13.9 2.02 <0.001 0.56 0.007
Length of hospital stay 9 1.06 1.02 - 1.09 1.0 - 6.7 3.05 0.0003 0.56 0.04
aOR, odds ratio; CI, confidence interval; NC= not calculated because there were too few strata
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they have to be different, because every situation (selection or transmission), outbreak 
or level of endemicity is different. Even if we knew every specific model used, it would 
not solve the problem of heterogeneity. For all of these reasons, we used a random ef-
fects model.
The statistical results may also have been influenced by publication bias, and the Eg-
ger and Kendall’s tau publication bias indicators showed significant results for several 
risk factors (Table 5). However, the authors tried to include as many studies as possible, 
despite differences in language or size of the outbreak. Nevertheless, a full-text article 
was not available for 20 studies, data were incomplete for two studies, and there may 
also be unpublished studies that we could not access. However, this number of studies 
is small relative to the number of studies included after title/abstract selection (n=256), 
so its influence on our results is likely to be limited.
We excluded studies including only patients with CF. These patients are chronically 
infected with P. aeruginosa, with strains acquired mostly in the community, and are a 
different patient population from the population of our interest (104).
Previously, a review by Falagas and Kopterides (2006) also identified risk factors associ-
ated with P. aeruginosa infection (15). Several of the current risk factors observed (Table 
1) match the risk factors observed by Falagas and Kopterides. However, in contrast to the 
review by Falagas and Kopterides, the current study focuses on carbapenem resistance 
and includes only studies that analyzed data using a multivariate model. Also, almost 
one-half of the studies included in this publication were published after 2006. Finally, 
we also included all studies that indicated a source or reservoir of their P. aeruginosa 
outbreak, and we conducted conventional and cumulative meta-analyses, results that 
are not available in the review by Falagas and Kopterides.
Conclusions and implications
This systematic review shows that the risk factors for P. aeruginosa infection and trans-
mission are diverse. However, the use of carbapenem antibiotics was the most signifi-
cant risk estimate from this meta-analysis, which highlights the importance of antibiotic 
stewardship in controlling P. aeruginosa outbreaks. During an outbreak involving one or 
more (clonal) strains, the use of these antibiotics could be a risk factor for acquisition of 
that clonal strain(s), by making the patient more vulnerable to colonization or infection. 
Importantly, antibiotic use is a risk factor that can be influenced in order to reduce the 
chance of outbreaks occurring. Another risk factor is the use of medical devices and 
reduction of device days. The use of medical devices and the number of device days 
are also the most frequently reported risk factors resulting from our meta-analyses. The 
increased use of medical devices, and for longer periods of time, means that patients 
are becoming more vulnerable to acquiring MDR P. aeruginosa (105). On the other hand, 
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other important risk factors for outbreaks involving MDR P. aeruginosa such as patient 
characteristics, underlying diseases or ICU admission, cannot be easily influenced.
This systematic review also shows that it is difficult to identify the actual source of 
P. aeruginosa outbreaks. Therefore, basic infection prevention measures remain very 
important. For example, contact isolation of patients and strict compliance with hand 
hygiene measures remain the major steps necessary to stop further transmission of 
outbreak isolates. This is important whether or not an assumed or proven exogenous 
source is responsible for the outbreak.
We believe that it is important that prospective studies relating to outbreaks of car-
bapenem-resistant P. aeruginosa report on sources and reservoirs of infection, and that 
analysis of any data be performed using a multivariate statistical model. This information 
is extremely valuable with respect to planning future research and control measures 
for antibiotic-resistant P. aeruginosa. It is also very important for authors to genetically 
type strains associated with infection in order to identify clonal clusters of isolates. This 
data allows the infectious disease specialist to determine whether infection and spread 
are related to selection (risk factor carbapenem/antibiotic use) or transmission (e.g., risk 
factor medical devices). The systematic review and meta-analysis published here shows 
the nine most important risk factors for the presence of carbapenem-resistant P. aeru-
ginosa bacterial isolates among hospitalized patients. The identification of these risk 
factors is useful in controlling future outbreaks of by these organisms. In this case, risk 
factors such as antibiotic use and high numbers of device days have to be reduced or 
eliminated in order to help prevent the appearance and spread of carbapenem-resistant 
P. aeruginosa. In this study, carbapenem use was identified with the highest pooled odds 
ratio. Therefore, use of this class of antibiotics especially should be reduced.
Finally, it is important to decrease the use of antibiotics, especially the use of carbap-
enems, in order to help prevent resistant P. aeruginosa outbreaks. In addition, it is highly 
recommended that an infectious disease consultant with a broad view on the preva-
lence of MDR bacteria and knowledge of the most recent guidelines for antibiotic use 
in the hospital concerned be consulted. Indeed, studies have shown that consultation 
with an infectious disease consultant significantly increases the correct administration 
of microbiologically correct antibiotic therapy (106-108).
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AbsTRACT
Healthcare-related infections caused by extended-spectrum beta-lactamase (ESBL)-
producing Klebsiella spp. are of major concern. To control transmission, deep under-
standing of the transmission mechanisms is needed. This systematic review aimed to 
identify risk factors and sources, clonal relatedness using molecular techniques, and the 
most effective control strategies for ESBL-producing Klebsiella spp. A systematic search 
of PubMed, Embase, and Outbreak Database was performed. We identified 2,771 articles 
from November 25th, 1960 until April 7th, 2014 of which 148 were included in the 
systematic review and 23 in a random-effects meta-analysis study. The random-effects 
meta-analyses showed that underlying disease or condition (odds ratio [OR] = 6.25; 
95% confidence interval [CI] = 2.85 to 13.66) generated the highest pooled estimate. 
ESBL-producing Klebsiella spp. were spread through person-to-person contact and via 
sources in the environment; we identified both monoclonal and polyclonal presence. 
Multi-faceted interventions are needed to prevent transmission of ESBL-producing 
Klebsiella spp.
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inTRoduCTion
Healthcare-related infections (HRIs) are a major clinical problem worldwide. In 2011, 
the World Health Organization (WHO) reported that in a mixed patient population the 
pooled HRI-prevalence was 10.1% in low- and middle-income countries and 7.6% in 
high-income countries (1). Prolonged hospital stay, higher costs, increased antimicrobial 
resistance, and risk of potentially life-threatening conditions indicate the enormous bur-
den of HRIs (2). Further, we are facing HRIs caused by multidrug-resistant gram-negative 
bacteria (MDR-GNB) without a parallel progression of the novel antibiotic classes (3).
Klebsiella spp. have been recognized as the most frequent cause of MDR-GNB out-
breaks, particularly after the emergence of the extended-spectrum beta-lactamase 
(ESBL) enzymes (4, 5). As a result, infections in hospitalized patients with this ESBL-
producing Klebsiella spp. have raised public concern due to the clinical outcomes and 
limited antibiotic options (6). Patients whose care requires devices, and patients who 
are identified with multiple antibiotic-resistant strains in the intensive care unit (ICU) are 
at highest risk to acquire an infection with an ESBL-producing Klebsiella spp. (7, 8). High 
discriminatory subtyping methods are beneficial to determine clonality of the outbreak 
strains with pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) as the well-known ‘gold standard’ for 
molecular epidemiological studies and for current clinical use (9).
It requires deep understanding of all outbreaks to optimally control transmission 
of ESBL-producing Klebsiella spp. (10). Recent guidelines about the management of 
MDR-GNB underscore the need of well-managed and multi-faceted interventions (11). 
Therefore, it is necessary to investigate the transmission dynamics and the risk factors 
for hospital outbreaks. This systematic review aimed to answer the following four ques-
tions. First, what are the risk factors for the presence of ESBL-producing Klebsiella spp.? 
Second, what are the main sources and reservoirs for this microorganism? Third, how 
can we identify the transmission patterns and the clonal relatedness among isolates 
from patients who acquired ESBL-producing Klebsiella spp.? Fourth, what are the most 
effective control strategies for ESBL-producing Klebsiella spp.?
mATeRiAls And meTHods
This systematic review and meta-analysis followed the guidelines outlined in the PRISMA 
statement (supplement 1)(12).
search strategy and selection criteria
We searched PubMed, Embase, and the Outbreak Database (until April 7th, 2014) to 
identify studies which examined the transmission of multidrug-resistant (MDR) Klebsi-
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ella spp., identified potential risk factors, described modes of transmission, described 
laboratory methods used for the identification, and described the effective interventions 
to prevent transmission of MDR Klebsiella spp. with using the terms as applied in supple-
ment 2. The search strategy was not limited by language, date of publication, country, 
study design, enzyme type, or patient characteristics. We excluded studies about: 1) 
pathogenesis, validation of molecular techniques, drug options, cost, 2) non-human 
studies, 3) studies only about carriers, health-care workers (HCWs), or family members, 
4) studies only about environmental contamination, 5) case report with no statement 
on transmission, 6) non-hospital studies, 7) letters, editorials, communications, weekly 
reports, and reviews. However, we also searched the eligible citations of all relevant 
reviews. TCH initiated full searches and AFV independently repeated the search for a 5 
percent subset of articles.
data extraction
We first screened all articles based on titles and abstracts and then we subsequently 
assessed the articles in full text according to the inclusion and exclusion criteria. TCH 
initiated the screening and extracted the data with help of AFV and MCV. To retrieve 
articles that could not be found in full-text, we contacted first authors or correspond-
ing authors of 80 publications. We also contacted the authors of 16 publications to 
obtain missing information about associated factors and cluster analyses. We defined 
the categories of MDR Klebsiella spp. as ESBL, possible ESBL and non-ESBL. We used the 
ESBL definition according to group 2b Bush criteria (13). We found several articles that 
showed resistance to cephalosporins before the term “ESBL” was established in 1989 
(14). These studies were included as being ‘ESBL’. Ultimately, we only focused on studies 
about ESBL-producing Klebsiella spp. within one hospital.
data analyses
We included articles related to ESBL-producing Klebsiella spp. that described the fac-
tors associated with the presence or acquisition of ESBL-producing Klebsiella spp. using 
a multivariate model. We took into account studies that have suggested and proven 
the sources of ESBL-producing Klebsiella spp. using molecular typing techniques. How-
ever, we also included studies that suggested the potential reservoirs. In addition, we 
included studies about the associated factors for mortality related to ESBL-producing 
Klebsiella spp.
In order to assess clonal relatedness and transmission patterns of ESBL-producing 
Klebsiella spp., studies that only performed phenotypic typing methods were excluded 
and studies that did use molecular typing were included. We merged studies that used 
polymerase chain reaction (PCR)-based techniques for typing. We assessed the result 
of molecular typing methods and calculated the total number of identified patterns. 
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We defined a cluster as ≥ two similar patterns of ESBL-producing Klebsiella spp. isolates. 
Likewise, a unique isolate was defined as a single pattern. The term monoclonal presence 
referred to a single cluster and the term polyclonal presence referred to ≥ two clusters. 
We calculated the total number of patterns, the clusters including cluster sizes, and 
the single patterns. If the information was available, we performed the cluster analyses 
based on the number of patients, otherwise on the number of isolates. We also reviewed 
studies about infection control strategies and prevention programs. We assessed the 
standard interventions possibly combined with additional control strategies, and re-
ported which were most successful strategies to stop transmission. We compiled data 
from two studies that were presented in four publications in the result section (15-18).
statistical analysis
We combined all associated factors that reported an odds ratio (OR) and a 95% confi-
dence interval (95% CI) into ten different categories: 1, medical devices (e.g., mechanical 
ventilation, intra-vascular devices); 2, prior cephalosporin exposure; 3, prior quinolone 
exposure; 4, prior other antibiotic exposure; 5, prior antifungal exposure; 6, length of 
hospital stay; 7, patient characteristics (e.g., age); 8, underlying disease or condition (e.g., 
malignant disease); 9, medical procedures (e.g., surgical intervention); 10, other (e.g., 
exposure to the hands of HCWs). Studies reporting associated factors for mortality were 
excluded. Random-effects meta-analyses were performed for all categories except the 
“prior antifungal exposure”, “medical procedures” which had less than three factors and 
“other” that comprised many various factors. Lytsy et al., used three different models 
of multivariable analyses to find reliable estimates for the most important variables. 
However, we chose to only include model 1 in our meta-analyses (18). We applied the 
method of DerSimonian and Laird and meta-analyses were performed using StatsDirect 
statistical software (StatsDirect, Version 2.8.0, Altrincham, StatsDirect Ltd, 2013) (19). We 
considered P values <0.05 as statistically significant. Bias assessment plots were con-
structed to explore publication bias using the Egger and Begg-Mazumbdar (Kendall’s 
tau) indicators (19, 20).
study quality
The methodological quality of all studies in the random-effects meta-analyses was as-
sessed using the strengthening the reporting of observational studies in epidemiology 
(STROBE) guidelines (Table A and Table B in supplement 3) or the Newcastle-Ottawa 
quality assessment scale (Table A and Table C in supplement 3), based on the study de-
sign (21, 22). Furthermore, the methodological quality of all molecular epidemiological 
studies in cluster analysis was assessed by the strengthening the reporting of molecular 
epidemiology for infectious disease (STROME-ID) guidelines (Table D in supplement 3) 




We identified a total of 5,608 articles as potentially relevant when using our search 
strategy (Figure 1). Of these, 835 articles met the eligibility criteria and 25 articles were 
retrieved from citations of interesting reviews. We received 45 full-text articles from 80 
authors. We got three further responses to the information requests that were sent to the 
authors of 17 articles. We ultimately included 148 articles in this systematic review (Fig-
ure 1). Five articles were written in Spanish, one article was written in French, one article 
was written in Turkish and 141 articles were written in English. The non-English articles 
were translated prior to data extraction. Most studies were conducted in Europe (39.9%; 
n= 59) particularly in France (n= 16), followed by Asia (18.9%; n= 28), North America 
(16.9%; n= 25), Africa (9.5%; n= 14), South America (10.8%; n= 16), multiple regions: 
Europe and Asia (3.4%; n= 5) and Australia (0.7%, n= 1) with 49 countries in total. All 
Excluded (n=271)
a. Not meeting the objectives (n= 50)
b. Did not include required transmission pattern,    
    associated factors, or intervention (n= 85)
c. Mixed with > 2 bacteria (n= 57)
d. Letters, concise communication, research
    notes, reviews, a book, and a case report
without any important  information (n= 49)
Literature search (until April 7, 2014)
Databases: Embase (n= 2753) 
PubMed (Medline) (n= 2770) 
Outbreak Database (n= 85)
Articles screened based on title and abstract
Included (n= 835)
Excluded (n= 4772) 
E.g. not related to the subject,  non-human studies, 
studies only about carriers, healthcare workers, or 
family members, case reports,  letters to the editor, 
weekly reports, commentaries, conference abstracts 
without any important information and duplicates
(n= 2837).
Full copies retrieved and assessed for eligibility: 
studies meeting inclusion criteria
Included (n= 222) 
Excluded (n=74) 
a. No cephalosporin resistance (n= 24)
b. Insufficient data (n= 13)
c. Mixed with another bacteria (n= 16)
d. Mixed with non-ESBL (n= 2)
e. Not healthcare-associated infections (n= 10)
f.  No further response from authors (n= 5)
g. No cluster analyses (n= 3) 
Search results combined (n= 5608)
Studies (n= 25) identified 
from searching reference 
lists of reviews (n= 26)
Two groups excluded (n= 342) 
a. Multihospital transmission (n= 106)
b. Other resistance mechanisms (n =236)
Meta-analyses of the 





a. Reporting associated factors for 
mortality (n= 4)
b. Reporting a hazard ratio (n= 1)
c. No confidence interval (n= 1)
1. Sources and reservoirs 
(n= 57) 












a. Not reporting  successful interventions 
(n= 3)
b. Not included in the  top 10 most 
successful interventions (n= 10)
Number of studies included in the review (n= 148)¹ 
Figure 1. Flow diagram of study selection for the systematic review and random-effects meta-analyses on 
extended-spectrum beta-lactamase-producing Klebsiella spp. ¹Number of studies included in the review 
comprise the sources and reservoirs, associated factors, cluster analysis and successful interventions. ²No 
response was obtained from the first and/or corresponding authors for the requested article.
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studies were published between 1991 and 2014 with study periods of less than a month 
up to seven years. Thirty-one studies (20.9%) indicated the suspected or identified index 
case. The study population was predominated by adult patients (45.3%, n= 67), followed 
by neonates (33.1%; n= 49), pediatric patients (5.4%; n= 8), and mix groups including the 
studies located in hospitals but which did not mention the study population (16.2%; n= 
24). Seventy-six percent of all studies took place at the ICU (n=113). These studies can 
be further divided in neonatal ICU (38.1%; n= 43), pediatric ICU (3.5%; n= 4), adult ICU 
(48.7%; n= 55) and mix ICU units (9.7%; n= 11). However, fifty-two studies were located 
both at ICU and non-ICU.
Associated factors
We identified 26 studies reporting associated risk factors with a statistically significant 
OR above one (Table 1) and seven studies reporting associated protective factors with 
a statistically significant OR below one (Table 2) for the presence of ESBL-producing 
Klebsiella spp. In addition, four studies identified the associated factors for bloodstream 
infections caused by ESBL-producing K. pneumoniae (Table 1). In general, prior antibiotic 
exposure was the most common associated factor in all studies. Four studies reported 
associated factors for mortality (24-27). It was published in these four studies that the 
presentation with septic shock had the highest odds ratio (205.99) (24).










Underlying disease or condition 17 OR 1.04 – 60.60 26 - 292 (28); (29); (30); (31)(2x); (18)(6x); (32); (33)(4x); (34)
Other antibiotic exposure 15 OR 1.55 – 95.21 10-292 (35); (24)(a); (36); (30); (31); (37)(a); (38); (39); (40); (41)
1 HR 4.60 206 (42)
Length of hospital stay 11 OR 1.05 – 12.60 18 - 80 (43); (29); (37)(a); (44); (38); (45); (18)(3x); (46)(a)
1 HR 1.26 206 (42)
Medical devices 9 OR 2.11 – 5.23 18 – 292 (47)(2x); (24)(a); (36); (38); (45); (34)(3x)
Prior cephalosporin exposure 9 OR 4.51 – 7.60 17 – 88 (28); (36); (48)(a); (18)(2x); (32)(3x); (46)(a)
Otherb 8 OR 1.66 – 9.30 18 – 94 (49); (43); (31); (38)(2x); (50); (32); (33)
Patient characteristics 3 OR 1.14 – 13.10 10 – 48 (35); (37)(a); (16)
1 HR 1.57 206 (42)
Prior quinolone exposure 3 OR 2.86 – 25.37 30 - 78 (36); (41); (46)(a)
Medical proceduresb 2 OR 9.34 – 10.35 52 - 60 (24)(a); (40)
Prior antifungal exposureb 2 OR 5.3 – 12 204 (30)(2x)
Abbreviations: RE, risk estimate, 2x, 3x, 4x or 6x, two, three, four or six different factors per reference.
a Bloodstream infections.
b This category was not included in a random-effects meta-analysis study.
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eight random-effects meta-analyses
Twenty-three studies were included in the seven random-effects meta-analyses, report-
ing 54 associated risk factors with a statistically significant OR above one and five associ-
ated protective factors with a statistically significant OR below one (Figure 1 and Table 
3). The category of underlying disease or condition (OR = 6.25; 95% CI = 2.85 to 13.66) 
and prior cephalosporin exposure (OR = 4.65; 95% CI = 2.83 to 7.65) generated the high-
est pooled estimates (Figure 2). The publication bias indicators showed no significant 
results (Table 3).
sources and reservoirs
Fifty-seven studies identified environmental sources and/or surrounding reservoirs for 
ESBL-producing Klebsiella spp. (Table 4). Contaminated sinks were the most reported 
sources in the environment (13.8%; n= 4) whereas the patients were the main reservoirs 
(48.9%; n= 23), followed by the hands of HCWs (25.5%; n= 12). Interestingly, one study 
showed food as a transmission source for ESBL-producing K. pneumoniae (50).
Cluster analyses
One hundred-twenty studies described the molecular methods used to type ESBL-
producing Klebsiella spp. and the analyses of genetic similarity (Table 5). In particular 
for ESBL-producing K. pneumoniae, ninety-two studies used PFGE and 16 studies used 
PCR-based techniques which were predominated by enterobacterial repetitive inter-
genic consensus sequence – polymerase chain reaction (ERIC-PCR) in seven studies. 
Multilocus sequence typing (MLST) was performed in seven studies as well as random 
amplified polymorphic DNA (RAPD). Nineteen studies performed more than one mo-
Table 2. Associated protective factors for the presence of ESBL-producing Klebsiella spp. based on multi-
variate analyses.
Associated protective factor no. of factors no. of patients Re Re or Re Range studies
Medical devices 2 206 HR 0.22 – 0.52 (42)
Prior penicillin+ β lactamase inhibitor exposurea 2 88 OR 0.16 – 0.27 (32)
Othersb 2 27 – 292 OR 0.22 – 0.50 (39); (34)
Prior antibiotic exposurea 1 54 OR 0.003 (44)
Prior carbapenem exposurea 1 206 HR 0.22 (42)
Agec 1 47 OR 0.95 (36)
Prior cephalosporin exposure 1 204 OR 0.1 (30)
Abbreviations: RE, risk estimate; HR, hazard ratio; OR, odds ratio.
a This factor was classified in the category of prior antibiotic exposure for a random-effects meta-analysis 
study.
b This category was not included in a random-effects meta-analysis study.
c This factor was classified in the category of patient characteristics for a random-effects meta-analysis 
study.
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Figure 2. Forest plots of random-effects meta-analyses: individual and pooled odds ratios for associated 
risk factors and associated protective factors for presence of ESBL-producing Klebsiella spp. among patients 
in hospitals. *Bloodstream infections
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lecular method to analyze clusters. The average number of patients in the 120 studies 
was 22.5 (ranging from 1 to 295 patients). The median range of the number of patterns 
was 1 to 10 (median range of cluster-size medians from 1 to 15). In 111 studies that 
provided both number of clusters and the cluster size based on the number of patients, 
the median number of clusters was 2 ranging from 0 to 15 and the median of the cluster-
size medians was 6 with a range of 0 to 81. In particular for K. pneumoniae, the median 
number of clusters was 2 and the median of cluster-size medians was 6. Further, the 
median number of clusters and the median of the cluster-size medians were 0 for K. 
oxytoca. Three surveillance studies reported an identical pattern indicating the clonal-
ity of identified ESBL-producing Klebsiella spp. strains in hospitals. In particular for the 
outbreak events, 43 studies showed monoclonal and 34 studies showed polyclonal 
presence of ESBL-producing Klebsiella spp. among patients within the hospital.
effective interventions
The identification of ESBL-producing Klebsiella spp. transmission in hospitals should 
be followed by infection control strategies. However, not all studies provided detailed 
information regarding the interventions. We identified 84 studies that described the 
interventions during the study period. Twenty-eight studies reported the standard 
interventions that did not succeed. All but three studies described the additional and/or 
successful strategies to prevent the spread of ESBL-producing Klebsiella spp. in hospitals. 
Ultimately, we presented the top ten strategies to control ESBL-producing Klebsiella spp. 
Table 3. Random-effects meta-analyses of the different associated risk factors and associated protective 






Range of oR 
in individual 
studies








or condition 9 6.25 2.85 – 13.66 1.66 – 60.60 0.39 0.18 2.61 < 0.01
Prior cephalosporin 
exposure 9 4.65 2.83 – 7.65 0.10 – 7.60 < 0.01 0.92 - 2.26 0.14
Prior other antibiotic 
exposure 17 4.38 2.29 – 8.34 0.003 – 95.21 0.16 0.39 1.51 0.16
Prior quinolone 
exposure 3 3.91 1.83 – 8.34 2.86 – 25.37 NC NC NC NC
Medical devices 9 2.99 2.27 – 3.95 2.11 – 5.23 0.33 0.26 1.53 < 0.01
Length of hospital 
stay 8 1.16 1.06 – 1.27 1.05 – 12.60 0.55 0.08 3.25 < 0.01
Patient 
characteristics 4 1.16 0.93 – 1.44 0.95 – 13.10 < 0.01 0.75 4.11 0.18
Abbreviations: OR, odds ratio; CI, confidence interval; NC, not calculated because there were too few strata.
a Only studies included that reported 95% CI and P values
89Epidemiology of ESBL-producing Klebsiella spp.
Table 4. Environmental sources and reservoirs for ESBL-producing Klebsiella spp., identified from n = 57 
studies.
Reservoirs or sources no of studies studies
innate environment
Bottles 1 (51)
Door handles, a siphon and a table 1 (52)(a)
Entire unit (Intensive Care Unit) 2 (53);(54)
Hospital kitchen-screened surfaces 1 (50)(a)
Incubator 2 (55)(a); (38)(a)
Liquid soap 2 (56)(a); (57)(a)
Mask 1 (58)(a)
Moist surfaces near sinks and faucets 1 (59)(a)
Roll boards in operating rooms 1 (60)(a)
Room surface 2 (55)(a); (38)(a)
Single use products
A. Intravenous medication or solution (re-
used repeatedly)
2 (61)(a); (62)(a)
B. Intravenous glucose preparation 
(multiple-dosed)
1 (51)
C. Oxygen saturation probes (re-used 
repeatedly)
1 (63)(a)
Sinks 4 (64)(a); (55)(a); (65)(a); (66)(a)
Suction pump located in the room of an 
infected patient
1 (67)(a)
Suction tube 1 (38)(a)
Thermometers 2 (63)(a); (68)
Two water reservoirs from humidifiers 1 (69)(a)
Ultrasonography coupling gel container 
of the emergency room
1 (70)(a)
Weighing scale machine for babies 1 (71)(a)
Human
Transient Hand Carriage 1 (72)
A. Patients 23 (73); (74)(a); (64)(a); (75)(a); (76)(a); (49)(a); (77)(a); (78)(a); (79)(a); (80); (35)(a); (81)(a);
(82)(a); (83)(a); (84)(a); (85)(a); (86)(a); (30)(a); (87); (88)(a); (89)(a); (90)(a); (91)(a)
B. Health Care Workers 4 (82)(a); (92)(a); (90)(a); (93)
Food handlers 1 (50)(a)
Handholding due to work overcharge 1 (94)
Hands 11 (95); (82); (68); (55)(a); (38)(a); (45)(a); (54); (96)(a); (67)(a); (57)(a); (97)
Artificial nails 1 (43)(a)
Onychomycosis 2 (98)(a); (99)&(39)(a)
C. Family (Mother to Child)
Breast milk 2 (63)(a); (15)(a)
Peripartum colonization of neonates 1 (70)(a)
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in hospitals from 71 studies (Table 6). Reinforcement of hand hygiene (46.5%) was the 
most successful intervention in all studies, followed by adequate compliance with the 
antibiotic control programs (33.8%). Removal of contaminated tools was also found in 




This is the first systematic review and meta-analyses to identify the transmission pattern 
of ESBL-producing Klebsiella spp. among hospitalized patients worldwide. Our random-
effects meta-analyses showed the underlying disease including malignancy or particular 
condition (OR = 6.25; 95% CI = 2.85 to 13.66) and prior cephalosporin exposure (OR = 
4.65; 95% CI = 2.83 to 7.65) as the most significant associated factors for the presence 
of ESBL-producing Klebsiella spp. Consistent with our study, Cornejo-Juárez et al., indi-
cated the increased risk of ESBL-Escherichia coli bacteremia in patients with hematologic 
malignancies who had prior cephalosporins exposure (164). Our finding was also in line 
with a systematic review of ESBL-producing Enterobacteriaceae in Latin America that 
reported prior antibiotic exposure, in particular cephalosporins as the associated risk 
factor with a statistically significant OR above one for the acquisition of ESBL-producing 
Klebsiella spp. (165). Nevertheless, based on the study by Piroth et al., antibiotic use can 
be an associated protective factor with a statistically significant OR below one (166). 
Moreover, our study reported the fact that infection with ESBL-producing Klebsiella 
spp. can cause fatal outcomes in association with other associated risk factors (167). 
Our study confirmed the importance of interaction between hospitalized patients, 
environmental sources, and surrounding reservoirs, in particular the HCWs. Obviously, 
the colonized and/or infected patients were the consistent reservoirs (Table 1). Further, 
it was clear that surrounding reservoirs and sources must be taken into consideration in 
order to end the vicious cycle of the spread of ESBL-producing Klebsiella spp. In general, 
likewise in case of Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus, HCWs who are colonized 
with ESBL-producing Klebsiella spp. play a pivotal role in the transmission through their 
hands (168). Even more, using artificial nails and having onychomycosis can be the 
transmission source for the presence of ESBL-producing Klebsiella spp. (39, 43).
molecular typing
PFGE still is the gold standard for molecular typing, in particular to prove the trans-
mission of ESBL-producing Klebsiella spp. among patients (9). However, it is useful to 
perform another molecular technique in order to confirm the result of the main diag-
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nostic technique or transmission (52, 104). Furthermore, our findings showed that both 
monoclonal and polyclonal presence occur in outbreak events. This indicated that clonal 
dissemination plays a role in outbreaks (63). However, it is also important to consider the 
horizontal plasmid transfer among different bacterial species (52). Studies on plasmid 
fingerprinting showed the importance of plasmid genotyping to predict the mode of 
plasmid transmission among patients (76, 104).
interventions
To stop the spread of ESBL-producing Klebsiella spp., reinforcement of hand hygiene 
and an antibiotic control program were the most successful interventions. Firstly, hand 
hygiene is a simple and low cost intervention to prevent the presence of ESBL-producing 
Klebsiella spp. The introduction of hand antiseptic will reduce the contamination of the 
hands with of ESBL-producing Klebsiella spp. (169). Recent guidelines also highlight 
hand hygiene as the top priority to prevent the transmission of nosocomial infections 
(11). Secondly, a meta-analysis study suggested cycling empirical antibiotic therapy 
to prevent antibiotic resistance (170). This adjustable cycling model confirmed the 
antibiotic control program as an important strategy for ESBL-producing Klebsiella spp. 
transmission.
study quality
Most studies included in the meta-analyses and cluster analysis had a low study quality 
using the recommended guidelines. However, in particular for the studies that were as-
sessed with STROME-ID guidelines, they had wide range of key objectives that did not 
focus solely on molecular epidemiology of ESBL-producing Klebsiella spp. Nonetheless, 
reporting the cases of ESBL-producing Klebsiella spp. according to STROME-ID guidelines 
can give clear information about the evidence to detect the transmission dynamics with 
molecular typing and helps in making the health-policy decision. In general, the studies 
that were included answered our research questions; however, our study indicated the 
importance to report structured articles that follow appropriate guidelines for a high 
study quality.
strengths and limitations
The major strength of our study was the inclusion of a large number of hospitalized 
patients with ESBL-producing Klebsiella spp. In the meta-analyses, we identified sev-
eral risk factors that were associated with the presence of ESBL-producing Klebsiella 
spp. We also summarized the most successful interventions to prevent the spread of 
ESBL-producing Klebsiella spp., which to our knowledge has never been done before. 
However, our study also has some limitations. Firstly, the heterogeneity of all included 
studies in combination with the diverse models used in all individual statistical analyses, 
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here combined in the meta-analyses. Therefore, we performed a random-effects model 
for the meta-analyses. Secondly, due to the different definitions of colonization and in-
fection in the studies, we termed them as presence of ESBL-producing Klebsiella spp. As 
a consequence, reporting them separately was not possible. Thirdly, our study focused 
on clonal spread; hence, we did not include studies about plasmid transfers. Fourthly, 
some studies only performed molecular typing investigation on selected samples due 
to cost effectiveness. Therefore, most probably we have bias on the number of clusters. 
Fifthly, publication bias might have occurred since we have a broad range of articles 
from different objectives to comprehensively answer our research questions.
Conclusion
The presence of ESBL-producing Klebsiella spp., which results in increased morbidity and 
mortality, may occur by either direct spread from patient to patient or indirect transmis-
sion via surrounding reservoirs and sources in the environment. Obviously, molecular 
typing techniques can identify transmission of ESBL-producing Klebsiella spp. within the 
hospital. Prior antibiotic exposure holds a key role for the presence of ESBL-producing 
Klebsiella spp. particularly cephalosporin use. Multi-faceted interventions, including re-
inforcement of hand hygiene and control of antibiotic use, are necessary to prevent the 
spread of ESBL-producing Klebsiella spp. Further studies on plasmid transfer are needed 
to learn more about transmission of ESBL-producing Klebsiella spp. within a hospital. In 
addition, it is important to report studies in a more structured way that systematically 
follows suitable guidelines.
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AbsTRACT
Emergence of multidrug-resistant Pseudomonas aeruginosa is of global concern. We 
aimed to identify epidemiological relationships, the most common way of transmis-
sion, and risk factors for presence of Verona Integron-encoded Metallo-β-lactamase 
(VIM)-positive P. aeruginosa (VIM-PA). We conducted a network analysis and matched 
case-control studies (1:2:2). Controls were hospital-based and matched with cases for 
ward, day of admission (control group 1 and 2) and time between admission and the 
identification of VIM-PA (control group 1). The network was visualized using Cytoscape, 
and risk factors were determined using conditional logistic regression. Between August 
2003 and April 2015, 144 case patients and 576 control patients were recruited. We 
identified 307 relationships in 114 out of these 144 patients, with most relationships 
(84.7%) identified at the same department <3 months after a previous case patient was 
discharged. In the multivariable model, having undergone ≥1 gastroscopy (odds ratio 
[OR] = 4.40, 95% confidence interval [CI] = 2.00 to 9.65 and OR = 2.47; 95% CI = 1.12 to 
5.49), >10 day use of selective digestive tract decontamination (SDD) (OR = 2.97; 95% CI 
= 1.02 to 8.68 and OR = 4.61; 95% CI = 1.22 to 17.37), and use of quinolones (OR = 3.29; 
95% CI = 1.34 to 8.10 and OR = 3.95; 95% CI = 1.13 to 13.83 and OR = 4.47; 95% CI = 1.75 
to 11.43) were identified as risk factors when using both control groups. The network 
analysis indicated that the majority of transmissions occurred on the wards, but through 
unidentified and presumably persistent sources, which are most likely in the innate hos-
pital environment. Previous use of certain antibiotic regimens made patients prone to 
VIM-PA carriage. Additionally, gastroscopy could be considered as a high-risk procedure 
in patients with risk factors. Our results add to the growing body of evidence that infec-
tion control measures targeting VIM-PA should be focused on reducing antibiotics and 
eliminating sources in the environment.
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The emergence of multidrug-resistant strains of Pseudomonas aeruginosa (MDRPA) is of 
global concern (1, 2). Infections with this resistant microorganism lead to increased mor-
bidity and mortality in patients; especially in specific patient groups, such as those in 
intensive care units (3-6). MDRPA hospital outbreaks are mostly caused by MDRPA which 
produce carbapenemases, with as most clinically significant the metallo-β-lactamases 
(MBL) (2). Currently, the Verona Integron-encoded MBL (VIM) is the most widespread 
MBL in P. aeruginosa (2, 7-9). Sources are often hard to eradicate because P. aeruginosa 
is known to form a biofilm in environmental niches which protects it from cleaning and 
disinfection actions (10, 11).
Since 2003, a VIM-positive clone of P. aeruginosa (VIM-PA) has emerged in our hospital 
and became entrenched causing multiple episodes of colonizations and infections in 
patients (9, 12). A systematic review published by our research group showed that the 
leading risk factors for acquiring MDRPA were carbapenem use and having medical 
devices (13). However, risk factors are likely to be outbreak specific because of different 
local circumstances and patient populations.
The aim of this study was first to identify epidemiological relationships between pa-
tients with a VIM-PA, and to identify the most common way of transmission. Second, we 
aimed to identify risk factors for presence of VIM-PA among colonized and/or infected 
patients with a case-control study. When a case-control study is used to understand 
an outbreak, it is often not clear what the best control group is. Both under- and over-
matching may affect the results; in essence, the choice of the control determines the 
outcome. Therefore, our third aim was identifying the most appropriate control group.
meTHods
ethics statement
Written approval to conduct this study was received from the medical ethics research 
committee of the Erasmus MC University Medical Centre (Erasmus MC), Rotterdam, the 
Netherlands (MEC-2015-240). This study is registered in the Dutch National Trial Register 
(NTR5145).
setting
This retrospective study was conducted at the Erasmus MC in Rotterdam, the Nether-
lands, using data from August 2003 until April 2015. In this 1200-bed university hospital 
all medical specialties are available; organized into 48 departments. The Department 
of Adult Intensive Care (adult ICU) comprises of three high-level ICU wards, and each 
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ward has only single-patient rooms. At the ICU, patients expected to be on a mechanical 
ventilator for >48h or anticipated to be admitted to the ICU for >72h receive selective di-
gestive tract decontamination (SDD). The SDD regimen is identical to the regimen used 
by de Smet et al., including four days of cefotaxime intravenously (14). The total number 
of clinical admissions and clinical admission days from 2003 until 2015 are available in 
supplement 1.
Patient inclusion and microbiological analysis
Patients were included if identified with VIM-PA between 48 hours after admittance 
to and 48 hours after discharge from a department in the main Erasmus MC building. 
Patients were excluded if admitted only to the Erasmus MC Sophia Children’s Hospital or 
only to the Erasmus MC Cancer Institute. These buildings are physically separated from 
the main building, and have their own employees. To our knowledge, there has been 
no cross-over of VIM-PA to and from these separate buildings. In addition, 22 patients 
that were involved in an outbreak resulting from a contaminated duodenoscope used 
for endoscopic retrograde cholangiopancreatography were excluded. The exact cause, 
source and transmission route were known and it was therefore investigated and re-
ported separately (15).
Cultures taken for clinical diagnostic purposes were processed in the laboratory using 
standard microbiological methods. In case of suspected growth of carbapenemase-
producing P. aeruginosa or MDRPA, an in-house polymerase chain reaction (PCR) for de-
tection of blaVIM on LightCycler 480 (Roche Diagnostics, Almere, The Netherlands) was 
performed using previously reported primers (9, 12). For screening for VIM-PA, swabs 
were obtained from throat and rectum, cultured overnight at 35°C in a Tryptic Soy Broth 
with ceftazidime (2mg/L) and vancomycin (50mg/L), followed by our in-house PCR test 
on the broth. Positive PCR results were confirmed by subculturing the broth on a blood 
agar (BD Diagnostics, Breda, The Netherlands); P. aeruginosa growing on this agar plate 
was subjected to blaVIM PCR. Identification and susceptibility testing was performed 
using Vitek2 (bioMérieux, Marcy l’Etoile, France). Since January 2013, the MALDI-TOF 
(Bruker Daltonics, Bremen, Germany) was used for identification. Clonal relatedness of 
VIM-PA from clinical and screening cultures was determined using the DiversiLab system 
with the Pseudomonas kit (bioMérieux).
General infection prevention and control measures were installed after each case was 
identified (e.g. isolation). However, in 2011 these measures were intensified; at two adult 
intensive care units (ICUs), twice-weekly screening for VIM-PA (i.e. rectum and throat 
cultures) was implemented from October 2011. However, after April 2014, this was 
reduced to once a week. After August 2014, the weekly screening halted; however, was 
re-implemented in September 2014 because a new case of VIM-PA was identified from 
a clinical sample. Additionally, at the ICU rectum and throat cultures on VIM are taken 
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upon admittance and discharge of patients. At the neurological high care ward, screen-
ing took place once a week from August 2013 until January 2016.
network analysis
Admission histories in time and department/room location of patients identified with 
VIM-PA were retrieved to define epidemiological relatedness. Each identified relation 
was classified in one out of four categories (Table 1). Then, the data were imported into 
Cytoscape v3.2.1 (http://www.cytoscape.org) and the network was visualized (16). It was 
analysed whether a patient only ‘received’, only ‘transmitted’, or ‘received and transmit-
ted’ the VIM-PA following the definitions in Table 1. “Only received” indicated that a 
patient did not have epidemiological links to patients identified with a VIM-PA at a later 
time, “only transmitted” indicated that a patient did not have epidemiological links to 
patients identified with a VIM-PA earlier in time. “Received and transmitted” indicated 
that a patient had epidemiological relationships to patients identified with VIM-PA ear-
lier in time and later in time.
Case-control studies
The risk factor analysis was performed in individual matched retrospective case-control 
studies, using a 1:2:2 ratio, with hospital-based controls. All information was extracted 
from the electronic medical records. A list of all patient and treatment related variables 
collected for cases and controls is presented in supplement 2.
Control groups
Patients in control group 1 and 2 were matched for the following three characteristics: 
I: admitted to the same ward where the case supposedly acquired the VIM-PA (i.e. the 
ward where the patient was admitted 48 hours before the positive culture) (exact 
match), II: being admitted on the same date as the case (best match), III: having the same 
days of exposure as the case (i.e. the days between admittance and the date of the first 
positive culture with VIM-PA) (best match). If exact matching was not possible -with the 
exception of ward- exposure time was found to be the most imperative factor. Patients 
in control group 3 and 4 were matched for the following characteristics: I: admitted to 
Table 1. Definitions of epidemiological relatedness
Definite1 Probable Possible-I Possible-II Impossible
Same patient room 1 1 0 0 0
Same department 1 1 1 1 0
Same period 1 0a 1 0a 0a/0/1
0= no; 1= yes, 0a= <3 months after previous positive patient was discharged. 1Definition definite was not 
possible at the intensive care units because only single patient rooms are present.
116 Chapter 3.1
the same ward as the case (exact match), II: admittance on the same date as the case 
(best match). The control patient had to be free of colonization or infection with VIM-PA. 
This could be proven either by negative screening cultures or by the absence of clinical 
cultures with VIM-PA. A control patient could not serve as a control more than two times; 
within and between the four different control groups. Also, a case patient could never be 
selected as a control patient.
Statistical analyses
For continuous variables, means or medians were calculated. For categorical variables, 
percentages were calculated. The conditional logistic regression model was used in 
both univariate and multivariable analyses. Univariate analyses were conducted using 
the COXREG procedure in SPSS version 21 (IBM CorP., Armonk, New York, USA). Charac-
teristics with a P-value of <0.1 in univariate analysis were included in the multivariable 
analyses. Treatment variables could be included as 1) use yes/no, 2) use for 0/1-3/≥4 
days or 3) use for 0/1-3/4-10/≥11 days. Selection for inclusion in the multivariable model 
of either category 1, 2 or 3 of a certain antibiotic was based on: 1) >5 patients in present 
in each group, 2) estimates of the different categories had to show a difference of at 
least 1 odds ratio (OR). Multivariable analyses were conducted using conditional logistic 
regression with dynamic ridge penalties in the R Project for statistical computing ver-
sion 3.3.1 (Vienna, Austria). Subgroup analyses were performed for ward of acquisition 
of case patients and matched controls being ICU or being non-ICU, as well as for case 
patients in clonal clusters as indicated by the typing results. Additionally, analyses were 
performed between patients in control group 1&2 and 3&4. Results were presented as 
ORs with 95% confidence intervals (CI). P-values <0.05 were considered statistically sig-




Out of 166 patients identified with a VIM-PA between August 2003 and April 2015, eight 
children were excluded because they were admitted only to the Erasmus MC Sophia 
Children’s hospital and one patient was excluded because admitted only to the Erasmus 
MC Cancer Institute. In addition, 13 patients were excluded because the VIM-PA was 
identified within 48 hours after admission. Ultimately, 144 patients were included in 
the network analysis and as case patients in the case-control study (supplement 1). 
Nineteen different wards of acquisition were identified, including three ICUs (i.e. two 
general adult ICUs and 1 thoracic ICU). The top 5 locations of acquisition were the two 
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general adult ICUs (87 patients, 60.4%), the gastro-intestinal surgical ward (10 patients; 
6.9%), and the gastroenterology and hepatology ward (7 patients, 4.9%). Typing showed 
that the VIM-PA of 29 (20.1%) patients belonged to clonal cluster A, 105 (72.9%) to clonal 
cluster B, 7 (4.9%) did not belong to clonal cluster A or B, and it was not possible to type 
strains from 3 patients (2.1%).
network analysis
From 2003 until 2015, we identified 307 relationships in 114 out of 144 patients (Table 
1, Figure 1). Thirty out of 144 patients did not have relationships to other case patients 
(20.8%). When considering the definitions (Table 1) we identified nine probable relation-
ships, 38 possible-I relationships and 260 possible-II relationships at 12 different depart-
ments. Most relationships (92%) were identified at the ICU. Twenty-five patients (17.4%) 




It was impossible to perfectly match all cases to four controls. Overall, perfect matching 
was achieved in 38.2% (range: 16.0%-66.0%). For cases, the median days from admis-
sion to acquisition of VIM-PA was 14 days (range: 1-114 days). In the control groups, the 
median error in days was 4, 4, -1 and -1 days respectively. Seventeen patients served 2 
times as control patient between the 4 control groups (11.8%).
Figure 1. Network of 307 relationships in 114 out of 144 patients identified with VIM-PA. Thirty out of 144 
patients did not have relationships to other case patients (20.8%). Edge colours represent different Erasmus 
MC departments; green represents the two adult ICU wards. Line shapes represent the different epidemio-
logical relationships as described in Table 1: contiguous line= probable, dash line= possible A, solid line= 
possible B. The arrow shows the direction of the relationship.
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Risk factors for acquisition
Patient related clinical variables with crude odds ratios, 95% CI and P-values are pre-
sented in Table 2. Compared to control group 1&2 and control group 3&4, the median 
length of admission was significantly longer and the 1-year mortality rate was signifi-
cantly higher in case patients (Table 2).
Treatment related variables with crude odds ratios, 95% CI and P-values are presented 
in Table 3 and in supplement 3. When comparing cases to control group 1&2, multivari-
able analysis revealed five risk factors; two patient related clinical risk factors, and three 
treatment related risk factors (Figure 2). The highest odds ratio was identified for having 
undergone ≥1 gastroscopy 6 months prior to the identification of VIM-PA (OR= 4.40, 
95%CI= 2.00 to 9.65, P<0.001). When comparing cases to control group 3&4, one patient 
related clinical protective factor was identified (i.e. malignancies) and one risk factor 
(i.e. gastroscopy) (Figure 2). Also, four treatment related risk factors were identified; use 
of piperacillin/tazobactam, 1-3 day and >3 day use of quinolones and >10 day use of 
SDD (Figure 2). The highest odds ratio was identified for >10 day use of SDD (OR= 4.61, 
95%CI= 1.22 to 17.37, P=0.024). In both case-control studies, previous use of quinolones, 
use of SDD for >10 days, and having undergone ≥1 gastroscopy 6 months prior to the 
identification of VIM-PA were identified as risk factors, and could therefore be considered 
robust risk factors.
Univariate results of the subgroup analyses are presented in supplement 4 and 5. 
Multivariable results are displayed in Figure 3. There are differences in identified risk 
factors in the different subgroups. For example, for patients with DiversiLab type A 
endoscopies did not seem to play a role, whereas in type B they did. Also, at the ICU 
Figure 2. Risk factors and protective factors identified using multivariable analysis. Abbreviations: SDD= 
selective digestive tract decontamination, 95%CI= 95% confidence interval.
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































antibiotic use (trimethoprim/sulfamethoxazole) was identified as a risk factor in com-
bination with having undergone ≥1 gastroscopy and bronchoscopy 6 months prior to 
the identification of VIM-PA, whereas at non-ICU wards it was a combination of having 
undergone ≥1 gastroscopy 6 months prior to the identification of VIM-PA and surgery or 
being admitted at the Erasmus MC before.
Univariate differences between control group 1&2 and 3&4 are presented in supple-
ment 6. Multivariable analysis revealed only two differences between the control groups, 
regarding protection by acute gastrointestinal tract problems and use of nitrofurantoin 
(Figure 2).
disCussion
Our study aimed to identify epidemiological relationships, the most common way of 
transmission and risk factors for presence of VIM-PA. In the network analysis, we did not 
identify definite relationship and only nine probable relationships. Therefore, the same 
patient room, either sharing a patient room or being admitted at the same patient room 
within 3 months, is not the most likely source. However, there was a relation with the 
Figure 3. Risk factors identified using multivariable analysis of subgroups DiversiLab type A or type B and 
ward of acquisition of the case patient being the intensive care unit (ICU) or non-ICU wards. Abbreviations: 
SDD= selective digestive tract decontamination, 95%CI= 95% confidence interval, ICU= intensive care unit.
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same department. Surprisingly, the same admission period seems not to be important; 
most relationships were identified within 3 months after the previous positive patient 
was discharged. Thus, the majority of transmissions occurred on the wards in a wide time 
frame. Therefore, it must have occurred through unidentified sources, which may be 
either undetected patients or unidentified sources in the innate environment. Given the 
fact that patients at the ICUs and neurology high-care ward were frequently screened; 
we assume that undetected patients are not plausible. Our hypothesis is that persistent 
sources in the innate environment play an important role in the route of transmission 
of this pathogen. This is in agreement with current knowledge on the behaviour of 
this bacterium, as well as previous outbreak reports that identified the environment as 
source/reservoir (13, 17).
The case-control studies showed first that previous use of certain antibiotics were as-
sociated with an increased risk of acquisition of VIM-PA; especially the use of quinolones, 
piperacillin/tazobactam, and trimethoprim/sulfamethoxazole should be avoided if pos-
sible. Second, gastroscopy and bronchoscopy were identified as risk factors (Figure 2). 
Third, the results of the two different case-control studies were largely in line with each 
other, with three common risk factors (i.e. previous use of quinolones, use of SDD for > 
10 days, and having undergone ≥1 gastroscopy 6 months prior to the identification of 
VIM-PA) that could therefore be considered as robust. The assumption would be that 
certain antibiotics change the normal gut or throat flora in such a way that multidrug-
resistant bacteria more easily attach to and colonize either the gut or throat. Neverthe-
less, multidrug-resistant microorganisms have to be offered to the patient, and this may 
occur through endoscopic procedures by contaminated endoscopes or using water 
from a contaminated source. Both the previous use of antibiotics and prior procedures 
with flexible endoscopes have been highlighted in previous studies as risk factors for 
acquisition of various multidrug microorganisms, including VIM-PA (18, 19).
The group of antibiotics that favours presence of VIM-PA (i.e. increases a patients’ sus-
ceptibility to acquire VIM-PA) depends on the choice of the control group. Furthermore, 
we learned that although highly significant factors were obtained with one group of 
controls, these can disappear when other groups are compared as these groups differ 
in inclusion criteria or definition; the results highly depend on the choice of the control.
limitations
Network analysis
Criteria for epidemiological relationships, especially relationships in time and space, 
are not clearly defined for outbreaks with multidrug-resistant bacteria. We developed 
criteria which are easy to apply; however, inherent to this is a simplification of the truth. 




First, this is a single-centre case-control study, which possibly hampers generalizability. 
Second, matching on ward of acquisition and length of stay prior to the positive culture 
might have caused additional matching on e.g. comorbidities and disease severity. How-
ever, we have done this deliberately. When comparing ICU to non-ICU patients, disease 
severity and possibly also comorbidities will be risk factors just because the groups are 
not similar. Third, misclassification of exposure could be present; not all control patients 
were cultured for VIM-PA, which could lead to VIM-PA carriers present in control grouP. 
However, this misclassification if present could only have led to an underestimation of 
the identified effects. Fourth, perfect matching was only achieved in 38%. This seems 
low; however, 100% perfect matching is not possible for large case-control studies 
including patients who have complicated medical histories and futures. Possibly, the 
percentage of perfect matching could be added as an item to the STROBE statement 
(20).
In one of the subgroup analyses, differences were identified between DiversiLab clonal 
cluster A and B (Figure 3). However, although widely applied, the DiversiLab system can 
be considered a limitation of the study, since available data regarding the DiversiLab 
system for P. aeruginosa are contradictory. A review by Brossier et al. on the performance 
of the DiversiLab system for P. aeruginosa concluded that the results should be inter-
preted with caution, and always in combination with epidemiological data, as was done 
in our study (21).
Conclusion
The network analysis indicated that the majority of transmissions occurred on the 
wards, but through unidentified and presumably persistent sources, which are most 
likely in the innate hospital environment. Previous use of certain antibiotic regimens 
made patients prone to VIM-PA carriage. Additionally, gastroscopy could be considered 
as a high-risk procedure in patients with risk factors.
Recommendation
If there is an outbreak with VIM-PA, we showed that first; the entire ward should be seen 
as reservoir and as contaminated. Therefore, cleaning and disinfection practices should 
be installed and possible sources should be eliminated. We also feel that it is especially 
important to search for unknown reservoirs in the environment. Second, use of par-
ticularly quinolones should be avoided because this could make a patient ‘prone’ for 
acquiring VIM-PA. Third, we showed that in an outbreak setting gastroscopy and bron-
choscopy could be seen as high-risk procedures. Finally, a case-control study should 
be executed to identify outbreak specific risk factors. Because we showed that if you 
125Transmission of VIM-positive P. aeruginosa
change matching criteria outcomes do differ, it would be advisable to always include 
multiple definitions for control inclusion.
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AbsTRACT
Increasing numbers of outbreaks caused by contaminated duodenoscopes used for 
Endoscopic Retrograde Cholangiopancreatography (ERCP) procedures have been re-
ported, some with fatal outcomes. We conducted a nationwide cross-sectional study to 
determine the prevalence of bacterial contamination of reprocessed duodenoscopes in 
The Netherlands. All 73 Dutch ERCP centers were invited to sample ≥2 duodenoscopes 
using centrally distributed kits according to uniform sampling methods, explained by 
video instructions. Depending on duodenoscope type, four to six sites were sampled 
and centrally cultured. Contamination was defined as (i) any microorganism with ≥20 
colony forming units (CFU)/20 mL (AM20) and (ii) presence of microorganisms with 
gastrointestinal or oral origin, independent of CFU count (MGO). Sixty-seven out of 73 
centers (92%) sampled 745 sites of 155 duodenoscopes. Ten different duodenoscope 
types from three distinct manufacturers were sampled including 69 (46%) Olympus 
TJFQ180V, 43 (29%) Olympus TJF-160VR, 11 (7%) Pentax ED34-i10T, 8 (5%) Pentax ED-
3490TK and 5 (3%) Fujifilm ED-530XT8. Thirty-three (22%) duodenoscopes from 26 
(39%) centers were contaminated (AM20). On 23 (15%) duodenoscopes MGO were de-
tected, including Enterobacter cloacae, Escherichia coli, Klebsiella pneumonia and yeasts. 
For both definitions, contamination was not duodenoscope type dependent (P values: 
0.20 and higher). In 39% of all Dutch ERCP centers, at least one AM20-contaminated 
patient-ready duodenoscope was identified. Fifteen per cent of the duodenoscopes 
harbored MGO, indicating residual organic material of previous patients, that is, failing 
of disinfection. These results suggest that the present reprocessing and process control 
procedures are not adequate and safe.
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Very recently, an increasing number of infectious outbreaks involving multidrug-resis-
tant organisms (MDRO) caused by contaminated duodenoscopes, used for Endoscopic 
Retrograde Cholangiopancreatography (ERCP) procedures, have been reported in both 
Europe and USA (1-5). These include outbreaks of infections with carbapenem-resistant 
Enterobacteriaceae, such as Escherichia coli and Klebsiella pneumoniae (1, 2), of which 
some have been associated with fatal outcomes (6). Post-ERCP infections typically range 
between 2% and 4% (7). It is not clear to what extent these infections are caused by 
the procedure itself (i.e. endogenous infections) or to what extent contaminated duo-
denoscopes are the source of infection (i.e. exogenous infections). For example, in one 
specific outbreak with a persistently contaminated duodenoscope, 14.4% of all patients 
who underwent an ERCP were found to be colonized or infected (8). Outbreaks can 
be traced by bacterial typing. Especially when MDRO strains are involved, detection is 
easier as laboratories usually store these resistant strains and (retrospective) typing can 
be performed. This raises the question whether outbreaks with duodenoscopes are a 
new and emerging problem or whether outbreaks are only detected more frequently 
because of increased awareness facilitated by recognizable MDRO in patients (2, 9).
During procedures in the gastrointestinal tract, all flexible endoscopes including 
duodenoscopes become heavily exposed to gastrointestinal flora (10). Therefore, flex-
ible endoscopes are reprocessed after each procedure: a multistep process involving 
flushing, manual cleaning, automated cleaning, high-level disinfection and drying. Duo-
denoscopes are more difficult to reprocess compared with other flexible endoscopes 
(10). This is due to their complex design, which includes a side viewing tip, forceps eleva-
tor and elevator channel. Patient-ready duodenoscopes can be contaminated because 
of breaches in the reprocessing protocol, inadequate handling or because the current 
technique of reprocessing may be inadequate for the currently available duodenoscope 
design (11). Recent outbreaks have been documented to occur even when manufactur-
ers’ Instructions For Use (IFU) for reprocessing were followed to the letter (2, 5, 9).
In the Netherlands, as in many other parts of the world, process control is used. This 
means that reprocessing is considered to be adequate when it is performed according 
to the IFU and according to the standard handbook of the Dutch Steering Group for 
Flexible Endoscope Cleaning and Disinfection (SFERD) (12). This handbook is based 
on regulations applicable in the Netherlands as well as the guidelines of the European 
Society of Gastrointestinal Endoscopy (ESGE) (13). Despite international outbreaks and 
outbreaks in Dutch ERCP centers, both the IFU and SFERD do not include microbial sur-
veillance after disinfection as a routine practice (14, 15). Recently, contamination of duo-
denoscopes has been assessed in several studies (16-18). Most studies were performed 
in a single university center, making it difficult to extrapolate their results and estimate 
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the true burden on a national level (17, 18). A study among 21 centers was conducted by 
Brandabur et al, showing contamination rates with a wide variability across centers (16). 
To date, no such study has been conducted in a nationwide setting using a uniform sam-
pling and culture method as well as examining all possible contamination sites. Given 
the increase in the number of publications pertaining duodenoscope contamination 
and the potentially severe consequences for patients, there is an urgency to develop 
a more thorough understanding of the scale of the problem. Therefore, the aim of this 
study was to determine the prevalence of microbial contamination of patient-ready 
duodenoscopes in all ERCP centers in the Netherlands.
meTHods
setting
We conducted a prospective nationwide cross-sectional study among all Dutch ERCP 
centers. In the Netherlands, over 16.000 ERCP procedures are performed in 73 ERCP cen-
ters yearly (19). All 73 Dutch ERCP centers were asked to sample at least two duodeno-
scopes at their own choosing and, if present, to include the newest Olympus TJF-Q180V 
(Olympus, Zoeterwoude, The Netherlands). Duodenoscopes were eligible for sampling 
if they were reprocessed and ready for patient use, for example, after high level disinfec-
tion or after drying in the storage cabinet. No data were recorded about the moment of 
sampling, surveillance methods or adherence to reprocessing or sampling protocols. No 
patient data were included in this study; therefore, there was no need for approval by 
the Medical Ethical Research Committee.
sample collection
Sampling was performed independently by local staff of the included ERCP centers, using 
a centrally distributed sample collection kit, according to a strict and uniform sampling 
protocol (see supplementary files). This method was developed by a multidisciplinary 
team of reprocessing staff, medical device experts, infection control professionals, medi-
cal microbiologists and gastroenterologists based on the SFERD standard handbook 
(12). The sampling protocol was explained using 12 instruction videos available online 
(see online supplementary videos). As examples, the sampling and labelling procedure 
was shown in detail using one Olympus TJF-160VR and one Pentax ED34- i10T (Pentax, 
Dodewaard, The Netherlands) duodenoscope. Duodenoscopes were sampled while 
placed in the Automated Endoscope Reprocessor or on a sterile surface. Depending on 
the duodenoscopes type, four to six sites were sampled. The four sites present in all 
duodenoscope types were: (i) a flush of the biopsy channel, (ii) a flush of the suction 
channel, (iii) a swab from the forceps elevator and (iv) a single brush through the biopsy 
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and suction channel. Type-dependent samples were: (i) a swab of the removable protec-
tion cap and (ii) a flush of the elevator channel or air/water channel, if these channels 
were unsealed. Channels were flushed with sterile physiological saline solution of which 
at least 20 mL was collected at the distal tip in a sterile container. The flush fluid was as-
pirated with a sterile needle and injected in two 9.5 mL BD Vacutainers without additives 
(Becton Dickinson, Etten-Leur, The Netherlands). Forceps elevator and protection cap 
were sampled with ESwabs (Copan Italia S.p.A., Brescia, Italy). Type dependent, Olympus 
BW-412T or Pentax CS6021T single-use endoscope cleaning brushes were used to brush 
the biopsy and suction channel. Both ESwabs and the brush tip were transported in 
ESwab medium. Instructions were to swab first, second to flush the channels and finally 
to brush the channels. The decision to reprocess the endoscope after sampling was up 
to the respective centers and was not documented for the purpose of the current study. 
Samples were sent to the Erasmus MC department of Medical Microbiology and Infec-
tious Diseases for culturing.
Culturing and interpretation
Samples were cultured on the day of receipt. Channel flushes were filtrated over a 0.45 
μm filter of which the filtrate was forced on R2A agar. ESwabs and brush tips were vor-
texed in their ESwab medium of which 0.75 mL was poured on a blood agar. Samples 
were incubated at 35°C, examined for growth for 72 hours and read at 24 hours, 48 
hours and 72 hours. Culture results were presented in colony forming units (CFU)/20 
mL per microorganism. Results were sent to the respective ERCP centers without fur-
ther interpretation: further action was up to the respective ERCP center and was not 
documented for the purpose of the current study. At the time of study conduct, Dutch 
guidelines for endoscopy centers stated that in case of contamination with a subset of 
indicator microorganisms with ≥20 CFU/20 mL or in case of persistent contamination, 
endoscopes should be quarantined and possible causes be investigated (12). Cultured 
microorganisms were categorized depending on their origin into gastrointestinal, oral, 
skin and waterborne flora. Contamination was defined according to two definitions: (i) 
microbial growth with ≥20 CFU/20 mL of any type of microorganism (AM20) as used by 
the ESGE guideline and Dutch SFERD handbook (12, 13), or (ii) presence of microbial 
growth (≥1 CFU/20 mL) of gastrointestinal and/or oral microorganisms (MGO).
statistical analysis
Categorical data are presented in percentages. Mean (range) and median (IQR) are 
given for continuous and skewed data, respectively. The χ² test was used to compare 
categorical data and Student’s t-test or Mann Whitney U-test was used to compare 
continuous data. Contamination rates of duodenoscope types and sample sites were 
compared according to a logistic regression model, using the SAS procedure GENMOD. 
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This model adjusted for the multiple samples of each unique duodenoscope, with each 
duodenoscope clustered within their respective ERCP center. Duodenoscope types were 
compared with the newest Olympus TJF-Q180V type as a reference and sample sites 
were compared with the flush of the biopsy channel. For both analyses, duodenoscope 
types or sample sites could be included if there was at least one contamination case and 
one non-contamination case. Analyses were performed using SAS V.9.4 (SAS, Cary, North 
Carolina, USA) and SPSS V.21.0 (IBM, Armonk, New York, USA).
ResulTs
Between June 2015 and March 2016, 67 out of 73 (92%) Dutch ERCP centers sampled 745 
sites of 155 endoscopes. Five endoscopes were excluded: four duodenoscopes from one 
center whose samples were cultured in their own microbiology department and one 
gastroscope from another center as this type of endoscope does not have a forceps el-
evator, that is, no duodenoscope (Figure 1). Twenty-six samples from 17 duodenoscopes 
were excluded, as these sites did not correspond with the specified duodenoscope type. 
This resulted in an inclusion of 150 duodenoscopes with a total of 701 samples from 66 
(92% of all centers) ERCP centers (Figure 1). The median time between local sampling 
Figure 1. Flow diagram. ERCP, Endoscopic Retrograde Cholangiopancreatography.
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and culturing in the Erasmus MC was 1 day (IQR 1–2). Table 1 provides an overview of the 
contamination prevalence per duodenoscope type and sample site for AM20 and MGO 
contamination definitions.
Contamination according to the AM20 definition was found in 33 (22%) out of the 
150 reprocessed and patient-ready duodenoscopes. Duodenoscopes were most often 
contaminated with skin flora (n=17; 11%) and to a lesser extent with waterborne flora 
(n=12; 8%), gastrointestinal flora (n=10; 7%) or oral flora (n=4; 3%). Contamination ac-
cording to the MGO definition was found in 23 (15%) duodenoscopes. Table 2 shows all 
different microorganisms that were cultured, among others Escherichia coli, Klebsiella 
pneumoniae and Pseudomonas aeruginosa.
Table 1. Prevalence of AM20 and MGO contamination for duodenoscopes and sample sites.
duodenoscope type
n Am20 mgo
Contam. not contam. Contam. not contam.
All duodenoscopes 150 33 (22%) 117 (78%) 23 (15%) 127 (85%)
Olympus TJF-Q180V 69 15 (22%) 54 (78%) 15 (22%) 54 (78%)
Olympus TJF-160VR 43 13 (30%) 30 (70%) 6 (14%) 37 (86%)
Olympus TJF-160R 8 1 (13%) 7 (87%) 0 8
Olympus TJF-140R 2 0 2 0 2
Olympus TJF-145 2 0 2 0 2
Pentax ED34-i10T 11 3 (27%) 8 (73%) 0 11
Pentax ED-3490TK 8 0 8 0 8
Pentax ED-3680TK 1 0 1 1 (100%) 0
Fujifilm ED-530XT8 5 0 5 0 5
Fujifilm ED-530XT 1 1 (100%) 0 1 (100%) 0
sample site
Am20 mgo
Contam. not contam. Contam. not contam.
All sample sites 701* 47 (7%) 654 (93%) 35 (5%) 666 (95%)
Biopsy channel 146 5 (3%) 141 (97%) 6 (4%) 140 (96%)
Suction channel 137 4 (3%) 133 (97%) 5 (4%) 132 (96%)
Forceps elevator 148 14 (10%) 134 (90%) 7 (5%) 141 (95%)
Brush 139 17 (12%) 122 (89%) 14 (10%) 125 (90%)
Protection cap 56 6 (11%) 50 (89%) 3 (5%) 53 (95%)
Elevator channel 53 0 53 0 53
Air/water channel 26 1 (5%) 21 (95%) 0 22
*Sampling of all possible sites would have yielded 745 samples: 44 (6%) sites were not sampled. This in-
cluded 4/150 (3%) biopsy channel, 13/150 (9%) suction channel, 2/150 (1%) forceps elevator, 11/150 (7%) 
brush, 9/65 (13%) protection cap, 2/55 (4%) elevator channel and 3/25 (12%) air/water channel samples.
AM20, Microbial growth with ≥20CFU/20mL of any type of microorganism; MGO, Presence of any microbial 
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Ten different duodenoscope types from three distinct manufacturers (i.e. Olympus, 
Pentax and Fujifilm) were sampled. Contamination as defined by AM20 was identified in 
five different duodenoscope types and contamination as defined by MGO was identified 
in four different types. As shown in Figure 2, contamination for AM20 (four duodeno-
scope types included) as well as MGO (two duodenoscope types included) was shown 
not to be type-dependent (all P>0.05).
The AM20 contaminated duodenoscopes originated from 26 (39%) centers across the 
Netherlands. No difference (P=0.10) was shown in contamination prevalence between 
academic tertiary medical centers (n=3/8; 38%), specialized peripheral medical centers 
(n=13/23; 57%) or general peripheral medical centers (n=10/35; 29%). This was also the 
case for MGO-contaminated duodenoscopes originating from 19 (28%) centers. No dif-
ference was found (P=0.25) between academic tertiary medical centers (n=3/8; 38%), 
specialized peripheral medical centers (n=9/23; 39%) and general peripheral medical 
centers (n=7/35; 20%).
Microorganisms were cultured from 166 (24%) sample sites of 97 (65%) duodeno-
scopes. Additionally, 54 (8%) sample sites of 41 (27%) duodenoscopes contained two or 
Figure 2. OR for each duodenoscope type on contamination. AM20, microbial growth with ≥20CFU/20 
mL of any type of microorganism; CFU, colony forming units; MGO, presence of any microbial growth of 
gastrointestinal or oral microorganisms.
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more microorganisms, in some cases up to five different microorganisms. As shown in 
table 1, all sample sites, except the flush of the elevator channel, were found positive for 
AM20 or MGO contamination. The flush of the biopsy channel was used as a reference 
to compare the contamination prevalence of all sample sites. Three sample sites had 
a higher probability of being contaminated (Figure 3). According to the AM20 defini-
tion, the swab of the elevator (OR 2.93, 95% CI 1.13 to 7.61; P=0.03) and the swab of 
the protection cap (3.38, 95% CI 1.08 to 10.55; P=0.04) were more often contaminated. 
The brush of the biopsy/suction channel was more often contaminated for both AM20 
(OR 3.87, 95% CI 1.13 to 7.61; P=0.006) and MGO (OR 2.64, 95% CI 1.14 to 6.14; P=0.02) 
definitions.
disCussion
In our nationwide prevalence study, we found that over one-fifth of sampled duodeno-
scopes were contaminated according to AM20 definition, with 39% of Dutch ERCP cen-
ters having at least one contaminated duodenoscope intended to be ready for patient 
use. Furthermore, MGO were cultured on 15% of the sampled duodenoscopes, indicat-
ing the presence of organic residue of previously treated patients. Our observations 
coincide with worldwide reported outbreaks indicating that exogenous transmission 
Figure 3. OR for each sample site on contamination. AM20, microbial growth with ≥20CFU/20 mL of any 
type of microorganism; CFU, colony forming units; MGO, presence of any microbial growth of gastrointes-
tinal or oral microorganisms.
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of bacteria and associated infections and even viral infections related to contaminated 
duodenoscopes continue to threaten patients undergoing ERCP (1-3, 5, 20). Therefore, 
stringent measures are required to lower the number of contaminated duodenoscopes 
in order to minimize the risk of interpatient microbial transmission during ERCP and to 
prevent future outbreaks.
The prevalence of duodenoscope contamination in this study was in line with reports 
from several retrospective single tertiary center studies (18, 21, 22). Recent studies by 
Brandabur et al. and Ross et al. performing post procedure or everyday morning cultures 
reported remarkably lower contamination rates (16, 17). This could be explained by the 
fact that continuous feedback of microbial surveillance resulted in a raised alertness, 
resulting in lower contamination rates over time. In the centers included in the present 
study, it is not common practice to perform surveillance cultures, especially no daily 
or post procedure cultures, as Dutch guidelines do not demand these (12, 23). Other 
contributing factors could be differences in sampling and culture methods. For example, 
we used a more sensitive contamination cut-off and a longer incubating time than 
Brandabur et al. and Ross et al (16, 17). The present study was conducted in 2015–2016 
after multiple MDRO-outbreaks were reported (inter)nationally, including reports of 
outbreaks in Dutch ERCP centers as early as 2009 and 2012 (14, 15). Despite current 
national awareness about the potential consequences of contamination, our results 
were concordant with a cross-sectional multicenter (n=37) Canadian study published in 
2002 in which a contamination prevalence of 30% was reported using a contamination 
cut-off of 10 CFU/mL (24).
The most recent duodenoscope types introduced into the market have distinct design 
changes, including sealing of the elevator channel and a sealed protection cap, aimed at 
preventing contamination and the need for reprocessing at these locations. In 2012, an 
outbreak in our hospital was linked to the newest Olympus TJF-Q180V duodenoscope 
(5). After the outbreak, the duodenoscope was investigated by Olympus and an inde-
pendent expert. One of the conclusions was that TJF-Q180V’s specific design features 
hampered adequate cleaning and disinfection (15). To further investigate these matters, 
we asked participating centers to include the TJF-Q180V duodenoscope, if present. The 
current study shows that contamination for both AM20 and MGO were not restricted 
to certain duodenoscope types. This is in line with outbreaks that have been reported 
involving various duodenoscope types from all three manufacturers (6). Moreover, 
Brandabur et al. also reported that culture positivity was not affected by scope type (16). 
Despite differences in design, none of the available duodenoscope types seem excluded 
from the risk of contamination.
The differences in the type of cultured flora can give an indication where in the 
reprocessing process the duodenoscopes were contaminated. Several guidelines that 
advocate active microbiological surveillance give guidance on how to interpret culture 
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results (13, 25). In this study, a substantial number of duodenoscopes were contami-
nated with skin and waterborne flora. Contamination with skin flora is thought to arise 
from handling and therefore could potentially easily be reduced by improved handling 
during reprocessing and transport. However, the presence of skin flora could be due 
to contamination during sampling. We cannot rule out this cause as sampling on site 
was not audited. Dutch centers have to use filtered water for reprocessing facilities and 
process control involves quarterly microbiological control of the rinse water (12). In our 
view, persistent contamination with waterborne flora demands a thorough investiga-
tion as it can be caused by several factors, including contamination of the water supply, 
inadequate filtering of the water supply and inadequate drying of the endoscope during 
storage. Contamination with MGO indicates inadequate reprocessing as originating from 
the gastrointestinal tract. This type of contamination could be due to a breach in the 
reprocessing procedure or because the reprocessing procedure cannot be adequately 
performed due to reprocessing, endoscopic or procedure specific risk factors. Currently, 
we are working on a Dutch guideline in which actions following positive cultures will 
be described extensively. The guideline will be submitted for international publication 
in the near future. Differences in Automated Endoscope Reprocessors, endoscope hang 
time and different reprocessing methods do not seem to affect contamination rates (16, 
26, 27). Beside the complex design of the duodenoscope (5, 6, 28), endoscope age has 
also been suggested as a risk factor (5, 18, 26), with Brandabur et al. proposing the num-
ber of procedures as a better indicator for endoscope usage (16). Contamination does 
not seem to be confined to duodenoscopes: single-center studies show that coloscopes 
and gastroscopes can have similar contamination rates (18, 22). However, compared 
with duodenoscopes, other gastrointestinal endoscopes are far less the reason of recent 
reported outbreaks (7). We hypothesize that this could be due to differences between 
types of procedures as ERCP procedures tend to be more invasive, entering sterile body 
cavities and could have a more compromised patient population. The latter defines the 
more serious and therefore detectable clinical outcome of transmission of microorgan-
isms by ERCP compared with other gastrointestinal endoscopes.
In the present study, the brush, the forceps elevator and the protection cap had the 
highest probability of detection of contamination. The forceps elevator is a site known 
to be prone to persistent contamination (2, 5, 16, 17). The brush is also noted as a site 
that can harbor the involved microorganism during an outbreak (17). Borescope channel 
inspections of gastroscopes and coloscopes performed by Ofstead et al. revealed that 
all reprocessed endoscope channels contained fluid, discoloration and debris (29). This 
underlines that the biopsy channel is subject to heavy wear and tear: devices are intro-
duced frequently, causing soiling of the channel which adds to the risk of contamination 
(30). Remarkably, in the present study, the elevator channel was not contaminated in 
any duodenoscope and the air/water channel in only one duodenoscope. Sampling of 
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these specific channels is often not performed during surveillance and often not even in 
the case of an outbreak (17).
In current guidelines and studies, there is no international consensus on a uniform 
sampling and culturing method, although several differences could potentially affect 
culture outcomes. The location and the number of sample sites differ greatly: in some 
instances, a channel brush (18, 31) or swab of the forceps elevator (12, 24) is omitted. 
When the channel brush or the forceps elevator would not be cultured in the present 
series, 19% (6/32) or 9% (3/32), respectively, of the AM20 contaminated duodenoscopes 
would have been missed. Some studies and guidelines advocate a different order of 
sampling, such as retrograde sampling or the flush-brush-flush method, as it might 
have a higher sensitivity (14, 25, 31, 32). The cleaning brush that is used for sampling 
could disrupt present biofilms and affect subsequent samples. However, in this study, 
the brush sample was performed last. A sample flush with a neutralizer instead of saline 
solution can prevent false negative outcomes due to the biocidal activity of residual 
disinfectants (33, 34) and is advocated by the French guideline and several French stud-
ies (18, 21, 33, 35). The toxicity of the neutralizers might also cause false negatives (36), 
and theoretically the endoscope should not contain any residual disinfectant after a 
successful reprocessing cycle. Other guidelines including the Dutch guideline, accord-
ing to which our sampling protocol was designed, do not require a neutralizer based 
on current evidence (12, 13, 25, 31). However, if a neutralizer effectively prevents false 
negative outcomes, the contamination rates in this study could be even higher. A longer 
incubation time is associated with a higher culture positivity rate. Saliou et al. state that 
endoscope samples should be incubated for at least 1 week. In their study, after 48 hours 
only 55.5% of the final number of contaminated endoscopes were found positive (18). 
Some studies and guidelines use an incubation time of 48 hours (16, 17, 25, 31). In this 
study, we have chosen for a 72 hours period: the microorganisms of concern would be 
detected and the study results could by compared with the centers’ previous microbio-
logical surveillance results. Also, the choice of growing media for incubation of flush 
samples can affect the culture positivity rate. R2A agar, as used in this study, has a high 
sensitivity, especially for slower growing microorganisms (37, 38). To be able to compare 
test results and omit false negative test results, standardized and uniform instructions 
for sampling, culturing and interpretation of culture results should be devised which, 
based on results in this study, should include a channel brush and a swab of the forceps 
elevator as these sites pose the highest risk of contamination.
To the best of our best knowledge, this is the first study assessing contamination 
of duodenoscopes nationwide. Another strength of our study is that we cultured all 
samples in one microbiology laboratory using a standardized protocol. Finally, because 
of the extensive sampling method we were able to analyses all possible contamination 
sites. This study has some limitations. This study could only be conducted nationwide as 
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a cross-sectional study without follow-up samples of the duodenoscopes: improvement 
of contamination rates or persistent contamination was not assessed. Furthermore, 
sampling was conducted independently by local staff. Although we provided strict 
sampling protocols with clear video instructions on how the culture procedure should 
be performed, we were not able to check for adherence to the sampling protocol. Also 
the conditions in which the endoscopes were sampled (i.e. just disinfected or after 
drying with or without alcohol flush or positive air flow) were not recorded. Potential 
differences in culture outcomes between sampling post-disinfection or post drying, 
differences in drying times or other storage or reprocessing parameters could not be as-
sessed. However, all assessed duodenoscopes were ready for use in patients and should 
not be contaminated, regardless of the moment of reprocessing. We hypothesize that 
the effect of these factors on the presence of especially gastrointestinal and or oral flora 
is rather small, as we see this as a failure of the reprocessing process. Last, a small amount 
of sites were not sampled, which could cause underestimation of the total number of 
contaminated duodenoscopes.
The observed nationwide high prevalence of contamination of patient-ready duode-
noscopes is a clear indication that the current combination of reprocessing and process 
control is not sufficient. All participating hospitals are dedicated endoscopy centers fol-
lowing the national guideline that underlines process control. This includes reprocess-
ing exactly according to the manufacturer’s instructions and extensive yearly audits (12, 
23). As adherence to reprocessing protocols was not observed, this study shows real-life 
outcomes of patient-ready duodenoscopes with little bias. Regardless of whether the 
precise cause of contamination was a breach in the reprocessing process or the complex 
duodenoscope design, process control was not able to identify and prevent such large-
scale inadequate reprocessing. This calls for concerted action by all parties involved, 
that is,: manufacturers, regulatory bodies, government agencies, gastroenterologists 
and medical microbiologists. Nowadays, ERCP has evolved into a minimally invasive 
interventional procedure having replaced more invasive and complicated surgical 
procedures. It is an essential procedure practiced all over the world with over 650 000 
procedures performed in USA annually (39). During revision of the market clearance of 
the Olympus TJF-Q180V duodenoscope, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
stated that a decrease in ERCP capacity would be unacceptable (40). However, contami-
nated duodenoscopes put patients at risk of developing clinically relevant infections by 
transmission of microorganisms. In 2015, the FDA issued a warning that some parts of 
duodenoscopes may be extremely difficult to access and adequate cleaning of all areas 
may not be possible (28). Since then additional measures have been suggested (11), 
including alternative reprocessing methods or implementation of microbial surveil-
lance as proposed by Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (10, 31). Eventually, 
radical changes in the design of duodenoscopes should ensure thorough cleaning and 
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disinfection. However, development and market introduction of such newly designed 
duodenoscopes will require substantial time. A complicating factor is that standard-
ized procedures to test duodenoscopes in their ability to be adequately cleaned and 
disinfected are not available. Therefore, on the short term, we should not solely rely 
on process control as there is no scientific proof that this serves as a reliable proxy for 
safe and clean duodenoscopes. Uniform guidelines and instructions for microbial sur-
veillance should be developed. Also, an international registry for contaminated scopes 
should be instituted in order to truly estimate the scale of the problem and track its 
impact and revolution over time.
To conclude, this nationwide cross-sectional study shows high prevalence rates of con-
tamination of duodenoscopes in Dutch ERCP centers. The recent reports on infections 
due to contaminated endoscopes will probably be due to involvement and alertness 
on highly resistant microorganisms, but also the more and more complex designs of 
endoscopes can play a role in this emergence. Additional preventive measures includ-
ing microbial surveillance strategies are needed to reduce the number of contaminated 
duodenoscopes.
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suPPlemenTAl mATeRiAl
supplement 1: Sampling protocol Olympus ERCP duodenoscope
supplement 2: Sampling protocol Pentax ERCP duodenoscope
online only suPPlemenTARy Videos:
Video 1. Instruction video Olympus TJF-160VR: swab forceps elevator
Video 2. Instruction video Olympus TJF-160VR: swab protection cap
Video 3. Instruction video Olympus TJF-160VR: flush elevator wire channel
Video 4. Instruction video Olympus TJF-160VR: flush suction channel
Video 5. Instruction video Olympus TJF-160VR: flush biopsy channel
Video 6. Instruction video Olympus TJF-160VR: brush biopsy/suction channel
Video 7. Instruction video Pentax ED34-i10T: swab forceps elevator
Video 8. Instruction video Pentax ED34-i10T: swab protection cap
Video 9. Instruction video Pentax ED34-i10T: flush suction channel
Video 10. Instruction video Pentax ED34-i10T: flush air/water channel
Video 11. Instruction video Pentax ED34-i10T: flush elevator wire channel
Video 12. Instruction video Pentax ED34-i10T: brush biopsy/suction channel
01010010 01101001 01110011 01101011 00100000 
01100110 01100001 01100011 01110100 01101111 
01110010 01110011 00100000 01100001 01101110 
01100100 00100000 01110100 01110010 01100001 
01101110 01110011 01101101 01101001 01110011 
01110011 01101001 01101111 01101110 00100000 
01101111 01100110 00100000 01101000 01100101 
01100001 01101100 01110100 01101000 01100011 
01100001 01110010 01100101 01011111 01110010 
01100101 01101100 01100001 01110100 01100101 
01100100 00100000 01110000 01100001 01110100 
01101000 01101111 01100111 01100101 01101110 
01110011 01010010 01101001 01110011 01101011 
00100000 01100110 01100001 01100011 01110100 
01101111 01110010 01110011 00100000 01100001 
01101110 01100100 00100000 01110100 01110010 
01100001 01101110 01110011 01101101 01101001 
01110011 01110011 01101001 01101111 01101110 
00100000 01101111 01100110 00100000 01101000 
01100101 01100001 01101100 01110100 01101000
01010010 01101001 01110011 01101011 00100000 
01100110 01100001 01100011 01110100 01101111 
01110010 01110011 00100000 01100001 01101110 
01100100 00100000 01110100 01110010 01100001 
01101110 01110011 01101101 01101001 01110011 
01110011 01101001 01101111 01101110 00100000 
01101111 01100110 00100000 01101000 01100101 
01100001 01101100 01110100 01101000 01100011 
01100001 01110010 01100101 01011111 01110010 
01100101 01101100 01100001 01110100 01100101 
01100100 00100000 01110000 01100001 01110100 
01101000 01101111 01100111 01100101 01101110 
01110011 01010010 01101001 01110011 01101011 
00100000 01100110 01100001 01100011 01110100 
01101111 01110010 01110011 00100000 01100001 
01101110 01100100 00100000 01110100 01110010 
01100001 01101110 01110011 01101101 01101001 
01110011 01110011 01101001 01101111 01101110 
00100000 01101111 01100110 00100000 01101000 
01100101 01100001 01101100 01110100 01101000
 Chapter 3.3
An outbreak of Clostridium 
diff icile infections due to new 
PCR ribotype 826: epidemiologic 
and microbiologic analyses
Anne F. Voor in ’t holt*
Monique J.T. Crobach*
Cornelis W. Knetsch





* These authors contributed equally to this study
Clinical Microbiology and Infection, 2017; S1198-743X(17)30460-3 (Epub ahead of print)
150 Chapter 3.3
AbsTRACT
The aim of this study was to investigate an unusual outbreak of five patients with a 
total of eight episodes of a Clostridium difficile infection on a gastrointestinal surgical 
ward of a Dutch tertiary-care university-affiliated hospital. Clinical case investigations 
and laboratory analyses were performed. Laboratory analyses included PCR ribotyping, 
multiple-locus variable-number tandem repeat analysis typing, toxin typing, antimicro-
bial susceptibility testing and whole genome sequencing. The outbreak was associated 
with recurrent and severe disease in two out of five patients. All episodes were due to a 
unique ribotype that was not recognized in the collection of an international network of 
reference laboratories and was assigned PCR ribotype 826. PCR ribotype 826 is a toxin 
A-, toxin B- and binary toxin- positive ribotype which according to molecular typing 
belongs to clade 5 and resembles the so called hypervirulent ribotype 078. The presence 
of a clonal outbreak was confirmed by whole genome sequencing, yet the source of this 
newly identified ribotype remained unclear. This newly identified C. difficile PCR ribotype 
826 is part of clade 5 and might also have increased virulence. The recognition of this 
outbreak highlights the need of ongoing C. difficile infection surveillance to monitor 
new circulating ribotypes with assumed increased virulence.
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inTRoduCTion
We identified an outbreak of eight episodes of Clostridium difficile infection (CDI) in five 
patients within a 4-month period (1 December 2015-31 March 2016). The outbreak oc-
curred on a gastrointestinal surgical ward of a Dutch tertiary-care hospital. In this case 
series, we describe the clinical characteristics of affected patients and microbiologic 
investigations that were performed on the identified strain.
meTHods
The case series was conducted at a gastrointestinal surgical ward of the Erasmus Uni-
versity Medical Center in Rotterdam, the Netherlands. The Erasmus MC participates in 
the national sentinel CDI surveillance program and therefore sends all samples from 
hospitalized CDI patients to the national Reference Laboratory for PCR ribotyping (I.K. 
Sanders et al., paper presented at the 25th European Congress of Clinical Microbiology 
and Infectious Diseases (ECCMID 2015), abstract P0793, 2015) (1). In case of an outbreak 
(defined as more than two isolates of the same type detected less than 7 days apart 
in one hospital either with onset of symptoms on the same ward, or accompanied 
by an increased CDI monthly incidence within the hospital; http://www.rivm.nl/
Documenten_en_publicaties/Algemeen_Actueel/Uitgaven/Infectieziekten/CDiffNL/
Tenth_Annual_Report_of_the_National_Reference_Laboratory_for_Clostridium_dif-
ficile_and_results_of_the_sentinel_surveillance), additional analyses can be performed 
by the Reference Laboratory. These include multiple-locus variable-number tandem 
repeat analysis (2), PCRs for toxin genes (3), PCRs for clade-specific makers (4), antimi-
crobial susceptibility screening tests (Etest) and whole genome sequencing (5).
Patient information and medical history from all CDI cases during this outbreak were 
collected from the electronical medical records. Defined daily doses for all antibiotics 
used up to three months before development of CDI and Charlson comorbidity scores 
were calculated (6). CDI was classified as severe if one or more of the following condi-
tions were present (attributable to CDI): fever (temperature of 38.5⁰C or higher), rigors, 
hemodynamic instability, ileus, peritonitis, mental status changes, admission to ICU, 
end organ failure, leukocytosis (>15 x 109), leukopenia (<2 x 109), hypoalbuminemia 
(<30g/L), >1.5-fold increase in creatinine level above baseline, serum lactate >2.2mmol/L, 
pseudomembranous colitis, colonic wall thickening, pericolonic fat stranding or ascites. 
All other cases were classified as mild CDI (7, 8).
Written approval to conduct the case series was received from the medical ethics 




The CDI incidence rate on the gastrointestinal surgical ward was 3.3 per 10,000 patient-
days (July 2009 to November 2015) and increased to 19.8 per 10,000 patient-days (De-
cember 2015-March 2016). In total, six patients with CDI were diagnosed, five of whom 
had the same PCR ribotype.
The index case of this outbreak (patient A) was an 83-year-old man who underwent 
pancreaticoduodenectomy to treat a carcinoma of the common bile duct 1 month 
earlier. In December 2015, during a readmission that was due to infected ascites, he 
developed diarrhoeal symptoms and was diagnosed with hospital-acquired CDI. Within 
1 week after the start of his symptoms, two other patients (patients B and C) on the same 
ward were diagnosed with hospital-acquired CDI. All three patients were treated with a 
7- to 11-day oral course of metronidazole and discharged.
In January 2016, a fourth hospital-acquired CDI case (patient D) on the ward was 
noticed. In February 2016, patient A was readmitted because of a CDI recurrence, and 
a fifth case (patient E) was reported. Patient A was readmitted once more to treat a 
second recurrence in February, and patient D was also diagnosed with a CDI recurrence 
in March. In total, four of eight CDI episodes (in two patients) were classified as severe 
CDI. None of the patients was admitted to the intensive care unit because of CDI, and 
no CDI-related mortality (within 30 days) occurred. All patients had received antibiotic 
therapy before acquiring CDI, and total defined daily doses of antibiotics administered 
before the onset of CDI ranged from 21 to 63 (median, 26.9). Four out of five patients 
had received therapy with proton pump inhibitors before the CDI diagnosis. The median 
Charlson comorbidity score was 2 (range 0 to 8).
In accordance with local guidelines, all patients who had or who were suspected to 
have CDI were placed in a single room and were not allowed to use shared sanitation. 
Medical personnel wore protective disposable gowns and gloves when entering the 
room, and handwashing with soap and water was endorsed. Isolation precautions were 
discontinued 48 hours after resolution of diarrhoeal symptoms. In reaction to this CDI 
outbreak, additional infection prevention measures were implemented on the ward 
during certain time periods (Figure 1).These additional infection prevention measures 
included cleaning and disinfection using 1000 ppm chlorine of the following items: au-
tomatic bedpan washer (daily), toilet chairs (after each use), utility room and sanitation 
(once or twice a day) and all patients rooms of half the department (once, after recog-
nition of the fifth case). Additionally, the metal bedpans were replaced by cardboard 
single-use bedpans. Moreover, after the fifth case was diagnosed, 56 environmental 
swabs were taken on two different sampling days: 19 and 24 February. Samples were 
taken from the following sites: sink, water tap, grip of cabinet, alarm system, dustbin, 
chairs/tables and bed curtains of a room that had been occupied by a CDI patient 
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(before final cleaning); the same items in a clean room (after cleaning and disinfection 
with 1000 ppm); and toilet, shower chair, sink, shower curtain, sack of laundry and towel 
dispenser of a shared bathroom (after cleaning and disinfection). Environmental swabs 
were inoculated in Clostridium difficile enrichment-modified broth (C. difficile enrichment 
broth; Mediaproducts, Groningen, The Netherlands) for 1 week and subcultured on CLO 
plates (C. difficile agar; bioMérieux, Marcy l’Étoile, France). No antibiotic restriction policy 
was implemented during this outbreak.
Stool samples of all five patients tested positive for toxin B and binary toxin genes 
in the Xpert C. difficile (Cepheid, Sunnyvale, CA, USA); however, the TcdC∆117 deletion 
specific for ribotype 027 was not identified. Investigations at the reference laboratory 
demonstrated the presence of TcdA and confirmed the presence TcdB and the binary 
toxin genes. In addition, a 39 bp deletion in TcdC was detected.
All five isolates and one isolate obtained from an environmental culture (taken from 
the sack of laundry in the shared bathroom after cleaning and disinfection) displayed 
the same PCR ribotyping profile. The profile was not recognized in the Dutch Reference 
Library (which is able to recognize 221 different PCR ribotypes), but it most resembled 
the profile of ribotypes 078, 126 and 066 most (all belonging to clade 5) (Figure 2a). A 
data set of sized fragments obtained by capillary gel-based electrophoresis PCR ribotyp-
ing (1) was sent as FSA file to international C. difficile reference laboratories (including 
the Leeds collection encompassing more than 800 PCR ribotypes , the WEBRIBO sys-
tem, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention database and databases from 
Sweden, Portugal, Belgium and Canada), but no match was found. The new strain was 
assigned as ribotype 826 by the Leeds ribotyping reference network. PCR analysis of a 
clade 5-specific DNA marker (4) revealed that all ribotype 826 isolates were positive for 
the marker, confirming that ribotype 826 is part of clade 5.
According to Clinical and Laboratory Standards Institute (CLSI) breakpoints, all iso-
lates were susceptible for erythromycin (minimum inhibitory concentration (MIC) <2 
mg/L), clindamycin (MIC <2 mg/L), metronidazole (MIC <2 mg/L) and vancomycin (MIC 
<2 mg/L), but resistant to ciprofloxacin (MIC >32 mg/L) and moxifloxacin (MIC >32 mg/L) 
(9).
The isolates were 100% identical with no summed tandem repeat differences, thereby 
confirming a clonal complex according to multiple-locus variable-number tandem 
repeat analysis.
In addition, whole genome sequencing was performed (Figure 2b). To provide phy-
logenetic context, reference strains 078, 126/078, 045, 033 and 066 and four patient 
samples from confirmed strain 078 cases were included. In total, 1678 single nucleotide 
polymorphisms (SNPs) were identified within this sample selection, which is the ex-
pected variation between different ribotypes of one clade. Within the outbreak isolates, 
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the recurrence in patient A compared to the initial patient A isolate, and one SNP differ-
ence between the patient D /patient E isolates and the initial patient A isolate). Clonality 
of these cluster isolates was thus confirmed by whole genome sequencing, as the com-
monly used cutoffs for classifying isolates as clonal is zero to two SNPs (5).
Figure 2. (a) PCR ribotyping patterns for ribotype 066, 078, 126 and 826. Upper row indicates fragment 
sizes. (b) Phylogenetic tree of ribotype 826 outbreak isolates and related ribotypes. 078, reference ribotype 
078 strain; 066, reference ribotype 066 strain; 045, reference ribotype 045 strain; 126078, reference ribotype 
126/078 strain 7005405_078/10015222_078; 8051728_078, 6072310_078; clinical patient CDI samples with 
confirmed ribotype 078; 4_826, sample from patient A (recurrent episode); 3_826, sample from patient A 
(initial episode); 6_826, sample from patient C; 1_826, sample from patient D (recurrent episode); 2_826, 
sample from patient D (initial episode); 8_826, sample from patient D (initial episode, repeat sample); 
5_826, sample from patient E. Isolate from patient B could not be sequenced.
Figure 1. Epidemic curve of five patients infected with Clostridium difficile caused by PCR ribotype 826. 
Green, outbreak, non-ICU ward; orange, other non-ICU ward; blue, ICU; dark green, diarrhoeal episode; 
white +, positive culture for C. difficile and mild C. difficile infection; white ++, positive culture for C. dif-
ficile and severe C. difficile infection; black +, positive C. difficile culture without diarrhoea; white -, negative 




The occurrence of this CDI outbreak was uncommon, as it occurred on a ward where 
transmission of C. difficile was rare, as proven by sentinel CDI surveillance. Also, two of 
five patients had recurrent disease and were severely affected. Cases were due to the 
newly identified ribotype 826. Additional investigations showed that ribotype 826 be-
longs to clade 5 with a characteristic clade 5-specific DNA marker and a 39 bp deletion 
in TcdC. Whole genome sequencing revealed that ribotype 826 resembles ribotype 078 
quite well. CDI cases due to clade 5 ribotypes have been reported to be associated with 
the highest 14-day mortality (10). We therefore assume that this new ribotype also has 
increased virulence, thus explaining the occurrence of this outbreak.
Whole genome sequencing results demonstrated clonality, thereby confirming trans-
mission, but unanswered questions remain, including the source of this ribotype and 
how transmission occurred. The index patient could have introduced this ribotype into 
the ward, although no unusual profession, recent travel or other remarkable expositions 
were reported. Alternatively, an undetected asymptomatic carrier might have intro-
duced the ribotype and spread it to other patients. Transmission could have occurred 
via shared items, as contamination was demonstrated in one of the environmental 
cultures, but unfortunately environmental swabs were only taken after the last patient 
was detected. The outbreak ceased with the implementation of additional infection 
prevention measures, suggesting that these cleaning and disinfection measures were 
effective, probably together with a raised awareness among the healthcare workers.
Because most PCR ribotypes of clade 5 are also found in animals, it is tempting to 
speculate that the newly recognized ribotype 826 derives from animals. The lack of this 
PCR ribotype in the databases of human collections supports this hypothesis. Unfortu-
nately, reference laboratories for animal-associated C. difficile infections are not available 
that could be used to match our isolates. To our knowledge, no additional 826 isolates 
have been detected since this outbreak.
This outbreak indicates that new C. difficile ribotypes with increased virulence still 
emerge at unexpected locations and without a clear source. Given the increased viru-
lence and still unknown source of this newly identified ribotype, ongoing CDI surveil-
lance remains essential, and other institutions should now be aware of ribotype 826.
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AbsTRACT
Infections with multidrug-resistant (MDR) microorganisms are an increasing threat to 
hospitalized patients. Although rapid typing of MDR microorganisms is required to ap-
ply targeted prevention measures, technical barriers often prevent this. We aimed to 
assess whether extended-spectrum beta-lactamase (ESBL)-producing Klebsiella species 
are transmitted between patients and whether routine, rapid typing is needed. For 43 
months, the clonality of all ESBL-producing Klebsiella isolates from patients admitted to 
Erasmus MC University Medical Center in Rotterdam, the Netherlands was assessed with 
Raman spectroscopy. A cluster was defined as n ≥2 patients who had identical isolates. 
Primary patients were the first patients in each cluster. Secondary patients were those 
identified with an isolate clonally related to the isolate of the primary patient. Isolates 
from 132 patients were analyzed. We identified 17 clusters, with 17 primary and 56 
secondary patients. Fifty-nine patients had a unique isolate. Patients (n=15) in four out 
of the 17 clusters were epidemiologically related. Ten of these 15 patients developed an 
infection. Clonal outbreaks of ESBL-producing Klebsiella species were detected in our 
hospital. Theoretically, after Raman spectroscopy had detected a cluster of n ≥2, six in-
fections in secondary patients could have been prevented. These findings demonstrate 
that spread of ESBL-producing Klebsiella species occurs, even in a non-outbreak setting, 
and underscore the need for routine rapid typing of these MDR bacteria.
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inTRoduCTion
Infections with multidrug-resistant (MDR) microorganisms are an increasing threat to 
hospitalized patients, leading to high morbidity and mortality because of ineffective 
antibiotic treatment (1, 2). In general, carriage of antimicrobial resistant organisms oc-
curs de novo by induction and selection during therapy (endogenous sources) or by 
transmission of already resistant organisms (exogenous sources). In healthcare settings 
transmission occurs either direct – patient to patient – or indirect via surrounding res-
ervoirs or sources in the environment (3). Exogenous infections can be prevented using 
measures aiming at preventing transmission. Nevertheless, Gram-negative bacteria 
producing beta-lactamase enzymes such as extended-spectrum beta-lactamase (ESBL) 
or carbapenemases are currently of major concern. These resistant bacteria are a major 
cause of healthcare-related infections, especially in patients with a prolonged hospital 
stay (4).
Although the spread of ESBL-producing Klebsiella spp. has not yet been elucidated, 
current data indicate that they are mainly polyclonal with some small clusters in the 
hospital (5, 6). However, if these small clusters go unnoticed and/or appropriate infec-
tion control measures are not taken, they may result in large hospital-wide outbreaks 
(7). Because the prevalence of ESBL-producing Klebsiella spp. is increasing worldwide, 
hospitals must remain vigilant (4, 8). It should however be noted that the prevalence 
differs among patient groups, clinical and geographic settings (4, 8).
Rapid typing of MDR microorganisms can be of great support to demonstrate spread 
of related microorganisms. As a result targeted infection prevention measures are to be 
applied to stop transmission. Although MDR bacteria can be easily detected in a routine 
setting using proper indicator antibiotics combined with confirmation assays, rapid 
typing of these isolates is often not routinely performed. This is mainly due to techni-
cal barriers: most typing techniques are time consuming and laborious and therefore 
difficult to implement in routine diagnostics. Raman spectroscopy is a rapid technol-
ogy that is used for whole organism fingerprinting and is applied in microbiological 
laboratories. This technique provides highly information-rich spectra which are required 
for maximum discriminatory power to distinguish unrelated microorganisms – which is 
required in outbreak management (9-11).
In this study, we applied this rapid typing technique to all ESBL-producing Klebsiella 
spp. that were identified in our hospital in the Netherlands for 43 months, in order to 
answer the following questions: first, are ESBL-producing Klebsiella spp. transmitted be-





Screening was performed as part of the infection control strategy using non-invasive 
sampling. The microbiological and epidemiological analyses were in first instance per-
formed to develop new strategies for infection control. Also, according to the Dutch 
regulation for research with human subjects, neither medical nor ethical approval was 
required to conduct the study since the data were retrospectively recorded. However, 
we received approval from the medical ethics research committee of the Erasmus Uni-
versity Medical Center (Erasmus MC) in Rotterdam, the Netherlands to conduct this 
study (MEC-2011-085). The existing data from the electronic medical records could not 
be recorded anonymously as the patient name is always present. Before data analyses 
however, the opt-out list available at our department was consulted and patient names 
were removed from the dataset by A.F. Voor in ‘t holt. The authors had no direct interac-
tion with the patients and no new patient data were collected during the study period.
Population
This study was conducted at the Erasmus MC in Rotterdam, the Netherlands. This is a 
1,320-bed university hospital, with 97 beds in the adult or pediatric intensive care unit 
(ICU) (Erasmus MC, 2012). All medical specialties are available. Table 1 presents the 
number of hospital admissions from 1 January 2010 until 1 August 2013, the number of 
patients identified with Klebsiella spp. - susceptible and ESBL-producing isolates - and 
the number of patients who were included in the current study.
Table 1. Study characteristics.
2010 2011 2012 2013a
No. of hospital admissions 40,626 41,773 41,001 21.893
No. of clinical admission days 292.209 288.799 299.736 n.a.
Klebsiella pneumoniaeb 774 677 619 320
ESBL-producing K. pneumoniaec 54 (40) 47 (10) 62 (48) 34 (25)
ESBL-rate per 1000 hospital admissions 1,33 1,13 1,51 1,55
Klebsiella oxytocab 370 338 351 161
ESBL-producing K. oxytocac 7 (0) 5 (3) 15 (5) 3 (1)
ESBL-rate per 1000 hospital admissions 0,17 0,12 0,37 0,14
Abbreviations: n.a., not available, no., number
a1 January until 1 August 2013
bOne per patient
cBetween brackets: number of patients included in current study
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study design and data collection
We included patients of all departments with a microbiologically confirmed ESBL-
producing K. pneumoniae or K. oxytoca between 1 January 2010 and 1 August 2013. 
After detection, all patients were immediately managed in contact isolation and placed 
in single-occupancy rooms. Contact isolation included the use of gloves and gowns, 
and disinfection of hands and wrists with hand alcohol when entering and leaving the 
room. No active surveillance and/or contact investigation were carried out. Isolates were 
cultured from clinical samples, either because of 1) assumed infection or 2) surveillance 
purposes in the ICU and hematology departments - patients receiving selective digestive 
tract decontamination are routinely tested for the presence of (resistant) Gram-negative 
bacteria twice weekly. This study consisted of two study periods. During study period I, 1 
January 2010 until 1 September 2012, isolates were collected and typed retrospectively. 
Also, clinical data were collected retrospectively. However, carbapenemase-producing 
isolates were immediately typed after detection at that time. During study period II (1 
September 2012 until 1 August 2013), typing with Raman spectroscopy was performed 
immediately after detection and clinical data were collected prospectively. In this report, 
data from both study periods were combined. Preventive measures were equal in both 
periods.
For each first isolate, we recorded patient data and bacteriological data, which were 
obtained from electronic patient records. Age of the patient was defined as age at day 
of detection of the first ESBL-producing Klebsiella isolate. Mortality was defined as death 
from any cause within one year after the day of detection of the first ESBL-producing 
Klebsiella isolate (12).
To identify healthcare-related infections and the specific type of infection, we used 
the criteria published by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) (13). We 
investigated microbiological data and medical records of included patients to distin-
guish colonization from infection.
microbiological analysis
Cultures were performed at the diagnostic laboratory of the department of Medical 
Microbiology and Infectious Diseases (Erasmus MC, Rotterdam, The Netherlands). In 
study period I, bacteria were taken from frozen stock cultures kept at -80⁰C, and were 
subsequently analyzed with Raman spectroscopy. In study period II, bacteria were typed 
with Raman spectroscopy immediately after the initial culture.
Identification and susceptibility testing for K. pneumoniae and K. oxytoca were per-
formed using VITEK 2 (bioMérieux, Lyon, France), and results were interpreted according 
to the EUCAST clinical breakpoints. ESBL confirmation was performed with either the 
combination disk-diffusion test (Rosco Diagnostica, Taastrup, Denmark) or the Etest 
(bioMérieux, Lyon, France). K. oxytoca isolates were regarded as ESBL-producing when 
166 Chapter 4.1
resistant to ceftazidime and demonstrating synergy between ceftazidime and clavulanic 
acid. K. oxytoca isolates were regarded as hyperproducers of K1 (KOXY) chromosomal 
beta-lactamase if they showed resistance to cefuroxime, piperacillin-tazobactam and 
aztreonam, borderline resistance to cefotaxime and cefepime, but remained susceptible 
to ceftazidime (14). Presence of carbapenemases was confirmed using real-time PCR for 
blaIMP, blaKPC, blaNDM, blaOXA-48, and blaVIM genes (15).
Clonal relatedness
Clonal relatedness was investigated with Raman spectroscopy using SpectraCellRA 
analysis (SCRA). Cultures, sample preparation, and SCRA measurements were performed 
according to the operators manual (version 1.7) (16). Analyses and calculations were 
performed as described previously (17). A cluster was defined as n ≥2 patients who 
had identical isolates as indicated with Raman spectroscopic analysis. A distinction was 
made between primary and secondary patients, and patients with a unique isolate. A 
primary patient was defined as the first patient in time in a cluster. Secondary patients 
were all subsequent patients who had a proven clonal relationship with the primary 
patient. Unique was defined as patients with a non-cluster isolate. When analyzing, data 
from primary patients and from patients with a unique isolate were combined since 
they were both the first patient in time with a certain type. The only difference was that 
primary patients generated secondary patients, and patients with a unique isolate did 
not.
spatial analysis
To investigate if patients identified in Raman spectroscopic clusters were epidemiologi-
cally related, four different definitions of epidemiological relatedness were created from 
highest to lowest likelihood (Table 2).
Table 2. Definitions of epidemiological relatedness.
Definitions
Definite Probable Possible Impossible
Same patient room yes yes no no
Same department yes yes yes no
Same period yes maybea maybeb maybec
aSame patient room within 3 months after primary patient has left.
bSame department within 3 months after primary patient has left.
cSame period but not the same department or patient room.
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statistical analysis
We calculated the transmission index (TI) to analyze the transmission dynamics using 
two different formulas. Firstly, it was calculated as the number of secondary patients 
divided by the number of primary patients and the number of patients with a unique 
isolate - with the results of Raman spectroscopy. Secondly, as the number of secondary 
patients who were epidemiologically related to the primary patient (definitions ‘definite’ 
and ‘probable’ combined, Table 2) divided by the number of primary patients and the 
number of patients with a unique isolate. Basic patient characteristics (e.g. age, gender, 
death from any cause within one year after positive culture) were analyzed as percent-
ages and means using Microsoft Excel 2010.
ResulTs
identification and characteristics of included patients
For the period from 1 January 2010 until 1 August 2013 we included 132 patients with an 
ESBL-producing Klebsiella isolate (Table 3, Figure 1). ESBL-producing K. pneumoniae was 
cultured in 123 patients and ESBL-producing K. oxytoca was cultured in nine patients 
(Table 3). Ninety isolates were obtained from clinical samples, and 42 isolates were 
obtained from surveillance cultures. In total, 17 clusters were identified with Raman 
spectroscopy, comprising 73 patients (cluster size ranging from two to ten patients), and 
59 patients were identified with a unique isolate. Among the 73 patients with a cluster 
isolate, we identified 17 primary patients, and 56 secondary patients (Table 3). Eighty-six 
out of 132 patients (65.2%) developed an infection with an ESBL-producing Klebsiella 
spp. (Table 3). Fifty-one out of 17 primary plus 59 unique patients (67.1%) and 35 out of 
56 secondary patients (62.5%) developed or had an infection with the ESBL-producing 
Klebsiella spp.
Eight patients were identified with an ESBL-producing K. pneumoniae isolate that 
was also resistant to imipenem and/or meropenem and three patients with an ESBL-
producing K. pneumoniae isolate intermediately susceptible to imipenem and merope-
nem. The blaKPC gene was detected in six out of these 11 patients, the blaOXA-48 gene 
was demonstrated in isolates of three patients and the blaNDM gene was present in 
isolates of two patients. According to Raman spectroscopic analyses, seven out of these 
11 patients had a unique isolate. In cluster 15 (n = 2), both patients had a KPC-producing 
isolate. In cluster ten (n = 10), two patients had an NDM-producing isolate.
Clinical epidemiology
From all 132 patients with an ESBL-producing Klebsiella spp. isolate, 130 were residents 













































































































































































































































169Transmission of ESBL-producing Klebsiella spp.
patients plus patients with a unique isolate (n = 17 + n = 59) and 54.8 for secondary 
patients (n = 56). Two clusters (cluster 6 and 11) consisted of newborns only. The overall 
mortality rate one year after detection of the bacteria was 17.4% (n = 23), consisting 
of three primary and nine secondary patients, and 11 patients with a unique isolate. 
Overall male percentage was 62.1%; 61.8% in primary patients plus patients with a 
unique isolate and 62.5% in secondary patients. Twenty-six patients (19.7%) were organ 
transplant recipients; three primary and eight secondary patients, and 15 patients with a 
unique isolate. The majority of patients received a kidney allograft (n = 22). Basic patient 
characteristics are displayed in table 4.
The most frequent specimen containing ESBL-producing Klebsiella spp. cultures for all 
patients was urine (45.5%), followed by rectum samples (21.2%). In primary patients plus 
patients with a unique isolate, 73.0% of patients who had a positive urine sample devel-
Table 3. Characteristics of clusters and unique isolates as defined with Raman spectroscopy, January 2010 
until August 2013.
Total no. of patients
No. of primary patientsa No. of secondary patients
Infection Colonization Infection Colonization
Total 132 51 25 35 21
K. pneumoniae 123 50 22 33 18
K. oxytoca 9 1 3 2 3
Cluster 1 2 0 1 1 0
Cluster 2 4 1 0 0 3
Cluster 3 9 1 0 5 3
Cluster 4 10 0 1 8 1
Cluster 5 5 0 1 4 0
Cluster 6 5 0 1 2 2
Cluster 7 3 1 0 1 1
Cluster 8 3 0 1 1 1
Cluster 9 2 0 1 1 0
Cluster 10 10 1 0 5 4
Cluster 11 2 0 1 1 0
Cluster 12 2 0 1 1 0
Cluster 13 5 1 0 2 2
Cluster 14 3 1 0 2 0
Cluster 15 2 1 0 0 1
Cluster 16 3 1 0 1 1
Cluster 17 3 0 1 0 2
Unique isolates 59 43 16 n.a. n.a.
Abbreviations: n.a., not applicable, no., number.
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oped or had an infection, compared with 47.8% of secondary patients (P value 0.049). 
Twenty-three percent of primary patients who had a positive rectum sample developed 
or had an infection, compared with 53.3% of secondary patients (P value 0.102).
spatial analysis
From the 132 patients, 95 were admitted to the hospital to 36 diff erent departments. 
Thirty-seven patients were not admitted when the ESBL-producing Klebsiella isolate was 
Table 5. The number of infected and colonized patients in the eight clusters identifi ed with Raman spec-






ColonizationPrim Sec Prim Sec
Cluster 3 0 0 0 1 1 0
Cluster 4 0 0 0 0 1 1
Cluster 5 0 0 0 0 2 0
Cluster 6 0 2 3 0 0 0
Cluster 8 0 0 0 0 1 1
Cluster 11 0 1 1 0 0 0
Cluster 13 0 0 0 1 2 2
Cluster 17 0 0 0 0 0 3
Abbreviations: no., number; prim, primary patients including patients with a unique isolate; sec, secondary 
patients. Epidemiological relatedness is presented as number of patients.
Table 4. Clinical characteristics of patients infected or colonized with ESBL-producing Klebsiella spp. and 
clinical characteristics of primary and secondary patients.
Variables
No. of patients (%) No. of patients (%)
Infection (n = 86) Colonization (n = 46) Primaryb (n = 76) Secondary (n = 56)
Gender, male 61 (70.9) 21 (45.7) 47 (61.8) 35 (62.5)
Age, mean years (SD) 53.4 (24.0) 42.9 (29.7) 52.3 (23.4) 46.3 (30.1)
COPD 6 (7.0) 1 (2.2) 5 (6.6) 2 (3.6)
1-year mortalitya 18 (20.9) 5 (10.9) 14 (18.4) 9 (16.1)
Organ transplantation 17 (19.8) 9 (19.6) 18 (23.7) 8 (14.3)
No. of primary patientsb 51 (59.3) 25 (54.3) n.a. n.a.
No. of patients who had an 
infection
n.a. n.a. 51 (67.1) 35 (62.5)
Abbreviations: COPD, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, SD, standard deviation, no., number, n.a., not 
applicable.
aDeath from any cause within one year after the fi rst positive culture.
bIncluding patients with a unique isolate
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detected. Also, 31 patients (23.5%) were admitted to either the ICU or the hematology 
department.
Patients in cluster 6 (n = 5) and 11 (n = 2) were, according to our definitions, definitely 
related as patients were related in time and place (Figure 2). Cluster 6 and 11 both con-
sisted of newborns infected (n =3) or colonized (n = 4) with K. oxytoca bacteria (Table 5). 
Patients in cluster 13 (n = 5) and 17 (n = 3) were probably related. In six clusters (cluster 
3, 4, 5, 8, 10 and 16) a more diverse picture of epidemiological relatedness was found 
(Table 5, Figure 2). Patients in cluster one (n = 2), two (n = 4), seven (n = 3), nine (n = 2), 
12 (n = 4), 14 (n = 3) and 15 (n = 2) could not be related to each other in time and place: 
transmission in the hospital was impossible according to the information in the medical 
records of the patients and our definitions (Figure 2).
When using the results of Raman spectroscopy, the transmission index was 0.74 (56 
divided by 17 plus 59; definition 1). When dividing epidemiologically related secondary 
patients in clusters by all primary patients, the transmission index declined to 0.30 (23 
divided by 17 plus 59; definition 2).
disCussion
summary of evidence
There are many ways of preventing antibiotic resistance, and especially the spread of 
antibiotic-resistant bacteria can be prevented in many different ways. A powerful policy 
is to prevent transmission of these resistant bacteria from patient to patient, the suc-
cess of which depends on the speed and accuracy of the typing method used for early 
identification of related clusters. Rapid and accurate typing allows targeted infection 
control measures to be applied immediately, thereby preventing morbidity and mortal-
ity among patients and reducing hospital costs (18).
In the present study, we performed an in-depth analysis of the epidemiology of ESBL-
producing Klebsiella spp. in a large university hospital using clinical samples and screen-
ing cultures over a 43-month period. Our results demonstrate that clonal outbreaks with 
ESBL-producing Klebsiella spp., as confirmed epidemiologically and by Raman spectros-
copy, definitely occurred in our hospital and should have been prevented. In theory, as 
soon as clonality had been demonstrated using Raman spectroscopy (n ≥2), six out of 
ten infections in seven different clusters could have been prevented by implementing 
immediate additional infection control measures. These additional infection control 
measures include immediate disinfection of the patient rooms and sanitation involved 
and a contact investigation among roommates. The contact investigation is performed 
from the first admission date of the primary patient until the date of contact isolation 
or discharge of the last secondary patient. The possible (NDM) and impossible (KPC) 
173Transmission of ESBL-producing Klebsiella spp.
transmissions of carbapenemase-producing Klebsiella spp. in cluster 10 and cluster 15 
were noted with typing at the time of detection. Additional screening of contact pa-
tients was performed, which did not reveal other colonized patients. Previous reports on 
ESBL-producing Klebsiella spp. have shown similar results, although some studies have 
identified large clusters (19). However, these studies often did not investigate whether 
patients in clusters - identified by molecular analysis - were also epidemiologically 
related (19).
Due to the retrospective nature of our analysis, our results represent merely the tip 
of the iceberg. We hypothesize that if patients had been routinely screened for MDR 
bacteria upon admission, during admission, upon discharge and/or after the finding of 
a primary case, we would have found more and larger clusters in which patients were 
epidemiologically related. The fact that we were not able to define relatedness in all 
secondary cases was presumably due in part to unidentified carriers (missed cases) 
and transmission. A possible additional theoretical explanation of secondary cases is 
community spread of these type of bacteria, as carriage in the community has been 
reported in the literature and is of rising concern. However, in the Netherlands spread in 
the community has not been reported so far (20).
The transmission index was 0.74. When we used epidemiological relatedness as a 
criterion for secondary patients, the transmission index decreased to 0.30. However, the 
R0 could not be calculated as each patient identified with an ESBL-producing Klebsiella 
spp. isolate was nursed in contact isolation and placed in a single-occupancy room im-
mediately after detection. At that moment it was not clear whether this patient was a 
primary or a secondary patient. These prompt measures may have kept the transmission 
index low.
limitations
Our study has a number of limitations. First, patients were not routinely cultured for 
carrying multi-resistant Enterobacteriaceae at admission or discharge during the study 
periods in our hospital and we were not able to include all the carriers identified in our 
hospital (Table 1). The presence of unidentified carriers therefore cannot be ruled out, 
and we may have underestimated the number of affected patients. Second, the surveil-
lance cultures in our dataset were only obtained from ICU and hematology patients 
while the remaining cultures were obtained from clinical samples. Third, in seven of 
the 17 clusters identified using Raman spectroscopy no epidemiological relatedness 
between patients was found. This may be due to low numbers of cultures – thus missing 
cases – and/or to our definition of epidemiological relatedness that may have been too 
strict (Table 2). Since contamination of the environment as a source needs to be taken 
into consideration when studying transmission, we chose a 3-month window during 
which we still considered transmission to be possible (Table 2) (21, 22). Unfortunately, 
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neither nationwide guidelines nor even the CDC provide a definition of epidemiological 
relatedness. Finally, we did not include the identification of the specific ESBL genes (e.g. 
blaCTX-M, blaSHV, blaTEM) and plasmid types in our analysis of the 132 isolates. There-
fore, transmission between different strains of plasmids carrying ESBL genes cannot be 
ruled out.
Conclusion and clinical implication
In summary, as transmission occurred during the entire study period and throughout 
the entire hospital, there is an urgent need for instant typing to detect and subsequently 
prevent the spread of ESBL-producing Klebsiella spp. We conclude that typing should 
continuously be performed, also in an apparent non-outbreak situation. In order to 
relate those patients who have clonally clustered isolates, it is important to actively 
screen contact patients for carriage of ESBL-producing Klebsiella spp. These recommen-
dations are similar to those given in previous investigations and in the recent Dutch 
MDRO guideline (19, 23-26). A rapid typing method that is easy to implement and that 
can be used for the early identification of clusters is Raman spectroscopy. Through the 
implementation of immediate infection-prevention strategies, those small outbreaks 
identified early on can be stopped and further transmission can be prevented. However, 
further research is needed to investigate the presence of ESBL-producing Klebsiella spp. 
and their transmission dynamics in other hospital settings. This will give further insight 
in the transmission magnitude of Klebsiella spp. in the hospital.
ACknowledgmenTs
We thank the employees of the diagnostic laboratory and the infection control practi-
tioners of the Department of Medical Microbiology and Infectious Diseases of Erasmus 
University Medical Center, Rotterdam, the Netherlands, for their work and cooperation.
ReFeRenCes
 1. Hawkey PM, Jones AM. 2009. The changing epidemiology of resistance. J Antimicrob Chemother 64 Suppl 1:i3-10.
 2. Paul M, Shani V, Muchtar E, Kariv G, Robenshtok E, Leibovici L. 2010. Systematic review and meta-analysis of the 
efficacy of appropriate empiric antibiotic therapy for sepsis. Antimicrob Agents Chemother 54:4851-4863.
 3. Harris AD, Perencevich EN, Johnson JK, Paterson DL, Morris JG, Strauss SM, Johnson JA. 2007. Patient-to-patient 
transmission is important in extended-spectrum beta-lactamase-producing Klebsiella pneumoniae acquisition. 
Clin Infect Dis 45:1347-1350.
 4. Livermore DM. 2012. Current epidemiology and growing resistance of gram-negative pathogens. Korean J Intern 
Med 27:128-142.
175Transmission of ESBL-producing Klebsiella spp.
 5. Souverein D, Boers SA, Veenendaal D, Euser SM, Kluytmans J, Den Boer JW. 2014. Polyclonal Spread and Outbreaks 
with ESBL Positive Gentamicin Resistant Klebsiella spp. in the Region Kennemerland, The Netherlands. PLoS One 
9:e101212.
 6. Severin JA, Lestari ES, Kloezen W, Lemmens-den Toom N, Mertaniasih NM, Kuntaman K, Purwanta M, Duerink DO, 
Hadi U, van Belkum A, Verbrugh HA, Goessens WH, Antimicrobial Resistance in Indonesia P, Prevention” study g. 
2012. Faecal carriage of extended-spectrum beta-lactamase-producing Enterobacteriaceae among humans in 
Java, Indonesia, in 2001-2002. Trop Med Int Health 17:455-461.
 7. Dautzenberg MJ, Ossewaarde JM, de Kraker ME, van der Zee A, van Burgh S, de Greeff SC, Bijlmer HA, Grundmann 
H, Cohen Stuart JW, Fluit AC, Troelstra A, Bonten MJ. 2014. Successful control of a hospital-wide outbreak of OXA-
48 producing Enterobacteriaceae in the Netherlands, 2009 to 2011. Euro Surveill 19.
 8. Bertrand X, Dowzicky MJ. 2012. Antimicrobial susceptibility among gram-negative isolates collected from inten-
sive care units in North America, Europe, the Asia-Pacific Rim, Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa between 
2004 and 2009 as part of the Tigecycline Evaluation and Surveillance Trial. Clin Ther 34:124-137.
 9. Jarvis WR, Munn VP, Highsmith AK, Culver DH, Hughes JM. 1985. The epidemiology of nosocomial infections 
caused by Klebsiella pneumoniae. Infect Control 6:68-74.
 10. Maquelin K, Dijkshoorn L, van der Reijden TJ, Puppels GJ. 2006. Rapid epidemiological analysis of Acinetobacter 
strains by Raman spectroscopy. J Microbiol Methods 64:126-131.
 11. te Witt R, Vaessen N, Melles DC, Lekkerkerk WS, van der Zwaan EA, Zandijk WH, Severin JA, Vos MC. 2013. Good 
performance of the SpectraCellRA system for typing of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus isolates. J Clin 
Microbiol 51:1434-1438.
 12. de Smet AM, Kluytmans JA, Cooper BS, Mascini EM, Benus RF, van der Werf TS, van der Hoeven JG, Pickkers P, 
Bogaers-Hofman D, van der Meer NJ, Bernards AT, Kuijper EJ, Joore JC, Leverstein-van Hall MA, Bindels AJ, Jansz 
AR, Wesselink RM, de Jongh BM, Dennesen PJ, van Asselt GJ, te Velde LF, Frenay IH, Kaasjager K, Bosch FH, van 
Iterson M, Thijsen SF, Kluge GH, Pauw W, de Vries JW, Kaan JA, Arends JP, Aarts LP, Sturm PD, Harinck HI, Voss 
A, Uijtendaal EV, Blok HE, Thieme Groen ES, Pouw ME, Kalkman CJ, Bonten MJ. 2009. Decontamination of the 
digestive tract and oropharynx in ICU patients. N Engl J Med 360:20-31.
 13. Horan TC, Andrus M, Dudeck MA. 2008. CDC/NHSN surveillance definition of health care–associated infection and 
criteria for specific types of infections in the acute care setting. American journal of infection control 36:309-332.
 14. Potz NA, Colman M, Warner M, Reynolds R, Livermore DM. 2004. False-positive extended-spectrum beta-lactamase 
tests for Klebsiella oxytoca strains hyperproducing K1 beta-lactamase. J Antimicrob Chemother 53:545-547.
 15. van der Zee A, Roorda L, Bosman G, Fluit AC, Hermans M, Smits PH, van der Zanden AG, Te Witt R, Bruijnesteijn 
van Coppenraet LE, Cohen Stuart J, Ossewaarde JM. 2014. Multi-centre evaluation of real-time multiplex PCR for 
detection of carbapenemase genes OXA-48, VIM, IMP, NDM and KPC. BMC Infect Dis 14:27.
 16. Willemse-Erix DF, Scholtes-Timmerman MJ, Jachtenberg JW, van Leeuwen WB, Horst-Kreft D, Bakker Schut TC, 
Deurenberg RH, Puppels GJ, van Belkum A, Vos MC, Maquelin K. 2009. Optical fingerprinting in bacterial epidemi-
ology: Raman spectroscopy as a real-time typing method. J Clin Microbiol 47:652-659.
 17. Willemse-Erix D, Bakker-Schut T, Slagboom-Bax F, Jachtenberg JW, Lemmens-den Toom N, Papagiannitsis CC, 
Kuntaman K, Puppels G, van Belkum A, Severin JA, Goessens W, Maquelin K. 2012. Rapid typing of extended-
spectrum beta-lactamase- and carbapenemase-producing Escherichia coli and Klebsiella pneumoniae isolates by 
use of SpectraCell RA. J Clin Microbiol 50:1370-1375.
 18. Shorr AF. 2009. Review of studies of the impact on Gram-negative bacterial resistance on outcomes in the inten-
sive care unit. Crit Care Med 37:1463-1469.
 19. DiPersio JR, Deshpande LM, Biedenbach DJ, Toleman MA, Walsh TR, Jones RN. 2005. Evolution and dissemination 
of extended-spectrum beta-lactamase-producing Klebsiella pneumoniae: epidemiology and molecular report 
from the SENTRY Antimicrobial Surveillance Program (1997-2003). Diagn Microbiol Infect Dis 51:1-7.
 20. Chong Y, Shimoda S, Yakushiji H, Ito Y, Miyamoto T, Kamimura T, Shimono N, Akashi K. 2013. Community spread 
of extended-spectrum beta-lactamase-producing Escherichia coli, Klebsiella pneumoniae and Proteus mirabilis: a 
long-term study in Japan. J Med Microbiol 62:1038-1043.
176 Chapter 4.1
 21. Freeman JT, Nimmo J, Gregory E, Tiong A, De Almeida M, McAuliffe GN, Roberts SA. 2014. Predictors of hospital 
surface contamination with Extended-spectrum beta-lactamase-producing Escherichia coli and Klebsiella pneu-
moniae: patient and organism factors. Antimicrob Resist Infect Control 3:5.
 22. Kramer A, Schwebke I, Kampf G. 2006. How long do nosocomial pathogens persist on inanimate surfaces? A 
systematic review. BMC Infect Dis 6:130.
 23. Chong Y, Yakushiji H, Ito Y, Kamimura T. 2011. Clinical and molecular epidemiology of extended-spectrum 
beta-lactamase-producing Escherichia coli and Klebsiella pneumoniae in a long-term study from Japan. Eur J Clin 
Microbiol Infect Dis 30:83-87.
 24. Nakamura T, Komatsu M, Yamasaki K, Fukuda S, Miyamoto Y, Higuchi T, Ono T, Nishio H, Sueyoshi N, Kida K, Satoh K, 
Toda H, Toyokawa M, Nishi I, Sakamoto M, Akagi M, Nakai I, Kofuku T, Orita T, Wada Y, Zikimoto T, Koike C, Kinoshita 
S, Hirai I, Takahashi H, Matsuura N, Yamamoto Y. 2012. Epidemiology of Escherichia coli, Klebsiella species, and 
Proteus mirabilis strains producing extended-spectrum beta-lactamases from clinical samples in the Kinki Region 
of Japan. Am J Clin Pathol 137:620-626.
 25. Benenson S, Levin PD, Block C, Adler A, Ergaz Z, Peleg O, Minster N, Gross I, Schaffer K, Moses AE, Cohen MJ. 2013. 
Continuous surveillance to reduce extended-spectrum beta-lactamase Klebsiella pneumoniae colonization in the 
neonatal intensive care unit. Neonatology 103:155-160.
 26. Dutch Working Group on Preventing Infections (WIP) (2012) Bijzonder resistente micro-organismen (BRMO).

01010010 01101001 01110011 01101011 00100000 
01100110 01100001 01100011 01110100 01101111 
01110010 01110011 00100000 01100001 01101110 
01100100 00100000 01110100 01110010 01100001 
01101110 01110011 01101101 01101001 01110011 
01110011 01101001 01101111 01101110 00100000 
01101111 01100110 00100000 01101000 01100101 
01100001 01101100 01110100 01101000 01100011 
01100001 01110010 01100101 01011111 01110010 
01100101 01101100 01100001 01110100 01100101 
01100100 00100000 01110000 01100001 01110100 
01101000 01101111 01100111 01100101 01101110 
01110011 01010010 01101001 01110011 01101011 
00100000 01100110 01100001 01100011 01110100 
01101111 01110010 01110011 00100000 01100001 
01101110 01100100 00100000 01110100 01110010 
01100001 01101110 01110011 01101101 01101001 
01110011 01110011 01101001 01101111 01101110 
00100000 01101111 01100110 00100000 01101000 
01100101 01100001 01101100 01110100 01101000
01010010 01101001 01110011 01101011 00100000 
01100110 01100001 01100011 01110100 01101111 
01110010 01110011 00100000 01100001 01101110 
01100100 00100000 01110100 01110010 01100001 
01101110 01110011 01101101 01101001 01110011 
01110011 01101001 01101111 01101110 00100000 
01101111 01100110 00100000 01101000 01100101 
01100001 01101100 01110100 01101000 01100011 
01100001 01110010 01100101 01011111 01110010 
01100101 01101100 01100001 01110100 01100101 
01100100 00100000 01110000 01100001 01110100 
01101000 01101111 01100111 01100101 01101110 
01110011 01010010 01101001 01110011 01101011 
00100000 01100110 01100001 01100011 01110100 
01101111 01110010 01110011 00100000 01100001 
01101110 01100100 00100000 01110100 01110010 
01100001 01101110 01110011 01101101 01101001 
01110011 01110011 01101001 01101111 01101110 
00100000 01101111 01100110 00100000 01101000 





coli transmission events using 
combined genetic and phenotypic 
epidemiology







* These authors contributed equally to this study
PLOS ONE, 2016; 11(7): e0160156
180 Chapter 4.2
AbsTRACT
Since the year 2000 there has been a sharp increase in the prevalence of healthcare-
related infections caused by extended-spectrum beta-lactamase (ESBL)-producing 
Escherichia coli. However, the high community prevalence of ESBL-producing E. coli 
isolates means that many E. coli typing techniques may not be suitable for detecting 
E. coli transmission events. Therefore, we investigated if High-throughput MultiLocus 
Sequence Typing (HiMLST) and/or Raman spectroscopy were suitable techniques for 
detecting recent E. coli transmission events. This study was conducted from January 
until December 2010 at Erasmus University Medical Center, Rotterdam, the Netherlands. 
Isolates were typed using HiMLST and Raman spectroscopy. A genetic cluster was de-
fined as two or more patients carrying identical isolates. We used predefined definitions 
for epidemiological relatedness to assess healthcare-related transmission. We included 
194 patients; strains of 112 patients were typed using HiMLST and strains of 194 patients 
were typed using Raman spectroscopy. Raman spectroscopy identified 16 clusters while 
HiMLST identified 10 clusters. However, no healthcare-related transmission events 
were detected. When combining data from both typing techniques, we identified eight 
clusters (n=34 patients), as well as 78 patients with a non-cluster isolate. However, we 
could not detect any healthcare-related transmission in these 8 clusters. Although 
clusters were genetically detected using HiMLST and Raman spectroscopy, no definite 
epidemiological relationships could be demonstrated which makes the possibility of 
healthcare-related transmission events highly unlikely. Our results suggest that typing 
of ESBL-producing E. coli using HiMLST and/or Raman spectroscopy is not helpful in 
detecting E. coli healthcare-related transmission events.
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inTRoduCTion
For many years, the spread of microorganisms expressing extended-spectrum beta-
lactamase (ESBL) genes was limited to those circulating in hospitals, with most isolates 
being Klebsiella pneumoniae (1). Since the year 2000 however, there has been a sharp 
increase in the prevalence of ESBL-producing microorganisms worldwide, whereby 
Escherichia coli has replaced K. pneumoniae as the major carrier of ESBL encoding genes 
(2-6). Worldwide, ESBL-producing Enterobacteriaceae carriage rates in the community 
range from <10% in Europe, to >50% in Southeast Asia, with E. coli as the predominant 
colonizing species (7, 8). In addition, current research in the Netherlands shows that 5 to 
7% of people in the Dutch community carry ESBL-producing E. coli isolates, with ST 131 
being the most dominant sequence type (9-13). E. coli is the most common agent associ-
ated with infections of the urinary tract and bloodstream infections arising from these 
urinary tract infections. Importantly, an increase in the number of antibiotic resistant 
bacteria in the community results in an increase in the number of antibiotic resistant 
bacteria in patients admitted to hospitals. The monitoring and prevention of healthcare-
related infections requires the early detection and differentiation of antibiotic resistant 
bacteria in order to identify possible sources of transmission. This then allows suitable 
action to be taken in order to prevent future transmission events and infections (14).
Resistant isolates can be routinely compared to detect hospital transmission using 
molecular typing methods - with Pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) as the gold 
standard technique. Although this technique has a good discriminatory power, it is too 
laborious to detect clones on a routine basis. Therefore, investigations need to be per-
formed to determine whether high-throughput techniques such as High-Throughput 
Multilocus Sequence Typing (HiMLST) and Raman spectroscopy are suitable techniques 
to be implemented in a routine setting. HiMLST is a genotyping technique which clas-
sifies isolates based on the sequence variations of seven housekeeping genes. While 
conventional MLST uses classical Sanger sequencing, HiMLST employs next-generation 
sequencing (NGS) to generate MLST sequence data using a high –throughput proto-
col (15). Raman spectroscopy is an easy to use and rapid technique which measures 
phenotypic expression profile differences between bacteria (16). This publication inves-
tigated whether either of these techniques, or a combination of both, could be used to 
differentiate between recent ESBL-producing E. coli transmission events in hospitals by 




Written approval to conduct the study was received from the medical ethics research 
committee of the Erasmus MC University Medical Center (Erasmus MC), Rotterdam, the 
Netherlands (MEC-2011-085). As per conclusion of our medical ethics research com-
mittee, written informed consent from patients for acquiring data from clinical records 
was not needed. The existing data from the electronic medical records could not be 
recorded anonymously as the patient name is always visible when collecting data. Be-
fore data analyses however, the opt-out list available at our department was consulted 
and patients were excluded when applicable. Also before analyses, patient names were 
removed from the dataset by A.F. Voor in ‘t holt and A.A. Wattel. The authors had no 
direct interaction with the patients during the study period and no new patient data 
were collected for this study.
design and setting
For this retrospective study patients were included from January until December 2010 at 
Erasmus MC, Rotterdam, the Netherlands. In this university hospital all medical special-
ties are available. In 2010, 40,626 patients were admitted resulting in 292,209 admission 
days.
bacterial collection and patient data
ESBL-producing E. coli isolates (according to the Clinical and Laboratory Standards 
Institute (CLSI) criteria), were obtained from the bacterial biobanks of the Department 
of Medical Microbiology and Infectious Diseases (MMIZ) at Erasmus MC (frozen stocks 
stored at -80⁰C) (17). Only the first E. coli isolate per patient was included in the study. 
All isolates were obtained from clinical samples sent to MMIZ for analysis due to: 1) an 
assumed infection, or 2) for surveillance purposes in the intensive care unit (ICU) and 
hematology departments of Erasmus MC. Patients admitted to ICU and hematology 
departments routinely receive selective digestive tract decontamination and are tested 
for the presence of (antibiotic resistant) Gram-negative bacteria twice weekly. If (antibi-
otic resistant) Gram-negative bacteria are detected, affected patients are immediately 
moved to ‘contact’ or ‘contact-droplet’ isolation in single-occupancy rooms. Healthcare 
workers wear gloves and gowns during patient care. No extra active surveillance and/or 
contact investigation was performed for this study.
Patient data (e.g. age, gender, and region of residence), hospital admission data (e.g. 
period, department, and patient room) and bacteriological data were obtained from 
electronic patient records. The age of the patient was defined as his/her age on the day 
of detection of the first ESBL-producing E. coli isolate. Mortality was defined as death 
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from any cause within 28 days after the day of detection of the first ESBL-producing 
E. coli isolate. Twenty-eight-day mortality data was obtained from electronic patient 
records.
High-throughput multilocus sequence typing
Due to availability and costs, a random selection of isolates were subjected to the stan-
dardized MultiLocus Sequence Typing (MLST) scheme for E. coli as reported by Wirth et 
al., 2006, using the High-Throughput MLST (HiMLST) strategy (15, 18). PCR primers were 
modified to reduce amplicon sizes, conserving the intact cores, and extended with uni-
versal tails to make the isolates suitable for HiMLST use. The HiMLST primer sequences 
used in this publication are shown in Table 1. Advantages of using the HiMLST technique 
in comparison to conventional MLST is that it allows genotyping of large numbers of 
isolates, requires less labour per isolate, and lowers overall costs (15). MLST types were 
generated using BioNumerics v6.6 software152 (Applied Math NV, Sint-Martens-Latem, 
Belgium), and by reference to the MLST database hosted at the University of Warwick 
(http://mlst.warwick.ac.uk/mlst/mlst/dbs/Ecoli).
Raman spectroscopy
Phenotypic relatedness was investigated via Raman spectroscopy using a SpectraCellRA 
(SCRA) apparatus (RiverD International B.V., Rotterdam, The Netherlands). Raman spec-
troscopy is a label-free, optical technology based on the inelastic scattering of light by 
molecules (19). The Raman spectrum displays molecule-specific changes in wavelength 
– so-called spectroscopic fingerprints (19). These fingerprints reflect the overall molecu-
lar composition of a sample (19). The advantages of Raman spectroscopy are that this 
is an easy-to-use rapid technique. However, one disadvantage is that it is not currently 
a widely used technique. Cultures, sample preparation and SCRA measurements were 
performed according to the operator manual (version 1.7) (16). Raman spectroscopy 
analyses and calculations were performed as described previously (19).
Table 1. High-throughput MultiLocus Sequence Typing primer sequences used in this publication.
gene Forward primer Reverse primer
adk 5’ - gacactatagattctgcttggcgctccggg - 3’ 5’ - cactatagggccgtcaactttcgcgtattt - 3’
fumc 5’ - gacactatagggtatttagtccagtac - 3’ 5’ - cactatagggatttaggcttgttgtctg - 3’
gyrb 5’ - gacactatagataactcctataaagtgtc - 3’ 5’ - cactatagggaatgttgttggtaaagcag - 3’
icd 5’ - gacactatagccagccatgctgaaagtg - 3’ 5’ - cactatagggcaccagagtcacagagtc - 3’
mdh 5’ - gacactatagtgcacgaaccagagacag - 3’ 5’ - cactatagggatgtcgttcttatctctgc - 3’
pura 5’ - gacactatagcatgtccgctgatccttg - 3’ 5’ - cactatagggcggtcgggaacggacctgc - 3’
reca 5’ - gacactatagacctttgtagctgtaccacg - 3’ 5’ - cactatagggagcgtgaaggtaaaacctgtg - 3’
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epidemiological relatedness
We defined a ‘cluster’ as two or more patients carrying identical isolates as indicated 
by HiMLST and/or Raman spectroscopic analysis. Within clusters, a ‘primary patient’ was 
defined as the first patient in time who was positive for an ESBL-producing E. coli isolate, 
while ‘secondary patients’ were all subsequent patients who were positive for an ESBL-
producing E. coli isolate that was genetically or phenotypically related to the primary pa-
tient as identified by HiMLST and/or Raman spectroscopy. Non-cluster (unique) patients 
were defined as primary patients. The ‘transmission index’ was calculated for genotypi-
cally and phenotypically identical ESBL-producing E. coli isolates and was calculated as 
the number of secondary patients divided by the number of primary patients. To be able 
to distinguish community acquisition from healthcare-related transmission, we defined 
‘healthcare-related transmission’ as ESBL-producing E. coli identified in a sample taken 
between 48 hours after admission and within 48 hours after discharge.
likelihood of healthcare-related transmission
To determine the likelihood of epidemiological relatedness of isolates within clusters we 
defined 4 groups based on the likelihood of healthcare-related transmission: 1) ‘definite’, 
2) ‘probable’, 3) ‘possible’, and 4) ‘impossible’ (Table 2). Patients were ‘definitely related’ 
if patients shared the same patient room within the same admission period. If patients 
shared the same patient room but did not have the same admission period, and if the 
second patient was admitted within two months after the first patient was discharged, 
then patients were defined as ‘probably related’. ‘Possibly related’ patients only shared 
the same department during the same admission period. Alternatively, any second 
patient who was admitted within two months after their first patient was discharged 
was also defined as ‘possibly related’. Patients ‘impossibly related’ were patients related 
neither in place nor in time. When using these definitions we assumed 1) that patients 
were not mobile outside their original ward and 2) that people who were mobile be-
tween rooms and wards did not transmit the microorganism.
models of transmission
We compared different categories using 4 different models in order to determine the 
likelihood of healthcare-related transmission events (Table 2). In ‘model 1’, we combined 
hospital admission data of patients with isolates within the same cluster according to 
HiMLST. In ‘model 2’, we combined hospital admission data of patients with isolates 
within the same cluster according to Raman spectroscopy. In ‘model 3’ we combined 2 
months of hospital admission data from patients with isolates within the same cluster 
and further sub-divided HiMLST clusters by adding data from Raman spectroscopy. 
‘Model 4’ was identical to model 3, but the patient data collected was extended to 3 
months.
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statistical Analysis
A non-parametric test was performed using an independent samples median test in 
order to compare median days of stay in the hospital before the detection of an ESBL-
producing E. coli between patients in clusters and non-cluster patients. A P value of 
<0.05 was considered statistically significant and the analysis was performed using IBM 
SPSS version 21 (SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL, USA).
ResulTs
selection of isolates and patients
In 2010, E. coli isolates were identified in 2,933 patients at Erasmus MC, including 204 
patients (7.0%) with an ESBL-producing E. coli. The ESBL-rate per 1,000 hospital admis-
sions was calculated as being 0.50. One hundred and ninety-eight ESBL-producing E. 
coli isolates from 194 patients were stored in MMIZ biobanks at Erasmus MC and were 
available for this study. We included 1 isolate per patient, except for 2 patients who 
were identified carrying 2 different ESBL-producing E. coli isolates. This difference was 
determined by differences in their antibiotic resistance profiles. In total, we included 
196 isolates - of which 33 belonged to ST 131 - representing 194 patients in the current 
study (Figure 1).
model 1
The first model included 113 randomly selected isolates (from 112 patients) typed using 
HiMLST (Figures 1 and 2). We identified 10 clusters (n = 65 isolates from 64 patients) 
with cluster size ranging from 2 to 33 patients - the largest cluster being ST 131, and 
48 primary patients carrying a non-cluster, unique isolate ESBL (Table 3, Figure 2). After 
applying the definitions described in Table 2, we identified 3 possible healthcare-related 
transmission events within the cluster representing ST 131 (Table 3). All other patients 
were impossible to relate to each other with respect to time and place. For patients in 
Table 2. Definitions of likelihood of epidemiological relatedness.
definition
definite Probable Possible impossible
Same patient room 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Same department 1 1 1 1 0 1 0
Same period 1 0a 1 0a 1 0 0
Abbreviations: 0= no; 1= yes
aNot the same period but same patient room (probable) or department (possible) within 2 months after 
primary patient was discharged.
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the 10 clusters, 14 isolates (21.5%) were considered as healthcare-related transmission 
(Table 3) and the remaining isolates considered as community acquired. Of the 2 patients 
previously described carrying 2 diff erent ESBL-producing E. coli isolates, the isolates of 
a single patient were typed using HiMLST. Results showed that these isolates had the 
same sequence type (ST 1137). This was the only patient present with this sequence 
type.
model 2
The second model of this study included 196 isolates (from 194 patients) typed using 
Raman spectroscopy. We identifi ed 16 clusters (n = 101 isolates), with cluster sizes rang-
ing from 2 to 26 patients, and 95 patients with a non-cluster isolate (Table 4). When 
applying the defi nitions as described in Table 2, only 1 patient was possibly related to 
another patient (Table 4). All other patients were impossible to relate with respect to 
time and place. From the patients in the 16 clusters, 33.7% (34 patients) were considered 
as originating from healthcare-related transmission events, and the remaining 66.3% 
considered as not originating from healthcare-related transmission events. For the 2 pa-
tients previously described with 2 diff erent ESBL-producing E. coli isolates, both isolates 
from both patients showed diff erent Raman spectroscopy cluster numbers.
Figure 1. Flow diagram of the selection of isolates and patients identifi ed with an ESBL-producing E. coli 
in 2010. The 113 isolates typed with HiMLST were a random selection out of the study total of 196 isolates. 
Abbreviations: HiMLST; High-throughput MultiLocus Sequence Typing, ESBL; extended-spectrum beta-
lactamase.
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Figure 2. Representative genotypic ESBL-producing E. coli clusters observed using High-throughput mul-
tilocus sequence typing (HiMLST). The different colors represent different sequence types. 1 allele differ-
ence= thick solid line; 2 allele differences= medium solid line; 3 allele differences= thin solid line; 4 allele 
differences= dashed line; >4 allele differences= dotted line.
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definite Probable Possible impossible
1 38 5 3 0 0 0 5
2 131 33 3 0 0 3b 30
3 155 3 0 0 0 0 3
4 354 3 1 0 0 0 3
5 399 3 2 0 0 0 3
6 405 5 3 0 0 0 5
7 410 4 0 0 0 0 4
8 429 2 1 0 0 0 2
9 624 3 0 0 0 0 3
10 648 3 1 0 0 0 3
Total n.a. 64 14 0 0 3 61
Abbreviations: HiMLST, High-throughput MultiLocus Sequence Typing; n.a., not applicable
aPositive isolate identified between 48 hours after admission and within 48 hours after discharge.
bOf which one isolate was considered as healthcare-related
Table 4. Epidemiological relatedness of ESBL-producing E. coli isolates typed using Raman spectroscopy 
only.
Cluster no. no. of patients Healthcare-relateda
model 2
definite Probable Possible impossible
1 3 0 0 0 0 3
2 9 8 0 0 0 9
3 3 0 0 0 0 3
4 3 1 0 0 0 3
5 2 2 0 0 1 1
6 2 1 0 0 0 2
7 2 1 0 0 0 2
8 2 1 0 0 0 2
9 22 6 0 0 0 22
10 26 5 0 0 0 26
11 4 2 0 0 0 4
12 2 0 0 0 0 2
13 5 5 0 0 0 5
14 12 2 0 0 0 12
15 2 0 0 0 0 2
16 2 0 0 0 0 2
Total 101 34 0 0 1 100
aPositive sample identified between 48 hours after admission and within 48 hours after discharge.
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model 3
The third model of this study included 113 isolates (from 112 patients) typed using both 
HiMLST and Raman spectroscopy. The median age of the 112 patients was 53.2 years 
(ranging from zero to 93) and 51 (45.5%) were male. The predominant sample site of the 
113 isolates was urine (64.6%), followed by rectum and throat samples (15.0%; Table 5). 
Overall, 41.1% of patients lived in Rotterdam, the Netherlands. Data on city of residence 
was not available for 2 patients and only one patient lived abroad in Aruba (autonomy 
within the Kingdom of the Netherlands).
We identified 8 clusters when combining the results of Raman spectroscopy and 
HiMLST, - with cluster sizes ranging from 2 to 15 isolates (n= 34 patients, 30.4%), and 
79 non-cluster isolates (78 patients, 69.6%; Table 5). This resulted in 86 primary patients 
(76.8%) and 26 secondary patients (23.2%), and a transmission index of 0.30. Of the 79 
non-cluster isolates only 36 isolates (32.1%) were unique isolates according to both 
typing techniques, 11 isolates (9.8%) were part of a cluster according to Raman spec-
troscopy but not according to HiMLST, and 21 isolates (18.8%) were part of a cluster 
consistent with HiMLST but not consistent with Raman spectroscopy. In cluster 1 to 4, 
100% of isolates belonged to ST 131 (Table 6), in cluster 5 to 8, no ST 131 isolates were 
identified.
Thirty-eight patients (33.9%) were detected with an ESBL-producing E. coli between 
48 hours after admission and within 48 hours after discharge and were therefore consid-
ered as healthcare-related transmission events. The median length of stay in the hospital 
of these patients before detection was 11.5 days (ranging from three to 150 days). Of 
patients in clusters (n= 12), the median length of stay in the hospital before detection 
was 16.0 days (ranging from 3 to 49 days) and in patients with a non-cluster isolate (n= 
26) the median length of stay in the hospital before detection was 11 days (ranging 
from 3 to 150 days) (P value 0.727). In total, 22 patients were identified with an ESBL-
producing E. coli before admission, or within 48 hours after admission, and 52 patients 
had been discharged from hospital, or were outpatients, when the first positive culture 
was identified. These 74 patients were considered as having a community acquired 
ESBL-producing E. coli, though these 74 patients (66.1%) could still be a potential source 
of transmission events to other patients. After applying the definitions as described in 
Table 2, all patients were impossible to relate with respect to time and place (Table 6).
model 4
In model 4, we included 113 isolates (from 112 patients) that were typed using both 
HiMLST and Raman spectroscopy. This was identical to model 3, but patient data was 
collected over a 3 month period. Model 4 clusters and sizes were similar to those found 
in the previous word using model 3. After applying the definitions as described in Table 
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2, only 1 patient was possibly related to another patient. All other patients were impos-
sible to relate in time and place (Table 6).
disCussion
In this study, genetically and phenotypically defined clusters of ESBL-producing E. coli 
were identified using HiMLST and Raman spectroscopy, but no epidemiological rela-
tionships could be found between patients assigned to various epidemiological clusters 
of ESBL-producing E. coli. The most prevalent sequence type was ST 131 (33/113; 29.2%), 
which was expected since it is the most predominant sequence type circulating in the 
community in both The Netherlands and worldwide (20). It was interesting that after 
sub-grouping the ST 131 isolates with Raman spectroscopy, 24/33 of these isolates could 
be subdivided into 4 different clusters, and 9 were considered as non-cluster (unique) 
isolates (model 3). However, despite this extra level of clustering, epidemiological rela-
tionships between these isolates and patients could still not be identified.
In outbreak settings, newer typing techniques such as whole genome sequencing 
(WGS) are proving to be helpful in healthcare- related transmission events settings, and 
are able to distinguish outbreak from non-outbreak bacterial strains (21, 22). However, 
this technique still needs threshold analyses for defining recent transmissions. Also, cur-
rently, the WGS technique is not generally available for use in routine patient settings 
due to the fact that it is a complex, laborious, time-consuming and expensive technique.
In this publication, clinical and molecular epidemiology (both genetic and pheno-
typic) data have been combined in an attempt to detect healthcare-related transmission 
events in a non-outbreak setting. In the Netherlands, recently introduced guidelines 
for multidrug-resistant microorganisms stated that all ESBL-producing E. coli in Dutch 
hospitals should be typed in order to better detect and manage healthcare-related 
transmission events (23). However, the exact definition of a ‘healthcare-related transmis-
sion event’ is not defined, and there are no defined typing techniques that are currently 
recommended for use. Additionally, it is not clear how any results obtained should actu-
ally be interpreted. Therefore, in this publication, the authors developed their own defi-
nitions for ‘healthcare-related transmission event’ and ‘likelihood of healthcare-related 
transmission’ (Table 2). In a systematic review, Kramer et al. determined how long E. coli 
can survive on inanimate surfaces, which differed from 1.5 hours up to 16 months (24). 
As this range is not practical, we selected the reference that was most applicable to 
the hospital setting when considering environmental contamination in our definitions 
of epidemiological relatedness (Table 2). However, Neely at al. found that most E. coli 
isolates had died in the environment only after 36 days (25). Therefore, we extended our 
time frame up to 2 months and incorporated this within the definitions ‘probable’ and 
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‘possible’ in Table 2. In case we still missed important links we extended the time frame 
used in model 3 from 2 to 3 months and used this time period in model 4 (Table 2). How-
ever, 33.9% of the 112 patients were considered as culture positive for ESBL-producing E. 
coli via a healthcare-related transmission event, but no healthcare-related transmission 
event was identified using our ‘likelihood’ definition. The question therefore arises if 
some of the 112 patients should actually be considered as ‘community acquired’, since 
there could still be some form of endogenous selection because of antibiotic use. This 
however is a subject for future research.
limitations
This study has some limitations. Firstly, the routine surveillance cultures in our dataset 
were obtained only from the adult ICU (3 different departments; 10 patients), children’s 
ICU (2 different departments; 2 patients) and hematology (1 department; 3 patients) 
while the remaining cultures were obtained from clinical samples. Therefore, the pres-
ence of unidentified ESBL-producing E. coli carrier patients cannot be ruled out. Also, the 
number of affected patients may have been underestimated, which would mean that 
the lack of epidemiological relatedness in this study could be a consequence of missing 
data. Secondly, we did not include the characterization of the specific ESBL genes (e.g. 
blaCTX-M, blaSHV, blaTEM) and plasmids in our analysis. It is known however that the 
IncFII plasmids harbor the CTX-M-15 enzyme, and that CTX-M-15 is mostly carried by 
the most prevalent ESBL-producing E. coli strain ST 131, which is also most prevalent 
in our study (26, 27). Finally, the possibility of ESBL antibiotic resistance gene transmis-
sion between other members of the Enterobacteriaceae and our E. coli isolates was not 
investigated.
Though this publication suggests that determining ESBL-producing E. coli transmission 
events is difficult using currently available, and high throughput, typing technologies 
the spread of antibiotic resistant organisms within healthcare settings remains a serious 
problem. For example, the isolation of hospitalized patients with ESBL-producing E. coli 
is a nationwide policy in the Netherlands, and more studies are required in order to 
determine if, and when, contact isolation is required or no longer indicated. Interest-
ingly, Tschudin-Sutter et al. showed that the rate of spread of ESBL-producing E. coli 
to roommates in hospitals was low and suggested discontinuing contact isolation of 
infected or colonized patients. However, these authors only included 93 patients in a 
study period of almost 12 years (June 1999 through April 2011) (8). In any case, transmis-
sion prevention measures including antibiotic stewardship, cleaning and disinfection, 
barrier precautions and hand hygiene, should ideally be implemented in all healthcare 
settings (28, 29). For example, Lautenbach et al. identified prior antibiotic usage as the 
only independent risk factor for acquiring an infection with ESBL-producing E. coli (28). 
The fact that ESBL-producing E. coli transmission events are difficult to detect, means that 
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the correct training of healthcare personnel in infection control procedures is extremely 
relevant. This in order to reduce the likelihood of transmission events occurring at all.
Conclusion and clinical implication
ESBL-producing E. coli healthcare-related transmission events could not be success-
fully determined even when using predefined epidemiological definitions and both 
genotypic and phenotypic typing techniques (HiMLST and Raman spectroscopy). Even 
though the majority of isolates belonged to ST 131, no epidemiological relatedness was 
identified between patients carrying ST 131 E. coli strains. We therefore conclude that 
only the general use and development of more sensitive typing techniques (e.g. whole 
genome sequencing), coupled to increased throughput, will generate useful data for 
identifying ESBL-producing E. coli transmission events in healthcare environments. At 
the clinical level, the implementation of WGS should ideally be coupled to the screening 
of all patients at admission to hospitals as previously suggested (30).
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summARizing disCussion
In this thesis, epidemiological studies were conducted in order to understand, describe, 
and evaluate the dynamics between patients and microorganisms in a hospital environ-
ment. We focused on risk factors, transmission, and detection of transmission.
Healthcare-related pathogens: risk factors
By performing systematic reviews with meta-analyses, we identified the leading risk 
factors, the leading protective factors, important environmental sources and reservoirs, 
and effective infection prevention strategies for carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteria-
ceae (CRE) (Chapter 2.1) (1), carbapenem-resistant Pseudomonas aeruginosa (Chapter 
2.2) (2), and extended-spectrum beta-lactamase (ESBL)-producing Klebsiella species 
(Chapter 2.3) (3); all highly-resistant microorganisms (HRMO). Figure 1 shows a sum-
mary of all patient-related and environmental factors identified in chapters 2.1, 2.2 and 
2.3 for acquiring and preventing acquisition of these HRMO.
We identified that the most reported environmental source for CRE, carbapenem-
resistant P. aeruginosa, and ESBL-producing Klebsiella species was the sink (Figure 1) 
(1-3), although in many individual studies a source was not described, not identified, or 
not searched for. The sink flora is, next to the waterborne flora, determined by the flora 
of admitted patients and by its use, after which a biofilm forms (4). Unfortunately, there 
are no studies about design and materials in preventing contamination of sinks with 
bacteria. In other words, the best sink to use in a hospital environment has not been 
engineered yet. Transmission of microorganisms via de sink occurs through splashing of 
water, or if materials used for a patient are put in or near the sink (5). Since the sink plays 
such an important role in transmission of HRMO, it is questionable whether a sink in a 
hospital environment is necessary. A study conducted by Hopman et al. in the Nether-
lands and a study conducted by Shaw et al. in Spain concluded that removal of sinks and 
water-free patient care significantly reduced colonization with Gram-negative bacteria 
in patients (6, 7). However, as Hopman et al. state in the limitation section of the article, 
removal of sinks could interfere with the transmission of Clostridium difficile spores, 
norovirus, and several other non-enveloped viruses, because they are resistant to hand 
alcohol. In these cases, after having contact, hands must be washed. Additionally, if your 
hands are soiled (e.g. with blood) or small surgical procedures are performed in for ex-
ample a room on an intensive care unit (ICU), there must be a facility to wash your hands. 
we conclude and recommend that a sink must be seen as an important but dangerous 
object in a patient room. Sinks should be considered dirty and an important source for 
transmission of bacteria. Healthcare workers (HCW) and patients must become aware of 
this risk and act accordingly.
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We identifi ed that the second most identifi ed source was transmission by contami-
nated hands of healthcare workers (HCW). Meanwhile, the low compliance rate to hand 
hygiene by HCW is still a concern (8). Unfortunately, interventions to increase compliance 
are of varying success (9, 10). Factors that impact compliance to hand hygiene by HCW 
are: (i) motivational factors (e.g. social infl uences, acuity of patient care, self-protection), 
and (ii), perceptions of the work environment (e.g. resources, knowledge, organizational 
culture) (11). A study conducted in the Netherlands introduced a multicomponent in-
tervention program in 10 hospitals. Hand hygiene compliance increased from 42.9% 
to 51.4%, a signifi cant increase (12). Connected to that, as most eff ective infection 
prevention strategy reported for ESBL-producing Klebsiella species, and the fourth most 
reported eff ective strategy to control CRE was improving adherence to hand hygiene 
(Figure 1). Therefore, we conclude that eff orts to improve hand hygiene compliance are 
still important and must be and/or remain a top priority in every hospital.
The most reported eff ective infection prevention strategy for control of CRE were 
barrier and contact precautions when identifying a patient with CRE, and the second 
most reported infection prevention strategy was transfer of identifi ed patients to a 
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Figure 1. Infection prevention strategies, sources/reservoirs and patient-related risk factors for acquisition 
of highly-resistant microorganisms identifi ed in chapters 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3.
Abbreviations: ICU; intensive care unit, HCW; healthcare workers, IP; infection prevention.
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single-occupancy room, or cohorting of patients with the same microorganism (Fig-
ure 1). Concerning single-occupancy rooms, there is increasing evidence showing a 
relationship between hospital room design and infection control. A systematic review 
by Taylor et al. showed that there is moderately high evidence that single-occupancy 
rooms are an intervention for infection control, and a systematic review by Stiller et 
al. showed that single-occupancy rooms are beneficial for infection control (13, 14). 
Additionally, the 2018 USA guidelines for design and construction of hospitals and 
outpatient facilities states: “The maximum number of beds per room in a medical/surgi-
cal patient care unit shall be one unless the necessity of a two-bed arrangement has been 
demonstrated (15).” All other types of patient care units (e.g. oncology, intermediate care) 
mentioned in this guideline refer to this section (i.e. patient rooms shall comply with 
requirements of medical/surgical patient care unit – patient room) (15). Unfortunately, 
in the Netherlands no such guideline is available. Therefore, it is difficult for the Dutch 
infection control departments to demand only single-occupancy rooms. There are 
also other advantages of single-occupancy rooms; it was shown to improve patients’ 
recovery because of increased privacy and increased patient support, to decrease 
length of hospital stay, to reduce patients’ stress, to cause less medication errors and to 
increase doctor-nurse-family communication (16-19). However, opponents claim (i) that 
single-occupancy rooms are more expensive, (ii) that it may cause social isolation, (iii) 
that it affects the layout of the hospital (e.g. walking distances) which reduces quality 
of care, and (iv) that there is not enough evidence that proves that single-occupancy 
rooms reduce healthcare-related infections (16-19). The reason that only a few studies 
are performed on this topic is that it is difficult to perform RCTs with single-occupancy 
rooms as intervention. we conclude based on the results of chapter 2.1 that contact 
precautions need to be installed for patients identified with CRE, and that a single room 
is preferred above multi-occupancy rooms.
The risk factor we identified as having a high pooled odds ratio (OR) in all three system-
atic reviews in this thesis was use of antibiotics (Figure 1) (1-3). Additionally, as described 
by Paño Pardo et al. antibiotic use is likely the primary determinant for persistent CRE 
carriage (20). This urgently calls for reducing use, and also optimizing appropriate use 
of antibiotics (i.e. antibiotic stewardship) (21). A Cochrane systematic review by Davey 
et al. concluded that there is high-certainty evidence that interventions are effective in 
increasing compliance with antibiotic policy and reducing duration of antibiotic treat-
ment (22). They also identified that less use of antibiotics did not increase mortality, 
but reduced length of hospital stay (22). However, as described by Parsonage et al., 
there are numerous ethical problems to be considered when reducing use of antibiotics 
(23). In short, authors discussed if you can deny helpful and even potentially lifesaving 
antibiotics to a patient because there is a potential lack of therapies for that patient in 
the future (23). Antibiotics are a risk factor for acquiring HRMO because broad-spectrum 
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antibiotics (e.g. carbapenems, cephalosporins and fluoroquinolones) influence the nor-
mal gut flora and effectively kill or suppress the susceptible microorganisms, thereby 
enabling resistant bacteria to emerge or adhere, survive, and proliferate (i.e. antibiotic 
selective pressure). we conclude in all three chapters that antibiotic use is associated 
with acquisition of HRMO, and use needs to be reduced as much as possible. Also, we 
describe that since many risk factors are identified (Figure 1), bundled interventions are 
needed, and these should include antibiotic stewardship.
Healthcare-related pathogens: sources and transmission
Transmission is defined as the process, the mechanisms and the determinants by which 
an infectious agent or an infectious disease is spread from a source or reservoir to an-
other person or across communities and countries (24). Transmission can be (i) direct 
(e.g. from person to person), or (ii) indirect (e.g. vehicle borne, vector borne or airborne) 
(24). All hospitals deal with outbreaks every now and then, and our tertiary hospital is no 
exception; as LeBourdais stated in 1974: “Hospitals are bacterial collectors and distribut-
ers.” In chapters 2.1-2.3, we evaluated outbreaks and transmission of microorganisms 
in our tertiary hospital (i.e. for two specific microorganisms) and nationwide (i.e. for a 
specific route of transmission).
Chapter 3.1 showed that when dealing with a large hospital-wide outbreak by 
Verona-integron-encoded metallo-beta-lactamase (VIM)-positive P. aeruginosa, the 
entire ward should be seen as reservoir and as contaminated, and unidentified persis-
tent sources in the innate environment play an important role in transmission dynam-
ics (25). This means that surveillance and cleaning of the environment is of utmost 
importance. In 2017, the World Health Organization (WHO) published a guideline for 
the prevention and control of CRE, carbapenem-resistant Acinetobacter baumannii and 
carbapenem-resistant P. aeruginosa in healthcare facilities (26). Although a low qual-
ity of evidence, the panel recommended that environmental surveillance cultures for 
these microorganisms may be considered when epidemiologically indicated (26). Also, 
because environmental contamination is associated with increased rates of patient 
colonization and infection. We identified quinolone use, use of the selective digestive 
tract decontamination regimen (SDD) and having undergone a gastroscopy as robust 
risk factors (25). A risk factor was defined as “robust” when identified using two different 
groups of control patients. Regarding SDD, Sánchez-Ramírez et al. concluded that SDD 
was effective in an ICU setting with a high level of resistance and subsequent high level 
of clinical infections (27). Several Dutch studies concluded the same in ICU settings with 
low levels of resistance (28-31). Additionally, SDD appeared to be cost-effective, and 
there was no relation between the use of SDD and the development of resistance in 
microorganisms in patients in the ICU (32-35). We hypothesize that the reason why we 
identified SDD as a robust risk factor, despite the antibiotic colistin being present in 
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SDD, could be because (i) the sites of the patient’s body where VIM-positive P. aerugi-
nosa primarily adhered was not in the gastrointestinal tract so could not be reached 
by SDD, (ii) the SDD could not reach VIM-positive P. aeruginosa in the gut because of 
a paralytic ileus, or (iii) topical application of colistin is not sufficient enough. Because 
SDD does kill other bacteria present in the gut, VIM-positive P. aeruginosa may adhere 
and proliferate. This is supported by James Hurley, who concluded that the incidence 
of ventilator-associated pneumonia caused by P. aeruginosa stayed similar in patients 
who did and who did not receive SDD (36). Regarding having undergone a gastroscopy; 
complex endoscopes have a relatively high chance of inadequate reprocessing com-
pared to non-complex endoscopes, such as gastroscopes. However, outbreaks with as 
source the gastroscope have been reported, and to date no study was performed to 
determine the prevalence of microbial contamination of patient-ready gastroscopes, or 
critically assessed the gastroscope reprocessing procedures (37-39). we conclude that 
when studying microorganisms using a case-control study design, investigators need to 
consider using different control groups, and reason in the method section of the article 
why certain control groups were chosen. Additionally, use of quinolones and SDD can 
make patients prone to carriage of VIM-positive P. aeruginosa, and gastroscopy could be 
considered as a high-risk procedure in patients with risk factors.
In Chapter 3.2, we performed a nationwide cross-sectional study to assess the con-
tamination rate of patient-ready duodenoscopes, after we proved and published in 2015 
that these were a source for VIM-positive P. aeruginosa and the cause of an outbreak of 
this bacterium (40). Our study showed that 22% (33 duodenoscopes) of patient-ready 
duodenoscopes from 67 hospitals in the Netherlands were contaminated with ≥20 
colony forming units (CFU), and 15% (23 duodenoscopes) were contaminated with 
gastrointestinal or oral bacteria, independent of CFU count (41). We also showed that 
this was not dependent on the duodenoscope manufacturer (e.g. Olympus, Pentax or 
Fujifilm), or duodenoscope type (41). This means that our study showed that patients are 
at risk. Since duodenoscopes are causally linked to outbreaks of CRE, and are difficult to 
clean and disinfect, it is a thin line between benefiting patients by the ERCP procedure 
and doing harm (41, 42). The different sampling conditions of the endoscopes and 
adherence to the strict sampling protocol could not be checked in our study, which 
is a limitation. To conclude, this study showed high prevalence rates of contaminated 
patient-ready duodenoscopes. This means that the current reprocessing and process 
control installed or the design of the endoscopes is not sufficient. This calls for further 
research and uniform guidelines and instructions, since they are currently lacking.
Third, chapter 3.3 shows an outbreak of C. difficile; a microorganism first identified in 
1935, causing infection, with as symptoms severe diarrhea and colitis (43). This outbreak 
was caused by a hypervirulent not-before published new C. difficile clone, and involved 
5 patients (44). By constructing an epidemiological curve and by conducting molecu-
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lar analyses transmission was confirmed. However, an environmental source was not 
identified. C. difficile can be hospital-acquired as well as community-acquired (45-47). 
Previously identified and known sources include (i) C. difficile colonized persons (i.e. in 
the absence of symptoms), as described by Crobach et al. in 2018: the most important 
unexplained reservoir for C. difficile transmission (48), (ii) animals, from wild animals to 
pets (49), and (iii), the environment, including water, plants and soil (49). With such a 
variety of sources successful infection prevention and control is difficult. In 2011, the 
burden of C. difficile infection (CDI) in the United States was estimated at almost 500,000 
infections, and 29,000 deaths (47). In Europe, during a point prevalence survey during 
2011-2012, 48% of all gastrointestinal infections registered were due to C. difficile, and 
most common in Hungary and UK-Wales (50). we conclude that new C. difficile ribotypes 
still emerge without a clear source. Therefore, ongoing surveillance as currently installed 
in the Netherlands needs to continue (51). In this way, outbreaks can be detected in an 
early phase and measures can be installed.
Overall, the conclusions from the studies presented in these three chapters show that 
bacteria are most often transmitted from an unidentified patient to the environment, 
object, or hands of HCW, to the next patient. Bacteria can remain on inanimate surfaces 
for months and therefore the hospital environment acts as a continuous source (52). 
Finally, outbreaks with HRMO happen, and close monitoring of high-risk environments 
and of high-risk patients is important to control transmission in an early phase.
Healthcare-related pathogens: detection of transmission
To detect local hospital outbreaks typing techniques are necessary. Therefore, we stud-
ied the then novel method Raman spectroscopy, a phenotypic typing method, in order 
to conclude whether or not to implement this technique in the diagnostic laboratory 
of our tertiary-care hospital. As described by Eberhardt et al., advantages for diagnostic 
laboratories when using Raman spectroscopy are (i), minimal sample preparation, (ii), 
high specificity, (iii), label free, no dyes and toxic waste products, and (iv), non-destruc-
tive, non-invasive (wavelength and power dependent) (53). Disadvantages are (i) auto 
fluorescence (sample dependent), (ii) low sensitivity, (iii) long measurement times if 
weak Raman signal, and (iv) sophisticated data analysis are often necessary (53).
In Chapter 4.1, we evaluated Raman spectroscopy using SpectraCellRA analysis 
(RiverD International B.V., Rotterdam, The Netherlands) for a period of 43 months (54). 
We applied this typing method retrospectively and included patients identified with 
ESBL-producing Klebsiella pneumoniae or ESBL-producing Klebsiella oxytoca, and used 
it prospectively, also for patients identified with an ESBL-producing K. pneumoniae or 
ESBL-producing K. oxytoca. We could detect clonal outbreaks which were epidemiologi-
cally plausible, which could have possibly been prevented if instant prospective typing 
had been implemented in our hospital. However, we think that our results are the tip of 
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the iceberg, because we did not install routine admission screenings, and therefore have 
presumably missed a lot of unidentified carriers. For this study, we also developed defi-
nitions of epidemiological relatedness, and conducted a spatial analysis to combine this 
with the Raman data. The definitions were not only applicable to Klebsiella species, but 
we also applied them to ESBL-producing Escherichia coli (chapter 4.2), and VIM-positive 
P. aeruginosa (chapter 3.1) transmission events (25, 55). Our definitions could have been 
too strict. Therefore, it is possible that we misclassified or missed epidemiological rela-
tions that were present.
In Chapter 4.2, we studied if High-Throughput Multilocus Sequence Typing (HiMLST) 
and Raman spectroscopy could detect ESBL-producing E. coli healthcare-related trans-
mission events, using four different models (55). We concluded that we did identify 
genetically and phenotypically defined clusters, however; patients in all four models 
were not epidemiologically related. This can be explained by (i), missing links (i.e. un-
identified carriers), and/or (ii), the high community carriage rates of ESBL-producing E. 
coli sequence type (ST) 131. To solve this problem, we concluded that more sensitive 
typing techniques (e.g. whole genome sequencing or wgMLST) and admission screen-
ing are needed.
we conclude that epidemiological plausible clusters for ESBL-producing Klebsiella 
species; however, this could not be concluded for ESBL-producing E. coli. Additionally, 
epidemiological relatedness is often described in publications; however, definitions 
are almost never published in such a way that they are directly applicable to your 
own research. With our table of epidemiological relatedness, applied to three differ-
ent scenarios, we hope to contribute to epidemiological research on transmission of 
bacteria. Raman spectroscopy had advantages and disadvantages. Eventually, Raman 
spectroscopy was not implemented as a routine typing technique in our hospital. This 
was mainly due to the software instabilities and the sudden unavailability of the method 
at that time.
FuTuRe PeRsPeCTiVes
Healthcare-related pathogens: risk factors
The literature studies in chapters 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 may serve as a basis and provide 
knowledge for observational or experimental research on HRMO. We feel that especially 
(i), future research should not only focus on developing new antibiotics, but also on 
novel therapeutic strategies since resistance to all biologic antimicrobials will ultimately 
develop (23). (ii) Future studies should reconsider the design of the hospital sink, in-
cluding the faucet, faucet aerator, sink tap, grating, plughole, and siphon because of 
biofilm formation of bacteria in these areas. (iii) More research is needed about single-
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patient rooms and the effect on acquisition of HRMO. On May 18, 2018, the Erasmus MC 
University Medical Center, Rotterdam, the Netherlands (Erasmus MC), moved to a new 
building, with only single-occupancy rooms. This event provided a unique opportunity 
to perform such a study. Hundreds of patients that were housed in multiple-occupancy 
rooms in the old building, and hundreds of patients that are housed in the new build-
ing were and continue to be included. From these patients, admission and discharge 
cultures (perianal swab) were and continue to be performed. Additionally, the hospital 
environment was and continuous to be thoroughly sampled in both buildings. Hope-
fully, this study will add to the existing knowledge about changes in environment and 
in patients when moving from multiple-occupancy rooms to only single-occupancy 
rooms. (iv) It is not known whether there is a relationship between HRMO infection 
prevention policy and the prevalence of HRMO. Therefore, future studies should assess 
the cost-effectiveness of infection prevention strategies to prevent transmission and 
acquisition of HRMO and compare policies in settings with a high prevalence of HRMO 
to settings with a low prevalence of HRMO.
Healthcare-related pathogens: sources and transmission
P. aeruginosa can survive in environments with low and high availability of nutrients, 
can grow at temperatures between 10⁰C and 42⁰C, and forms biofilms (56). Therefore, 
this microorganism is difficult to remove from the environment. (i) The most optimal 
cleaning agent for P. aeruginosa environmental cleaning protocols has not yet been 
defined. This can be investigated by future studies. (ii) We identified use of SDD as a risk 
factor for acquiring VIM-positive P. aeruginosa; in future research a subgroup analysis of 
all patients with SDD could be performed to unravel any unidentified important patient 
characteristics. Additionally, future studies should determine if SDD can be optimized in 
settings were this microorganism is present. (iii) Since gastroscopy was identified as a 
high-risk procedure, future studies should investigate the prevalence of bacterial con-
tamination of gastroscopes, and should assess the gastroscope reprocessing process.
Regarding contamination of duodenoscopes, future studies should (i) investigate the 
effect of other confounding factors, such as age and number of procedures of the duo-
denoscope and the time component (i.e. considering the warnings by for example the 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration and newly developed guidelines) on contamination 
levels of duodenoscopes. (ii) Since the reprocessing of duodenoscopes is not optimal, 
future studies should investigate different and novel cleaning and drying methods. (iii) 
A cross-sectional study design is useful when wanting to know a prevalence; however, 
follow-up data of duodenoscopes is needed to study persistence of colonization and to 
study the effects of interventions on contamination rates. This can be investigated by 
future studies.
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Finally, our newly identified ribotype 826 C. difficile was not identified in databases of 
human collections, and animal collections are lacking. Therefore, we strongly support 
the development of a global database or national reference laboratory for animal-
associated C. difficile infections can be realized.
Healthcare-related pathogens: detection of transmission
Considering the different typing methods in combination with epidemiological re-
latedness, it is (i) important that there are as less as unidentified carriers as possible. 
Therefore, future studies about transmission dynamics should assess in a setting with 
admission cultures of all patients if molecular relationships can be explained epidemio-
logically. (ii) In chapter 4.2, we did not find any epidemiological relationships between 
patients with phenotypically identical ESBL-producing E. coli. If admission cultures are 
installed, the different relationships should be studied again for this microorganism. 
Since literature on the effect and necessity of infection prevention measures for patients 
identified with ESBL-producing E. coli is contradictory, these data could be helpful. (iii) 
In chapters 4.1 and 4.2, we studied ESBL-producing K. pneumoniae, ESBL-producing K. 
oxytoca and ESBL-producing E. coli; future studies should investigate other HRMO. (iv) 
Transmission dynamics of HRMO should be studied in different settings; for example 
university compared to non-academic hospitals, or hospitals in countries with a high 
HRMO prevalence compared to hospitals in countries with a low HRMO prevalence. Ad-
ditionally, network analyses should be performed to further understand transmission 
dynamics. To fully understand transmission dynamics, the network analyses should 
not only include movements of patients in one hospital, but also movements of pa-
tients between different hospitals. Furthermore, not only movements in and between 
hospitals should be included, but also for example admissions to nursing homes and 
rehabilitation clinics. Finally, (v) future studies should keep evaluating novel promising 
typing methods, as speed and accuracy can always be improved, and are important in 
fast, efficient and effective infection prevention and control.
FinAl noTes
Epidemiology is the study of the occurrence and distribution of health-related events, 
states, and processes in specified populations, including the study of the determinants 
influencing such processes, and the application of this knowledge to control relevant 
health problems (24). Study includes: (i) surveillance, (ii) observation, (iii) screening, (iv) 
hypothesis testing, (v) analytic research, (vi) experiments, and (vii) prediction (24). In this 
thesis, epidemiological studies were conducted in order to understand, describe, and 
evaluate the dynamics between patients and microorganisms in a hospital environment.
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study designs
Back in 1904, summarizing and pooling of data in review articles was introduced (57). 
Currently, systematic reviews are well established studies to summarize all available 
evidence about a specific subject. Because of the possible high impact of results of 
systematic reviews on decision making in healthcare, the quality of reporting of meta-
analyses (QUOROM) statement was introduced in 1996 (officially published in 1999) (58, 
59). This statement aimed at enhancing quality of systematic reviews of randomized 
controlled trials (RCTs) (58). In 2009, the preferred reporting items for systematic reviews 
and meta-analyses (PRISMA) statement was introduced as an update of the QUOROM 
statement (www.prisma-statement.org) (60). Currently, in 2018, an update of the 2009 
statement is under development. In addition, in 2018, the PRISMA statement checklist 
is mandatory to add as supplemental material when submitting a systematic review to 
over 180 journals. Hence, we also need to consider the limitations of systematic reviews. 
A first limitation that needs to be considered is the between study heterogeneity. This 
means that there are underlying differences among the included studies. This may be 
caused by (i) the selection of patients, (ii) differences in study setting, (iii) patient charac-
teristics, (iv) measurements, and/or (v) methodological study differences (61). One can 
reason if heterogeneity between studies is present or not, or use the I2 statistic (61, 62). 
The I2 statistic is easily available, easy to apply, and easy interpretations are available 
(62). However, the I2 statistic is often used inappropriately (63). Only the statistic itself 
can give wrong information, as for example a meta-analysis with an I2 value of 80% can 
correspond with less variance than a meta-analysis with an I2 value of 20%. Therefore, 
it should always be used together with the forest plot. However, still when using a for-
est plot, the I2 statistic only shows you the extent to which confidence intervals from 
the different studies overlap with each other, nothing about the actual study to study 
dispersion in effects (63). In chapters 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3, heterogeneity between studies 
was present when using the I2 statistic in combination with the forest plot. Therefore, 
in all these three studies, a random effects model was fitted in all meta-analyses. A 
random effects model allows for differences from study to study, and is therefore a good 
statistical option if heterogeneity between studies is present (64). A second limitation 
of systematic reviews is publication bias. Publication bias means that the research that 
is available differs in its results from the results of all the research that has been done 
(65). Often, studies with a non-significant result or negative results are not published. 
Publication bias was also present in almost all meta-analyses present in this thesis, as 
indicated by funnel plots (i.e. visual inspection) or by bias indicators by Egger et al, and 
Begg and Mazumdar (66, 67). It is possible to correct for publication bias by imputing 
the apparent missing values in funnel plots; however, this is not always preferable.
From chapter 3.1 we learned that the approach of using two different groups as 
controls showed that results you obtain from case-control studies highly depend on 
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the choice of the control patients. As described by Feinstein and Horwitz in 1983, the 
different choices of control patients suggest either that (i) the perfect control group 
does not exist, or (ii) that just no specific standards have been established in order to 
decide which controls to use (68). Additionally, described by Grimes and Schulz in 2005, 
poor choice of controls can lead to both wrong results and possible medical harm (69).
With a cross-sectional study as used in chapter 3.2, data is collected at a given point 
in time. Making causal inferences is not possible with this type of study, unless the 
exposure, in this case contamination, is stable over time (70). Kraemer et al. states that 
limitations of cross-sectional studies are acknowledged, however understated (71). To 
assess the validity of observational studies, including cross-sectional studies, a Cochrane 
systematic review by Anglemyer et al. included reviews, and investigated healthcare-
outcomes assessed with observational study designs compared with those assessed by 
RCTs (72). They concluded that when conducting a review on a specific topic, on average 
there is little difference between results obtained from RCTs and results obtained from 
observational studies (72). However, unfortunately a direct comparison between cross-
sectional studies and RCTs was not possible, because of lack of identified studies (72).
The future of hospital epidemiology
An epidemiologist is a professional who strives to study and control the factors that 
influence the occurrence of disease or other health-related conditions and events in 
defined populations and societies, has an expertise in population thinking and epide-
miological methods, and is knowledgeable about public health and causal inferences in 
health (24). A healthcare epidemiologist should have knowledge about (i) disease expo-
sure and transmission, (ii) an understanding of measures of incidence and prevalence, 
and (iii) basic knowledge of microbiology, bacteriology, virology and mycology (73). As 
described by Bryant et al, having at least one dedicated full-time healthcare epidemiolo-
gist, next to infection preventionists and clinical microbiologists, is a requirement for 
an effective infection prevention and control/healthcare epidemiology program in a 
healthcare institution (74). In the future, I hope we can accomplish this in every Dutch 
hospital; both academic and non-academic.
In this thesis, we described three topics, all about healthcare-related pathogens; (i) risk 
factors, (ii) sources and transmission, and (iii) detection of transmission. In my opinion, 
the three topics in this thesis are connected. We need to learn from other outbreaks 
and studies about infection prevention and microorganisms, we need to learn from our 
own outbreaks and gain deep understanding how and why it happened, and we need 
to constantly evaluate existing and new typing methods to quickly learn if isolates from 
patients are related or not. There are also four different levels within the three topics 
(Figure 2): (i) healthcare at individual hospital level, (ii) healthcare at regional level, (iii) 
healthcare at national level, and (iv) healthcare at international level.
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These levels are also connected. Concerning the individual hospital level, data collec-
tion and data connection can happen without any problems. However, when collecting 
and connecting regional, national or international patient data in order to epidemiologi-
cally interpret the results of molecular genotypic or phenotypic typing, problems of data 
ownership and patient privacy arise, especially when a website-based database is used. 
Therefore, agreements between institutes need to be signed and the patient privacy 
must be adequately protected. In the future, I hope we can develop fi rst national guide-
lines, and then followed by international guidelines about data ownership and patient 
privacy. National and international collaborations are in my opinion the key. Overall, 
research is the connecting factor, which needs to be executed at each level, about every 
topic possible. Share information about infection prevention, share data, share research. 
In this way we can combat antimicrobial resistance and combat spread more eff ectively 
and effi  ciently, because transmission happens, and often through unidentifi ed sources 
and/or reservoirs.
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Dit proefschrift bestaat uit literatuuronderzoeken en observationele studies over zorg-
gerelateerde ziekteverwekkers. Deze studies zijn onderverdeeld in de volgende drie 
onderwerpen: (i) het identificeren en beschrijven van risicofactoren voor het verkrijgen 
van zorggerelateerde ziekteverwekkers, (ii) bronnen en overdracht van zorggerelateerde 
ziekteverwekkers, en (iii) het detecteren van overdracht van zorggerelateerde ziektever-
wekkers. Het doel van deze studies was het optimaliseren en het veiliger maken van 
zorg voor patiënten opgenomen in het Erasmus MC Universitair Medisch Centrum in 
Rotterdam (Erasmus MC). Ook geven de uitkomsten van de studies inzichten welke van 
nut zijn voor andere zorginstellingen, wereldwijd.
zoRggeRelATeeRde ziekTeVeRwekkeRs: RisiCoFACToRen
Het eerste deel van dit proefschrift bestaat uit drie systematische literatuuronderzoeken. 
Een systematisch literatuuronderzoek heeft als doel alle beschikbare wetenschappelijke 
literatuur over een specifiek onderwerp samen te vatten, kwalitatief en/of kwantitatief. 
Het samenvoegen van resultaten van de verschillende studies kan ook door middel 
van een statistische methode; dit wordt ook wel een meta-analyse genoemd. Het doel 
van de literatuuronderzoeken in dit proefschrift was het identificeren van (i) de be-
langrijkste risicofactoren, (ii) de belangrijkste beschermende factoren, (iii) veel voorko-
mende bronnen in de ziekenhuisomgeving, en (iv) de meest effectieve infectiepreventie 
maatregelen voor het voorkomen van overdracht van verschillende zorggerelateerde 
ziekteverwekkers, ofwel micro-organismen. In hoofdstuk 2.1 beschreven we dit voor 
carbapenem-resistente Enterobacteriaceae (CRE). Enterobacteriaceae zijn Gram-
negatieve bacteriën; de bekendste genera binnen de familie van de Enterobacteriaceae 
zijn: Escherichia, Klebsiella, Proteus, Enterobacter, Morganella, Salmonella en Serratia. In 
hoofdstuk 2.2 beschreven we carbapenem-resistente Pseudomonas aeruginosa, en in 
hoofdstuk 2.3 extended-spectrum beta-lactamase (ESBL)-producerende Klebsiella spe-
cies. Het enzym ESBL zorgt voor resistentie tegen belangrijke groepen van antibiotica, 
namelijk de penicillines en cefalosporines. Al deze micro-organismen worden ook wel 
bijzonder resistente micro-organismen (BRMO) genoemd. Ze zijn bijzonder resistent 
omdat ze resistent zijn tegen eerste keus antibiotica of tegen meerdere groepen an-
tibiotica. De behandeling van infecties door BRMO is daardoor vaker complex, en er 
moet uitgeweken worden naar soorten antibiotica die men liever niet gebruikt vanwege 
bijvoorbeeld hoge toxiciteit. Ook worden patiënten bij wie deze bacteriën zijn geïden-
tificeerd in isolatie verpleegd om overdracht van de bacterie naar andere patiënten te 
voorkomen. Afhankelijk van het micro-organisme betekent dit een eenpersoonskamer 
(soms zelfs met sluiskamer), en zowel zorgverleners als bezoek dragen een schort en 
handschoenen, eventueel uitgebreid met een mondkapje en een muts. Het is belangrijk 
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verspreiding van BRMO binnen zorginstellingen te voorkomen omdat (i) het hebben 
van een infectie met een BRMO adequate behandeling bemoeilijkt of zelfs onmogelijk 
maakt, (ii) patiënten langer opgenomen liggen in isolatie en (iii) patiënten mogelijk een 
slechtere prognose hebben door het hebben van een BRMO. Hierbij is een samenvatting 
van kennis van uitbraken wereldwijd, en bevindingen en gedachtegangen van collega 
onderzoekers in publicaties cruciaal. In fi guur 1 staan de belangrijkste bevindingen van 
hoofdstuk 2.1, hoofdstuk 2.2 en hoofdstuk 2.3 weergegeven.
De factor die in alle drie de studies een hoog risico op overdracht met BRMO gaf was 
het gebruik van diverse antibiotica. Dit laat zien dat zorgverleners zich moeten inzetten 
om antibiotica alleen te gebruiken als het daadwerkelijk nodig is.
De omgevingsbron welke het meest werd gerapporteerd voor alle onderzochte BRMO 
was de wasbak. Vanuit de wasbak kunnen de bacteriën via spatten terecht komen op 
voorwerpen rondom de wasbak. Via die voorwerpen kunnen ze dan vervolgens bij de 
patiënt komen. Dit pleit mogelijk voor het verwijderen van wasbakken in de patiënt 
omgeving. Echter, in verschillende situaties blijft een wasbak nodig: (i) bij patiënten 
geïdentifi ceerd met een micro-organisme dat resistent is tegen handalcohol, (ii) als 
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Figuur 1. De belangrijkste risicofactoren, veel voorkomende bronnen in de omgeving, en de meest ef-
fectieve infectiepreventie (IP) maatregelen voor overdracht en het voorkomen van overdracht van verschil-
lende bijzonder resistente micro-organismen.
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handen van zorgverleners visueel bevuild zijn met bijvoorbeeld braaksel, en (iii) bij het 
uitvoeren van kleine chirurgische ingrepen op de patiëntkamer. De meest gerappor-
teerde effectieve infectie preventie strategie voor CRE was het gebruik van persoonlijke 
beschermingsmiddelen en het instellen van isolatie. Voor ESBL-producerende Klebsiella 
was dit extra aandacht besteden aan handhygiëne.
zoRggeRelATeeRde ziekTeVeRwekkeRs: bRonnen en oVeRdRACHT
Overdracht, ofwel transmissie van micro-organismen wordt vaak gedefinieerd als het 
proces, het mechanisme en factoren waardoor een micro-organisme of ziekte verspreid 
vanuit een reservoir of omgevingsbron naar een persoon. Overdracht kan worden on-
derverdeeld in twee categorieën: (i) directe transmissie, van patiënt naar patiënt, of (ii) 
indirecte transmissie, van patiënt naar patiënt via de omgeving (e.g. via een voorwerp of 
via de lucht). In de volgende drie hoofdstukken beschrijven en evalueren wij overdracht 
van micro-organismen in het Erasmus MC (i.e. voor twee specifieke micro-organismen) 
en landelijk (i.e. voor een specifieke transmissie route),
Hoofdstuk 3.1 beschrijft een grote uitbraak veroorzaakt door Verona Integron-
encoded Metallo-β-lactamase (VIM) –positieve P. aeruginosa. Dit micro-organisme is 
resistent tegen carbapenem antibiotica (e.g. imipenem en meropenem). Wij onderzoch-
ten onderliggende risicofactoren voor het oplopen van deze bacterie door middel van 
een patiënt-controle onderzoek. In een patiënt-controle onderzoek worden patiënten 
met de bacterie (cases) vergeleken met patiënten die vergelijkbaar zijn met de cases, 
maar zonder de bacterie. Omdat VIM-positieve P. aeruginosa niet vaak voorkomt, is dit 
efficiënter dan prospectief een grote groep patiënten volgen. In deze studie includeer-
den wij 144 patiënten met de bacterie en 576 controles. Door middel van een multi-
variaat statistisch model identificeerden wij de volgende risicofactoren: (i) het hebben 
ondergaan van een gastroscopie binnen 6 maanden voor identificatie van de bacterie, 
(ii) het gebruik van selectieve darm decontaminatie (SDD), antibiotica voorschreven op 
de intensive care, en (iii) het gebruik van chinolonen. Ook hebben wij een netwerkana-
lyse uitgevoerd, waarin wij vaststelden dat overdracht van de bacterie niet via directe 
transmissie plaatsvindt (i.e. van patiënt naar patiënt), maar indirect, via de omgeving. 
Wij concludeerden dat deze studie laat zien dat het gebruik van antibiotica zo mogelijk 
verminderd moet worden, een gastroscopie kan worden gezien als een hoog-risico pro-
cedure bij patiënten bij wie andere risicofactoren (e.g. antibiotica gebruik) ook aanwezig 
zijn, en er aandacht moet worden besteed aan het opsporen en elimineren van bronnen 
in de omgeving aangezien de netwerkanalyse liet zien dat overdracht van VIM-positieve 
P. aeruginosa vooral via de omgeving plaatsvindt.
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Hoofdstuk 3.2 beschrijft een landelijke studie naar contaminatie van duodenosco-
pen gebruikt voor endoscopische retrograde cholangio- en pancreaticografie (ERCP). 
Een ECRP wordt ingezet om de galwegen en alvleesklier te onderzoeken, en wordt in 
Nederland ongeveer 17.000 keer per jaar uitgevoerd in 73 verschillende centra. Tijdens 
de ERCP procedure kunnen duodenoscopen gecontamineerd raken met darmflora. 
Deze flora bestaat voornamelijk uit bacteriën. Als duodenoscopen na elke procedure 
inadequaat gereinigd en gedesinfecteerd worden, kunnen patiënten besmet raken 
met de darmflora van de vorige patiënt(en). Een duodenoscoop is erg complex want 
heeft onder andere een zijwaarts gerichte tip, een liftmechanisme, en een liftkanaal. 
Hierdoor is een duodenoscoop lastiger te reinigen en desinfecteren dan andere endo-
scopen, bijvoorbeeld een gastroscoop of een coloscoop. Wereldwijd zijn er uitbraken 
met BRMO geïdentificeerd en gerapporteerd waarbij de duodenoscoop de bron was. 
Ook in het Erasmus MC is er een uitbraak gerapporteerd door een gecontamineerde 
duodenoscoop, waarbij 22 patiënten betrokken waren (Verfaillie et al., Endoscopy 2015; 
47(6): 493-502). Door deze wereldwijde uitbraken met als bron een duodenoscoop en 
het besef dat duodenoscopen niet adequaat gereinigd en gedesinfecteerd kunnen wor-
den, vonden wij het belangrijk vast te stellen hoeveel duodenoscopen daadwerkelijk 
zijn gecontamineerd, en waaruit de flora bestaat. Met de huidige studie onderzochten 
wij hoeveel duodenoscopen in Nederland gecontamineerd zijn en of het uitmaakt van 
welke fabrikant (i.e. Olympus, Pentax of Fujifilm) de scoop afkomstig is. Zevenenzestig 
van de 73 (91.8%) Nederlandse ERCP-centra hebben aan onze studie meegedaan, en 
155 duodenoscopen zijn geïncludeerd. Drieëndertig duodenoscopen (22%) waren ge-
contamineerd, waarvan 23 (15%) met darmflora. Het maakte niet uit van welke fabrikant 
de duodenoscoop was, contaminatie was evenredig verdeeld over alle 3. De resultaten 
van deze studie laten zien dat de huidige reinigings- en desinfectie procedures niet ade-
quaat en veilig zijn, waarvoor een oplossing nodig is. Een mogelijke oplossing zou het 
aanpassen van het design van de duodenoscoop zijn, zodanig dat adequate reiniging 
en desinfectie wel mogelijk is. Helaas is dit geen korte termijn oplossing aangezien het 
ontwerpen en introduceren van een nieuwe duodenoscoop een langdurig traject is.
Hoofdstuk 3.3 beschrijft een uitbraak veroorzaakt door Clostridium difficile. C. difficile 
bevindt zich in de darmen, en kan ernstige diarree en darmontstekingen veroorzaken. 
De C. difficile welke deze uitbraak veroorzaakte was hypervirulent, en het bleek boven-
dien te gaan om een nieuw type. Bij de uitbraak waren 5 patiënten betrokken. Door 
het combineren van epidemiologische gegevens en moleculaire typeringsuitslagen kon 
transmissie worden vastgesteld; maar helaas werd geen bron in de omgeving ontdekt. 
De ontdekking en bevestiging van het plaatsvinden van deze uitbraak laat zien dat 
(landelijke) surveillance van dit micro-organisme nodig is; dit om nieuwe types met een 
mogelijke verhoogde virulentie tijdig op te sporen.
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zoRggeRelATeeRde ziekTeVeRwekkeRs: HeT deTeCTeRen VAn 
oVeRdRACHT
Omdat het voorkomen van BRMO steeds meer toeneemt en daardoor ook uitbraken in 
ziekenhuizen door BRMO neemt de behoefte aan goede typeertechnieken toe. Mole-
culaire typeertechnieken helpen om patiënten geïdentificeerd met dezelfde bacterie 
te differentiëren in verschillende clusters, en zijn daardoor belangrijke tools in infectie-
preventie. Er bestaan veel verschillende typeertechnieken, elk met voor- en nadelen. 
De keuze welke typeertechniek te gebruiken hangt af van veel factoren, bijvoorbeeld: 
(i) welk micro-organisme moet getypeerd worden, (ii) is er haast bij of niet, (iii) hoeveel 
patiënten zijn er betrokken over een periode van hoeveel maanden/jaren, (iv) wat kost 
de typeertechniek en (v) welke technieken en kennis over de technieken is er beschik-
baar binnen een instelling. In hoofdstuk 4.1 en 4.2 hebben we de toen nieuwe, snelle, 
veelbelovende fenotypische typeertechniek Raman spectroscopy, welke gebruik maakt 
van SpectraCellRA analysis (RiverD International B.V., Rotterdam), bestudeerd met als 
doel gegevens te verkrijgen om te bepalen of deze techniek in de routine diagnostiek 
van het Erasmus MC geïmplementeerd zou moeten worden.
In hoofdstuk 4.1 hebben we over een periode van 43 maanden 132 patiënten 
geïdentificeerd met ESBL-producerende Klebsiella pneumoniae en Klebsiella oxytoca ge-
includeerd, en isolaten getypeerd met behulp van Raman spectroscopy. In deze studie 
ontwikkelden wij ook definities om te bepalen of patiënten epidemiologisch gerelateerd 
waren; gerelateerd in plaats en tijd (Tabel 1). Wij hebben deze definities ontwikkeld 
omdat de definities die beschikbaar zijn in wetenschappelijke literatuur of bij instanties 
zoals de Centers for Disease Control and prevention (CDC) niet specifiek genoeg zijn. 
Dit omdat de definitie “gerelateerd in plaats en tijd” niets zegt over of dit alleen kamer-
genoten moeten zijn of ook afdelingsgenoten, en of alleen patiënten opgenomen ten 
tijde van de opname van de case meegerekend moeten worden of ook patiënten die 
een paar dagen eerder op dezelfde kamer lagen. De definities ontwikkeld tijdens het 
uitvoeren van deze studie hebben wij ook toegepast in hoofdstuk 4.2 en in hoofdstuk 
3.1. Door middel van de typeertechniek konden we vaststellen dat 73 van de 132 pati-











Dezelfde patiëntkamer 1 1 0 0 0
Dezelfde afdeling 1 1 1 1 0
Dezelfde tijdsperiode 1 0a 1 0a 0a/0/1
0= nee; 1= ja, 0a= <3 maanden nadat de vorige positieve patiënt was ontslagen. 1De definitie ‘definitief ge-
relateerd’ was niet mogelijk op de intensive care, dit omdat daar alleen maar eenpersoonskamers aanwezig 
waren.
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enten verdeeld waren over 17 clusters en 59 patiënten een uniek isolaat hadden. Door 
het toepassen van de definities in tabel 1 bleken patiënten in 2 clusters definitief aan 
elkaar gerelateerd te zijn, in 6 clusters was het een mix van waarschijnlijk, mogelijk en 
onmogelijk en in 7 clusters waren patiënten epidemiologisch onmogelijk aan elkaar ge-
relateerd. Alle eerste patiënten in de tijd in een cluster noemden wij primaire patiënten, 
in dit geval waren dit er dus 17. Alle opvolgende patiënten in de tijd in clusters noem-
den wij secundaire patiënten in ons geval waren dit 56 patiënten. Bij identificatie van 
een cluster (2 patiënten of meer) zouden extra infectiepreventie maatregelen kunnen 
worden ingezet waardoor verspreiding van de bacterie naar meer secundaire patiënten 
voorkomen zou kunnen worden. Deze maatregelen zouden grondige reiniging en 
desinfectie van patiëntkamers en sanitair, en het uitbreiden van een contactonderzoek 
kunnen inhouden. In theorie, bij het routinematig inzetten van Raman spectroscopy 
zou het dus mogelijk zijn om kolonisaties en infecties bij patiënten te voorkomen. Deze 
studie laat zien dat transmissie plaatsvindt, ook in een schijnbaar niet-uitbraak situatie. 
Wij concluderen dat het routinematig typeren van BRMO nodig is.
Door het hoge percentage van dragers van 1 specifieke ESBL-producerende Esche-
richia coli (i.e. sequence type 131) buiten het ziekenhuis is het lastig om door middel 
van typeertechnieken verschillende clusters te ontdekken. Dit is de reden waarom 
wij in hoofdstuk 4.2 hebben onderzocht of de combinatie van typeertechnieken 
High-throughput MultiLocus Sequence Typing (HiMLST) en Raman spectroscopy meer 
inzicht zou geven in recente overdracht van ESBL-producerende E. coli in het Erasmus 
MC. Overdracht werd gedefinieerd volgens de definities in tabel 1. Wij includeerden 194 
patiënten met een ESBL-producerende E. coli. Alleen gebruik makend van Raman spec-
troscopy resulteerde in 16 clusters, en alleen gebruik makend van HiMLST resulteerde in 
10 clusters. Maar, patiënten binnen zowel de Raman spectroscopy als de HiMLST clusters 
waren niet epidemiologisch gerelateerd. Een combinatie van beide technieken leverde 
8 clusters op, maar ook in deze 8 clusters waren patiënten niet epidemiologisch gere-
lateerd. Wij concludeerden dat ondanks dat er clusters werden geïdentificeerd door de 
verschillende typeertechnieken, of een combinatie van beiden, geen epidemiologische 
relaties werden gevonden. Wij concludeerden dat in het Erasmus MC het routinematig 
typeren van ESBL-producerende E. coli niet zinvol is met zowel HiMLST als Raman spec-
troscopy.
Raman spectroscopy had voordelen en nadelen en is tijdelijk geïmplementeerd 
geweest in de routine diagnostiek van het Erasmus MC voor specifieke resistente bacte-




De in dit proefschrift beschreven studies geven aanleiding tot vervolgonderzoek. De 
3 studies in hoofdstuk 2 over het onderwerp identificeren en beschrijven van risico-
factoren voor het verkrijgen van zorggerelateerde ziekteverwekkers laten zien dat 
vervolgonderzoek moet worden gedaan naar: (i) het ontwikkelen van nieuwe antibiotica 
en het ontwikkelen van nieuwe therapeutische strategieën, (ii) het ontwikkelen van een 
wasbak speciaal voor gebruik in het ziekenhuis, (iii) het effect van eenpersoonskamers 
op overdracht van BRMO, en (iv) de kosteneffectiviteit van alle preventiestrategieën op 
dit moment geïmplementeerd in ziekenhuizen.
De drie studies in hoofdstuk 3 over het onderwerp bronnen en overdracht van zorg-
gerelateerde ziekteverwekkers laten zien dat wat betreft VIM-positieve P. aeruginosa 
meer onderzoek moet worden gedaan naar: (i) het beste middel om de omgeving mee 
schoon te maken en te desinfecteren, (ii) het gebruik van SDD in combinatie met het 
voorkomen van VIM-positieve P. aeruginosa, en (iii) de prevalentie van contaminatie van 
gastroscopen. Wat betreft gecontamineerde duodenoscopen kan vervolgonderzoek 
worden gedaan naar: (i) het effect van factoren welke niet zijn meegenomen in de hui-
dige studie, zoals het tijdscomponent en leeftijd van de duodenoscoop (i.e. in jaren oud 
en in het aantal en soort uitgevoerde procedures), (ii) het ontwikkelen van nieuwe rei-
niging en desinfectie methodes, en (iii) het uitvoeren van een prospectief longitudinale 
studie in plaats van een cross-sectioneel onderzoek. Het onderzoek naar C. difficile laat 
zien dat de database op dit moment beschikbaar in Nederland met alle verschillende 
types geïdentificeerd in Nederland kan helpen om snel het probleem vast te kunnen 
stellen. Maar, een dergelijke database van C. difficile geïdentificeerd in dieren ontbreekt. 
We hopen dat een dergelijke database in de toekomst wel beschikbaar zal zijn.
De 2 studies in hoofdstuk 4 over het onderwerp het detecteren van overdracht 
van zorggerelateerde ziekteverwekkers laten zien dat het belangrijk is om nieuwe 
typeermethodes te blijven evalueren; dit omdat het snel identificeren van een uitbraak 
essentieel is voor effectieve en efficiënte infectiepreventie. Ook kan naar de volgende 
onderwerpen vervolgonderzoek gedaan worden: (i) omdat het belangrijk is om zo veel 
mogelijk patiënten met het micro-organisme waarin je geïnteresseerd bent te identi-
ficeren, zou deze studie herhaald kunnen worden in een setting waar opnamekweken 
bij patiënten worden afgenomen. Hierbij wordt de kans op het ontbreken van scha-
kels tussen patiënten kleiner. (ii) Wij hebben nu alleen ESBL-positieve K. pneumoniae, 
ESBL-positieve K. oxytoca en ESBL-positieve E. coli geëvalueerd. In toekomstige studies 
zouden ook andere BRMO onderzocht kunnen worden. (iii) Om overdracht van micro-
organismen tussen patiënten nog beter te begrijpen, zou het zinvol zijn niet alleen te 
kijken naar patiëntbewegingen binnen 1 ziekenhuis, maar ook te kijken naar overplaat-
singen naar bijvoorbeeld andere ziekenhuizen, verpleeghuizen en revalidatieklinieken.
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Promoveren doe je vaak maar één keer in je leven. Dit is ook de reden dat het alleen 
doen niet gaat en je discussies, feedback, sparren, een steuntje in de rug, een schouder-
klopje, het er even niet over hebben, en soms een beetje afleiding heel hard nodig hebt. 
Daarom wil ik in het bijzonder onderstaande personen die mij hebben begeleid, onder-
steund, gesteund en geholpen hebben de afgelopen jaren heel hartelijk danken. Ik ben 
dankbaar en trots dat ik mijn promotietraject met deze mensen heb mogen doorlopen.
Prof.dr. Vos, beste Greet, als promotor en supervisor ben je altijd nauw betrokken bij al 
mijn projecten. Je bent gedreven, betrokken, volhardend en een echte doorzetter. Ik 
heb heel veel van je geleerd, en leer nog dagelijks bij. Hartelijk dank voor de ruimte en 
het vertrouwen om mijn eigen ideeën in te brengen en ook uit te voeren. Ik hoop in de 
toekomst nog veel van je te mogen leren en nog lang met je te mogen samenwerken.
Dr. Severin, beste Juliëtte, als co-promotor en supervisor hebben we veel samengewerkt. 
Niet alleen wat betreft de inhoud van dit proefschrift, maar ook over UNIP gerelateerde 
zaken. Je bent een echte multitasker en onwijs goed geïnformeerd. Ondanks de werk-
druk kon je voor mij altijd ruimte maken. Ik hoop ook van jou nog veel te mogen leren 
en nog lang met je te mogen samenwerken.
Graag wil ik de leden van de kleine commissie Prof.dr. Bruno, Prof.dr. Gommers en Prof.
dr. Vandenbroucke-Grauls en de leden van de grote commissie hartelijk bedanken voor 
de kritische beoordeling van mijn proefschrift en de bereidheid om plaats te nemen in 
de kleine en/of grote commissie.
Drs. van Dijk, drs. van der Schoor, beste Manon en Anja; mijn paranimfen. Wat ben ik blij 
dat jullie als mede gezondheidswetenschappers/epidemiologen ons team zijn komen 
versterken. Het is ontzettend fijn met jullie te kunnen sparren en samen onderzoeken uit 
te voeren en te analyseren. En het is ook nog eens ontzettend gezellig.
Dr. Verkaik en Dr. Bode, Beste Nelianne en Lonneke, hartelijk dank voor jullie kritische 
houding, betrokkenheid en samenwerking de afgelopen periode.
Beste Ad, ik wil je hartelijk bedanken voor je vriendelijkheid, betrokkenheid en behu-
lpzaamheid. Er is niets waarmee ik niet bij jou terecht kon.
Beste ICT team Marius, Arjen en Conrad; wat had ik zonder jullie gemoeten! Nou, niks, 
want dan was dit boekje er niet geweest. Ik kom graag nog eens jullie koffiezetapparaat 
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en toetsenborden schoonmaken en zal proberen het aantal mailtjes dat ik stuur tot een 
minimum te beperken.
Beste DIPpers Mieke, Wim, Ron, Diana, Willeke, Inge, Heidy, Marissa en Jitske; DIPs-in-
opleiding Lia en Rachel; assistenten DIP Lara, Joyce, Sandra, Greet en Astrid; en alle oud 
Erasmus MC DIPpers die afgelopen jaren naar andere ziekenhuizen zijn uitgevlogen: 
eigenwijs zijn jullie zeker, punt. Hartelijk dank voor de prettige samenwerking, hopelijk 
blijven we dit nog heel wat jaren doen.
Beste Greet de Jonge-Joustra, hartelijk dank voor alle moeite om maar afspraken in de 
agenda van Greet Vos te plannen. Het was niet altijd makkelijk, maar we hadden vaak 
geluk!
Dr. Klaassen, beste Corné, dank voor je samenwerking en het uitleggen van moleculaire 
technieken en diagnostiek. Ik kan nog steeds ontzettend veel van je leren. Alle analisten; 
in het bijzonder Willemien van de MODI, hartelijk dank voor jullie hulp!
Dr. Herrewegh, beste Arnold, mijn mede adviseur onderzoek. Zelfde functie, maar een 
totaal andere invulling. Ook al hoefde ik bij jou geen urenbriefjes in te leveren liep ik 
toch vaak bij je binnen. Dank voor het meedenken met subsidieaanvragen.
Beste stagiaires Marijke, Alina, Tirza, Erik, Laura, Danique, Wida, Margot, Karlijn, Oguz en 
Mehjabeen. Hopelijk hebben jullie iets van mij kunnen leren, weet dat ik ook ontzettend 
veel van jullie heb geleerd.
Beste Marian, Femke en Simone van het secretariaat; bedankt dat ik bij vragen altijd op 
jullie deur kon kloppen.
Beste Na-902 (ex-)kamergenoten: Hessel, Joëll, Michiel, Dr. Sylvie, Dr. Gerjo, Jannette, 
Dr. Wendy, Rixt, Elise, Hassna, Ramzy, Nikolas, Valérie, Gerdie, Dr. Bas, Dr. Iain, Dr. Astrid, 
Maarten, Dr. Suzanne, Wilson, Stefan, Mirjam, Bertrand, Chinmoy, Manon, Anja en Dr. 
Sanne. Vaak hebben we plattegronden zitten maken over hoeveel OIOs en postdocs er 
in 1 ruimte kunnen passen. Af en toe een ontzettend kippenhok, maar vaak ook doodse 
stilte en opperste concentratie met rammelende toetsenborden. Zelf denk ik dat met 15 
bureaus de tent aardig vol zit, of we moeten er een verdieping in gaan maken inclusief 
trap.
Beste Arjan, officieel een halve MMIZ OIO, dank voor je bezoekjes en leuke discussies.
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Verder wil ik alle andere stafleden en medewerkers van de afdeling medische microbi-
ologie en infectieziekten hartelijk danken. Met veel al samengewerkt, en met anderen 
wellicht in de toekomst.
Familie, bedankt!
Lieve Manon & Aarnout; bedankt voor de thee, de gesprekken, en de Veluwse nuchter-
heid; dit had ik af en toe echt nodig.
Lieve Loes & Bart; dank voor jullie vriendschap!
Lieve Leon, Wietske, Anouk en Tessa; bedankt voor alle play-dates, een luisterend oor en 
gezelligheid.
Lieve Oma Fenny; mijn voorbeeld. Dank voor je wijsheid, kijk op het leven, en betrokken-
heid bij mij en mijn gezin.
Lieve ouders, Roel en Joke, broer Jurriën en lieve schoonfamilie, Tom, Ria, en schoonzus 
Dieuwke & vriend Rasmus, dank dat jullie er voor mij waren.
Lieve Rick, heel veel pizza-avonden en discussies over wie van ons nu het slimste is. Na 
vandaag win ik. Met jou wil ik oud en grijs worden, in ons droomhuis, met een tuin voor 
onze appelboom, en een paar kipjes. Lieve Emma en Diederick en de kleine baby in mijn 
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